Strife is one of the most ambiguous political concepts, and potentially lethal for countries and peoples, writes Abdel-Moneim Said Revolutions -- whether turbulent and bloody or peaceful and velvet -- occur when the majority of a people decides to forge a radically different future for itself. Revolt normally involves a dissenting minority whose actions may either jolt a society into awareness and sympathy or stir general censure and condemnation. In either case, it is normally a short-lived phenomenon. Civil disobedience is a form of protest that can be politically and socially divisive to varying degrees, but it is driven by a clear logic with explicit ends. Strife, on the other hand, is something else entirely. It is a kind of political fomentation that may or may not border on anarchy, depending on the political maturity of society and the ability of its existing institutions to handle change. Its most salient trait is that it is always morally and factually hazy. It is, too, a process that can spiral. First, an initial dispute drives a wedge through society, then parties within opposing camps find themselves at loggerheads over whether the costs of turmoil were worth the initial ends and they, in turn, split into opposing camps, and so on. At any point during this fragmentation people may be mobilised over the latest cause of sedition in what has effectively become a complex network of seditions. In Islamic history what became known as the Great Upheaval was triggered by the assassination of the third Caliph, Othman Bin Affan, and the ensuing dispute over his successor. The contest between the supporters of Ali Ibn Abi Taleb and Muawiya Ibn Abi Sufyan escalated into the nascent Islamic empire's first civil war, inscribing the concept of fitna (strife) on its political lore. But the process did not stop there. Dissension and confusion spread until it was no longer possible to identify which side was right and which was wrong. Although the parties appealed to arbitration, the rulings led to the emergence of the Khawarij, the Shia and other dissenting factions that soon began to wage war on one another. Anyone who imagines that such sedition ended 14 centuries ago is mistaken. In recent years, it has been reproduced in Iraq, a major venue for the first upheaval. Perhaps the chief difference between then and now is that in the remote past the victims numbered in the tens of thousands whereas today they can be counted in the hundreds of thousands, and still there is no end in sight to the fighting. Throughout history cases of sedition and civil strife have shared common features. They began as a dispute over a political issue of some sort, but this issue was subsumed under, and overshadowed by, an ideological dispute. The latter was of absolutist nature -- each side believing it was categorically right and its opponents categorically wrong. Frequently the dispute donned a religious guise, constructed and perpetuated as a means to fire popular zeal, mobilise support and inspire a spirit of self-sacrifice. Paradoxically, in accomplishing these ends, the leaders of the various camps become prisoners of their own rhetoric, eventually finding themselves at the mercy of the groups they sought to lead. Wisdom and foresight cannot survive such a dynamic. Nor can other political and moral virtues. Moderation and modesty, the pursuit of the higher common welfare, flexibility and the willingness to compromise and, above all, tolerance, fall by the wayside. These political and ethical values have preoccupied political philosophers from Plato to Fukuyama (if the former focused on moderation the latter homed in on trust). Not only did the dissemination of such values act as a safeguard against strife, so too did the creation and spread of institutions and mechanisms for combating strife and killing it in the bud. And here, I believe, is the factor that has always set Egypt apart from other countries in the region. Whether the secret of this lies in the riparian nature of the country or in other factors, Egypt has always been resistant to strife and abhors those who seek to ignite it. The modern Egyptian state has developed many mechanisms, institutionalised and conceptual, for contending with various sources of strife. What we must ask ourselves is whether they remain sufficiently strong to fulfil their task. At present there are several potential sources of strife at work in the country. Some might be more dangerous than others, but all compel us not only to denounce those who fan the flames but to ensure that we have the proper fire-fighting tools. There are two reasons why we need to devote extra attention to this matter. The first is the media, which is riding the IT revolution with an unprecedented proliferation of satellite and electronic communications. If hearsay and rumour, obfuscation and fabrication, are the ABC of sedition, its practitioners now have ready access to one of the rapidest means for sparking wildfires. The second, related reason, is that it is no longer possible to draw a line