The regrettable defeat of Egypt's culture minister in elections for the position of head of the UN's foremost social and educational institution is replete with important lessons, writes Abdel-Moneim Said I must confess that I have a great deal of sympathy for the Egyptian minister of culture, Farouk Hosni. I feel for him as a person, for he is one of those considerate and solicitous types of people who make everyone they meet feel at ease, and as an artist whose skill and acute sensitivity to form and expression make him an excellent cultural exponent. I also sympathise for him at the professional level, for it is indisputable that he has been one of the foremost Egyptian ministers of culture in recent decades. He succeeded in strengthening civil culture and fortifying it in its struggle against extremist trends that could have swept away all vestiges of civil life in our country; he injected a fresh vibrancy into Egyptian and international culture through intensive translation projects, promoting intellectual exchanges and stimulating literary and artistic production; he set into motion the largest and most ambitious project of renovating and restoring Egyptian antiquities; and he revived the rich and ancient art of Egyptian architecture. In short, Hosni has been a dynamic and productive minister. Observers often class him together with Tharwat Abaza as the ministers of culture who accomplished the most. In my opinion, Hosni surpassed the latter in this regard. Yet one's sympathies should not blind one to the need to contemplate the electoral campaign for the UNESCO director-general post and to derive lessons from it. After all, this was more than an electoral campaign over an international office; it was part and parcel of what is happening in the world, the Arab region and Egypt, and the election results drove this point home. Also because Farouk Hosni's nomination obtained the support of all Arab states, he became the "Arab candidate" par excellence. Consequently, an assessment process is necessary because Arab candidates will continue to be nominated for international posts and because the problems we encountered this time will most likely reoccur in the future. I was perhaps one of a handful of people in Egypt who believed it difficult if not impossible for Hosni to be elected. I voiced this opinion on three occasions, once about a year ago to Mohamed Salmawy, editor-in-chief of Al-Ahram Hebdo and one of the minister of culture's aides in the campaign; then in an article on "The Farouk Hosni dilemma"; and lastly in direct communication with the minister himself, who called me to discuss -- very delicately I should add -- the aforementioned article. On all of these occasions, the minister had my heartfelt support and sympathy, but this was one matter and my appreciation of the political situation another. Of course, when I had the opportunity to contribute what little help I could offer, I did so without hesitation, even though I was certain from my assessment of the situation that such efforts would be of little avail. Now, Egypt was well poised for another international post. On the one hand, international opinion held that Africa merited the UNESCO leadership which could have favoured Egypt, in particular, because its combination of African, Arab and Muslim cultural affiliations and because of its geographic and historical centrality. In addition, Egyptian diplomacy has demonstrated considerable skill and expertise in various multilateral and international forums since the creation of the UN and its subsidiary organisations. At the same time, Egyptian, Arab and Muslim identities were not part of the equations. After all, an Egyptian Muslim -- Mohamed El-Baradei -- was elected head of the International Atomic Energy Agency and, together with this agency, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, and an Egyptian Arab Christian --Boutros Boutros-Ghali -- was elected secretary-general of the UN. In light of the foregoing, Farouk Hosni would have been a perfect candidate for the UNESCO post were it not for two crucial matters. First, the electoral process is a crucible for candidates; it is the time when their professional and personal records come under intensive scrutiny and the moment when they have to pay for flaws and sins, whether or not of their own doing. Second, elections are a time for making choices and this process converges with the broader currents of events that are unfolding at that time. Naturally, campaign strategies and tactics -- building alliances and neutralising enemies and the like -- play an important part, but in elections to international office this factor is less crucial than the previous two. Simply put, the moment of the UNESCO director-general elections was the moment in which Hosni's handling of the dilemma he found himself in since becoming minister of culture was put to the test. This is the same dilemma encountered by all public officials in Egypt who have an ambitious programme for reform or development and then come face to face with the problem of Israel, the Arab-Israeli conflict and some very tough if not impossible choices. On this occasion, the minister of culture was promoting a cultural reform programme and ran up against the wall of "normalisation". In a milieu seething, for various reasons, with fulminating ideologies and filled to the brim with intellectuals who have decided to withdraw from direct battle with Israel and Israelis and concentrate solely on mobilising the domestic front against them, the minister decided to press forward with his reform programme and to put cultural normalisation with Israel on hold. The result was that he -- to our benefit -- won on the reform programme but he would end up paying the price for this at the moment of reckoning at elections time. The world found it difficult to understand how Egypt could be at peace with Israel while its minister of culture thought otherwise, even if the paradox is perfectly understandable from the Egyptian perspective, which sees an ongoing war between Israel and other Arab parties with which Egypt has close and unbreakable bonds. To complicate matters further for Hosni, the Egyptian cultural community refused to spare him from its own test of his candidacy qualifications. This took the form of a fierce scrutiny for "concessions to normalisation", under which somehow figured the preservation and restoration of Jewish synagogues that are an integral part of Egypt's cultural heritage. Was not Moses born in Egypt, raised in the palace of the Pharaoh and married to an Egyptian? Regional and international circumstances also worked against Hosni. In spite of the fact that President Barack Obama's address to the Islamic world was delivered from Cairo in the hope of assuaging the bitter legacy of the preceding administration, the new American president also hoped to achieve a landmark inroad in solving the chronic Arab-Israeli conflict which has a profound impact on a panoply of issues from Pakistan to Morocco. For the Obama administration, it was not so much the election of the UNESCO director- general that mattered, but how this could serve to promote a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and, secondly, to build an international coalition for dealing with the world's varied other complex issues. From the American perspective, Israel holds the key to the first question, for it will have to withdraw from the occupied territories and it has to be pressured to halt settlement construction. With regards to the second question, Russia holds the key. Therefore, Israel had to be placated by opposing Hosni, not only because he sided with the opponents to normalisation but also because he did not promote a culture of peace. To placate Russia the US called a halt to the anti-ballistic missile shield in Eastern Europe. To give Washington credit where credit is due, it was frank with Cairo when it said it would readily support another Egyptian candidate who had not handled the above- mentioned historical dilemma in the manner that Farouk Hosni had, and it offered some suggestions as alternatives, such as Ismail Serageddin and Zahi Hawass. Such frankness was certainly not a trait of certain European parties who felt that promises are one thing and surrendering to the rules of the US-led international order when things come to the crunch another.
