The ICC will rule on an important but little known issue soon, which could decide the fate of this troubled nation, says Asmaa El-Husseini Once again the attention of the Sudanese is turned towards The Hague. It is as if their very destiny is connected to this city so far from their own country, continent and reality. This time the matter is not about the International Criminal Court (ICC), which issued a decision last March to arrest Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir, still a complex issue in Sudan. The Sudanese are turned towards The Hague, with their hands over their hearts in fear, facing a different court, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague. This court took up the Abyei case, disputed by northern and southern Sudan, after Sudan failed to find its own solution. The importance of the Abyei area is that it is rich in oil, natural gas, minerals and water. With a total area of 25,000 square kilometres, it does not exceed one per cent of the area of Sudan as a whole. It makes up only three per cent of the area of the south, where about two-thirds of Sudan's oil fields are located. Abyei extends geographically to Bahr El-Ghazal in southern Sudan; however, the administration of the area falls to Kordofan and the leaders are chosen from the southern population. Abyei has historically been an area of overlap between two tribes: the Arab Misariyah and the southern Dinka Ngok tribes. After the Permanent Court of Arbitration made its long-awaited decision on Wednesday, the pace of preparations in Abyei and its four surrounding states increased. Sudan is preparing to cope with any consequences that might result from the court's decision. The leader of the Sudan National Congress Party and the leader of Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement (SPLM) reaffirmed their commitment to the decision made by the court, whatever the outcome. They are working to increase the participation of the region's representatives once the decision of The Hague is announced, and they want to foster Abyei's acceptance of the decision. However, significant concerns still remain and many still believe that any solution to the Abyei problem will itself be a problem. There is the fear that no party will be satisfied with the outcome of the arbitration, and that it could develop into an armed conflict between the Dinka and the Misariyah, and between the Sudanese army and the SPLM. Repercussions of this conflict would impact the whole of Sudan. There are others who hope that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) will be able to control the situation with the assistance of the international community, especially since international players like the United Nations and the United States are aware of the seriousness of the case. The US sent special envoy Scott Gration to Sudan, and the UN secretary-general sent envoy Ashraf Qazi, among other examples of international officials being sent to Abyei before Sudan decides whether to accept the decision of the court. The Abyei area has been itself an obstacle to the negotiations in the South because of the dispute over the CPA reached by the Sudanese government and SPLM. This dispute almost destroyed the uneasy peace, and the CPA would have collapsed if it had not been for the intervention of intermediaries. The dispute prompted the US administration's proposal, which the two parties agreed on in order to resolve the dispute. This agreement has become known as the Abyei Protocol and it defers the final solution to the region's problem until the end of the Interim Period in 2011. At this time, a separate referendum will be held in Abyei, in conjunction with a referendum in southern Sudan. There are two options: either Abyei maintains its separate administrative status in the north, or becomes a part of the mandate of Bahr El-Ghazal in the south. The territory of Abyei is defined as the area of the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905. The Abyei Protocol stipulated that residents of Abyei, during the Interim Period until 2011, are citizens of every southern state of Kordofan and Bahr Al-Ghazal. The Protocol put the Abyei Boundary Commission in charge of demarcation and definition of Abyei's borders; leaders of the commission were to use foreign experts and listen to representatives of the people of the Abyei Area in order to complete this task. Foreign experts worked to determine the borders of Abyei, but did not find a map of the area for the year 1905. Instead the experts used maps of Abyei from other years. The National Congress Party (NCP) rejected the experts' findings and claimed that they had enlarged the Abyei area to the south more than it should have been. The NCP also accused the experts of placing all of the oil-rich regions in the south. The SPLM, however, welcomed the decision as "binding" and "final". A huge controversy broke out between the NCP and the SPLM, each trying to impose its own opinion. The situation blew up in May of last year, resulting in the deaths of about 90 people and the flight of about 50,000 citizens from Abyei. Large parts of the town were burned and destroyed and it turned into a ghost town. Those who took responsibility for what happened were allowed a part in the dialogue, and they were able to reach a settlement: the Abyei Roadmap for the Implementation of the Abyei Protocol. The most important of the Roadmap's clauses replaces the Abyei Boundary Commission with international management, the appointment of temporary joint forces in the area, and the return of displaced persons. In the opinion of Sudanese writer Kamir, the problem in Abyei is an example of the lack of vision and political will in Sudan. He stresses that the issue is political, rather than a matter of law, and that if Sudan had leaders with clarity of vision and a commitment to unity, Abyei would become a region of peaceful coexistence. Similarly, professor Ali Mahmoud Hassanein, Knapp president of the Federal Party, sees the conflict in Abyei, in its essence, as a clash between unity and separation. As for Sudanese journalist Othman Mirghani, he believes that it is difficult for those outside of Sudan to understand the Abyei issue. The border disputes are between the two tribes and much has happened in Abyei until now. The date of the end of the Interim Period is approaching and the referendum will determine the fate of Sudan. Will it remain one nation or become two nations? Mirghani thinks that no matter how Abyei is governed, it can never become two nations. Regardless of the borders of the region, tribal overlap and seasonal movement of shepherds grazing their animals is inevitable, it is life or death for these tribes. Mirghani says: "War is not a choice but fate, and it is triggered by a spark." He says that if the situation explodes in Abyei, the situation will explode in Sudan as a whole. This would dismantle the existing Interim Period. Mirghani fears that any future conflict about Abyei will be a worst- case scenario for Sudan. For if it should occur, it would not be a war between armed groups or between the army and rebels, as it was in the past, but rather it would be a war between two nations. Mirghani stresses that the Sudanese people in general are not inclined towards war, but want peace. However, the underlying problem of conflict and war exists. Mirghani thinks that if the crisis is managed with integrity, then it will be solved peacefully. The fact remains that Abyei and other areas like it in Sudan cannot afford to draw boundaries and put up walls between different peoples because of the tradition of coexistence and migration of the various peoples, which pre-empts efforts to compartmentalise these areas. The many generations of Abyei's people coexisting peacefully should inspire the people of Sudan today to look to the creative genius of their own natural dispositions in order to develop innovative solutions to the present crisis. Regardless of the court's ruling, these are the people of Abyei and its streets resonate with their legacy.