between local and foreign sources of sedition. Issues that once fell clearly within the realm of domestic affairs are now components of global policies promoted by international agencies and, as often as not, viewed as sufficient grounds for international intervention. One of the most potentially explosive sources of strife in Egypt today is sectarian sedition. From time to time Egypt experiences flare-ups between Muslims and Copts. What is noteworthy is how such sporadic, but still isolated incidents, have led to contentious outbursts by religious intellectuals and officials and how religious officials and institutions are rising to face this challenge. Two recent examples are the outcry stirred by Mohamed Selim Al-Awwa, president of the Egyptian Society for Culture and Dialogue, during an interview on a satellite television programme on 16 September, and the no less heated controversy stirred by remarks attributed to Father Bishoi, Secretary of the Coptic Church's Holy Synod and Bishop of Damietta and Kafr Al-Sheikh. In both cases attempts to contain the crisis were not only immediate and concerted but constructive and effective. The Islamic Research Academy issued a statement declaring, "we are monitoring such irresponsible behaviour out of our concern for the security of the nation, inclusive of both its Muslims and Christians, in the hope of safeguarding national security and in order to counter the strife that could be stirred by such behaviour which threatens national security and stability." The statement went on to confirm that Egypt is an Islamic state by virtue of its constitution, which forms the social contract of its people. "Accordingly, the rights of citizenship, which the prophet taught us by means of his pledge to the Christians of Najran and in which he determined that they shall have the same rights and duties as Muslims, are conditional upon respect for the Islamic identity and the rights of citizenship stipulated in the constitution." Pope Shenouda endorsed the Al-Azhar body's plea to Egyptian Muslim and Christian intellectuals to draw a red line under the discussion of religious beliefs. He also expressed his regrets for the misunderstanding Bishoi caused and the Muslim sensitivities he had wounded. "The love between Copts and Muslims will not tolerate division, especially over matters of religion," he said. Bishoi, for his part, declared: "Since my duty is to ensure the safety of the Muslims and Christians of this nation and to safeguard national unity, I proclaim that I have always stood against the defamation of religions and their symbols, particularly Islam, because Muslims are fellow citizens in our nation." The second major source of strife is political in nature. Right now, its aim is to foment havoc ahead of crucial political landmarks, from the People's Assembly elections in November to the presidential elections next year. The most salient sign of the workings of seditious forces is the call to boycott the forthcoming legislative elections. The bid, however, has clearly failed to rally a significant following. On 17 September the Wafd Party announced that it would take part in the elections. The announcement followed a vote during a meeting of the party's general assembly, which approved the decision with 504 in favour against 407 against. The Nasserist Party also took practical steps in favour of participation. It revealed an initial list of 55 candidates, six of whom are women, who will contest seats in 24 governorates. A third source of strife, ironically, has its origins in the system of government, which is presumed to be founded on a balance between the powers and functions of its legislative, judicial and executive branches. Several articles of the Egyptian constitution provide for the autonomy of the judiciary. While these provisions were designed with an eye to protecting the judiciary from executive intervention, recent events testify to a completely new and unexpected development: the encroachment of the judiciary into the realm of the executive. There have been increasing instances of the courts assuming powers that fall squarely under the jurisdiction of the executive. Setting minimum wage levels, for example, is a purely economic matter related to the labour market and opportunities for economic growth. The question of exporting gas to Israel falls under "sovereign powers" of which the conduct of foreign relations is one, as was eventually confirmed by the Supreme Administrative Court. But it is not so much the rulings that should concern us here. With all due respect to the courts that issued them, the judiciary's attempts to exercise such powers throws government into a state of apprehension and confusion. The effect of this permeates through the whole of society, stirring suspicion and doubt, which is always the first step toward strife. Egypt's record in dealing with all sources of strife has, by and large, been positive. However, the question remains as to whether existing mechanisms are sufficient to keep the threats from getting out of hand.
