Disputes over the formation of a new Iraqi government are going from bad to worse, writes Salah Hemeid Efforts to form a new Iraqi government received a new setback this week when the main Sunni coalition said it would not back a Shia-led government formed by caretaker Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki. The move comes after reports that the two main Shia political groups are close to an agreement that will allow the incumbent premier to form the new government, seven months after the country's inconclusive elections. The Al-Iraqiya List, led by former Shia prime minister Iyad Allawi, said that it had severed talks with Al-Maliki's State of Law Coalition (SLC) on forming the new government and announced it might support his Shia rival, Iraqi vice-president Adel Abdel-Mehdi. Some Al-Iraqiya leaders threatened to deny recognition of any government formed by the SLC and its allies in the Iraqi National Alliance (INA), the Iraqi National Coalition led by pro-Iranian cleric Ammar Al-Hakim. "Any government led by Al-Maliki will not be in the interests of the Iraqi people, and Al-Iraqiya will not participate in it regardless of the consequences," said Haidar Al-Mullah after the group's leadership meeting on Friday. Al-Maliki, however, dismissed the move as "only representing the position of the extremist wing of the List." "We will continue our dialogue with Al-Iraqiya in order to reach an understanding that serves all parties and forms a national all-inclusive government," he said in a statement. Al-Iraqiya reacted sharply and accused Al-Maliki of attempting to undermine the List by trying to drive a wedge between its different component groups. One of its leaders, Jamal Al-Bateekh, said the decision to leave the negotiations on the new government was taken unanimously. Al-Iraqiya won 91 seats in the 7 March elections, beating Al-Maliki's bloc by two seats. To form a government, a 163-seat majority of the 325 seats in parliament is needed, but neither bloc has yet been able to form a governing coalition. However, Al-Iraqiya's present disenchantment seems to have been prompted by news that the main groups in the Shia Iraqi National Alliance are nearing an agreement to pick a nominee for the premiership who will deprive it of the job. The reports were sparked by a statement by Ayatollah Kadhum Al-Haerri, who urged the two main Shia factions to speed up efforts to form the new government. "Faithful politicians must take the initiative to unify their stance, close their ranks and speed up the choice of a prime minister among those who are efficient and capable of administering the [state's] affairs," Al-Haerri said. "They must not ignore the wishes of the electorate, which they are indebted to uphold," he said in a statement posted on his website. "Be sensible, carry out your duties and stop the deceit and conspiracies that weaken all of you," Al-Haerri warned in his statement, which amounts to a fatwa, or religious edict. Al-Haerri is a senior Shia cleric of Iranian origin who lived with his family in Iraq before being deported by Saddam Hussein in the 1970s because of his links to Al-Maliki's Daawa Party. His religious views are widely followed by many Iraqi Shias, especially followers of cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr, who controls the Sadrist Trend. Following Al-Haerri's statement, the Sadrist Trend, which has 40 seats in the new parliament and is a key partner in the INA, said it might be willing to drop its veto against Al-Maliki and back his nomination. Al-Iraqiya's angry reaction comes after Syria and Iraq agreed to restore ambassadors to each other's capitals, marking an improvement in ties that could help end Iraq's lingering political crisis. Iraq withdrew its ambassador from Syria in August last year after Al-Maliki accused Damascus of sheltering people he said were behind bomb attacks in Baghdad. Since then, Damascus has shunned Al-Maliki and expressed implicit support for Al-Iraqiya and its leader Allawi, who is believed to have the backing of Iraq's Sunni Arab neighbours and Turkey. However, many observers believe the reinstatement of the two countries' ambassadors could be due to a different explanation. Damascus's sudden change of heart followed a visit to the city by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on 18 September, they note, to discuss the crisis in Iraq with Syrian counterpart Bashar Al-Assad. Al-Assad has also met with several of Al-Maliki's aides, signalling a thaw in relations between the two men. Having the backing of both Iran and Syria, two regional power- brokers with stakes in who rules Iraq, could boost Al-Maliki's chances of forming a government. Nevertheless, whether Al-Maliki can muster enough internal support to form a new government is still in doubt, even if the Sadrists will give him their backing under Iranian pressure. Al-Hakim's Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (SIIC), the backbone of the Shia alliance, has remained adamant in its rejection of Al-Maliki. On Monday Al-Hakim did not send a representative to a meeting of the Iraqi National Coalition scheduled to select Al-Maliki as the bloc's candidate for the post of premier. Instead, he met with leaders of Al-Iraqiya to discuss the possibility of forming a coalition and driving Al-Maliki out of the race. Without the support of the SIIC's 15 members in parliament Al-Maliki might not be able to present a strong Shia coalition that would persuade the Kurds to join in forming a new government. The Iraqi National Alliance has a total of 159 seats in the 325-seat parliament, four short of the majority required to form the government, making it dependant on the Kurds, who have some 50 seats. Observers are sceptical that members of the Shia alliance will manage to put their differences aside and agree on a single candidate. Whether a new Iraqi government will in fact be able to function also depends largely on including Sunnis in the next administration, and a further question is whether Al-Iraqiya will agree to join a government from which the Sunnis feel they have been marginalised. Al-Maliki has tried to divide Al-Iraqiya by signalling to its leaders that he would offer them significant posts in his administration and some other concessions, including a larger say in security matters and in the decision-making process. So far, Al-Iraqiya leaders have not budged and have resisted such temptations, even showing their ability to drag out, delay or sabotage efforts to form a new government. They have also warned that if they are left out in the cold they might boycott the entire political process, denying it national consensus and legitimacy. While Iran and Syria could act to influence the process, it remains to be seen what Iraq's other neighbours will do. Saudi Arabia, which wields tremendous influence among Iraqi Sunnis and is believed to have strong objections to Al-Maliki, does not seem willing to accept him as the head of Iraq's next government. The likelihood of Al-Maliki forming a government without Al-Hakim's support and Sunni participation means that the country's transition is in danger of going further awry, further weakening the already perilously weak state. If a cabinet emerges without Sunni participation, it will be too fragile to steer the country through the conflicting interests of the country's rival sectarian and ethnic groups.
