The Arabs could learn much from watching Iran, Turkey and Russia play their cards in the struggle for influence and power in the Caucasus, writes Mustafa El-Labbad* Iran and Turkey are locked in a neck-to-neck contest over regional roles not only in the Middle East but in the Caucasus as well. An analysis of the dynamics of their rivalry in that region is important from the Arab perspective, as it sheds light on the means and tactics, and skills and resources that they bring to bear on their contest in this region. This applies all the more so in view of the resemblance between the ways the two powers conduct their rivalries in the two regions. In both areas, they steer well clear of direct military involvement and, instead, build networks of alliances through which they can extend and consolidate their regional presence. A second common denominator is the involvement of a third and senior party in the business of policy design and role assignation: the US in the Middle East and Russia in the Caucasus. The Caucasus -- the crossroads between Europe, Asia and the Middle East -- consists of two major political regions. The southern Caucasus consists of the three fully independent republics of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. The northern Caucasus, by contrast, is located entirely within the borders of the Russian Federation and is made up of the autonomous republics of Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan, Adyghea, Kabardino- Balkaria, Karachai-Cherkessia, North Ossetia, Krasnodar Krai and Stavropol Krai. As Russia has long since established its dominant influence in North Caucasus, Iran and Turkey remain uninvolved in whatever tensions that erupt there. It is, therefore, to the South Caucasus that we must turn to examine the Russian- Turkish-Iranian regional rivalry since the emergence of the three independent republics there following the break-up of the Soviet Union. Geographical and historical factors combine to establish the influence of the three powers in the Caucasus. Not only do Iran, Turkey and Russia form the region's natural boundaries, but the Persian, Ottoman and Russian empires have had long histories of control over it. One could say that for three centuries, at least, the Caucasus has been the thermometer for gauging power balances in the Iranian-Turkish- Russian triangle. Caught in the middle, the small, relatively sparsely populated and weaker republics are ultimately dependent for their survival upon their alliances with one of the three powers. We find, therefore, that since its independence from the former Soviet Union, Azerbaijan has allied with linguistically, ethnically and culturally similar Turkey, while Armenia allied first with Russia and more recently with Iran. Although Georgia has attempted to cast its sights further afield, forging ties with the West in general, and the US in particular, it failed to escape the Russian grip, to which testify the events of summer 2008. The alliances between the three regional powers and the Caucasian countries are as intricate as the Caucasian terrain and linguistic/ethnic make-up. The conflict in the early 1990s between Armenia and Azerbaijan, leading to Armenia's occupation of the Azerbaijani province of Nagorno-Karabakh, exemplifies the ironies. Although Iran and Azerbaijan share a common Shia Muslim bond, Tehran sided with Christian Armenia because of Azerbaijan's alliance with its regional adversary Turkey. Similarly, predominantly Christian Georgia has maintained warm relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey, and relatively cool relations with Armenia. As these examples indicate, political-strategic considerations override religious and sectarian allegiances in the patterns of alliances. And these same patterns repeated themselves since the mid-1990s whenever the three southern Caucasian republics quarrelled. Most recently, Obama's visit to Turkey marked the official opening of a more proactive phase in Turkey's policies towards its neighbouring areas, even if it began around a year ago. Turkey is currently involved in intensive negotiations with neighbouring Armenia over normalising relations between them. Reopening the common border between the two countries, closed since the mid-1990s, will facilitate Turkey's land access to Azerbaijan and Central Asia, while Armenia will have greater land access to Europe. Also, the planned Nabucco pipeline for transporting natural gas from the Caspian Sea through Turkey to the EU would be able to pass through Armenia, which would give the latter a much needed boost to its strategic value and chronically suffering economy. In terms of pure interests, therefore, there is nothing to stand in the way of normalisation. However, several impediments continue to hamper the prospect of Armenia changing its pattern of alliances. Prime among them is the history of the hundreds of thousands of Armenian civilians who were killed or died in forced marches in 1915. Whereas Yerevan insists that Ankara officially recognise the Armenian "genocide" at the hands of Turkish forces, Ankara refuses to go so far. While expressing its deep regret over these events, Ankara maintains that this was wartime and that it was not a one-sided affair. Another major sticking point in Turkish-Armenian negotiations is Armenia's occupation of the Azerbaijani area of Nagorno-Karabakh. As long as this problem remains unresolved, the common linguistic, cultural and ethnic bonds between Turkey and Azerbaijan will impede normalisation between Ankara and Yerevan. Moscow has been keeping a close eye on the Turkish-Armenian negotiations. Their success would usher in the Nabucco pipeline, which would break Moscow's monopoly with regards to the overland flow of energy supplies to Europe. In addition, with the Armenian barrier removed, Turkish influence in the Caucasus would outstrip that of its Russian and Iranian rivals, as Ankara would be on good terms with all three South Caucasus republics, in contrast to Russia's and Iran's good relations with only one of them, Armenia. Iran, for its part, has little to offer to dissuade Yerevan from moving ahead in its negotiations with Ankara. It certainly cannot vie with either Moscow or Ankara in offers of military or economic aid. The most it has been able to do, so far, is to supply Armenia with cheap energy in exchange for Armenia's support against Azerbaijan, which has voiced territorial claims to northwest Iran, which Baku refers to as "South Azerbaijan". Azerbaijan fears that Ankara is preparing to sell it out on the question of the return of Armenian occupied Nagorno-Karabakh, which has not been made a point in the Turkish-Armenian negotiations. Capitalising on Baku's dismay, Russia invited Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev to Moscow for talks. That Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdogan subsequently asked to attend that meeting as well may mean that Moscow could regain control over the pace and direction of developments in that region. It is hardly surprising therefore that Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan should choose precisely this time for a visit to Iran in order to meet with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani and National Security Adviser Said Jalili. If the Armenian move was motivated by shifting balances in the Caucasus, Tehran needs to maintain a broader perspective. Above all, it would refrain from doing anything that might jeopardise its strategic relations with Moscow merely in order to placate Armenia, as important as the latter is to Tehran in the Caucasus region. Given this plus the abovementioned fact that Tehran has little more to offer Yerevan beyond cheap energy supplies, the current round of Armenian-Iranian talks will lead to nothing. The Iranian-Turkish-Russian interplay in the Caucasus is instructive on the dynamics of international power politics. It teaches us, above all, that national interests prevail over ideology and sectarian or ethnic allegiances in the forging or dissolution of bilateral alliances. We learn, secondly, that the primary tools that the three regional powers bring to bear in their rivalries are diversification and consolidation of alliances through the creation of new and concrete areas of economic and strategic common interest, as opposed to the bluster and bravado that blares across the airwaves in our part of the world. As the balances of power currently stand in the Caucasus, Russia leads, with Turkey edging closer in second and Iran in third place. However, against that shifting background we learn, thirdly, that the hierarchy of regional power status does not change from one day to the next and that what it takes to change them is a long and complex process in which economic, political and strategic assets are deployed realistically, rationally and resolutely. * The writer is director of Al-Sharq Centre for Regional and Strategic Studies.
