Cutting off the money supply to terrorists and diversifying economic and military aid are key to winning the battle for Pakistan, writes Tariq Osman Hyder* There is a surge of terrorist attacks in Pakistan, the most audacious being the precision assault on the headquarters of the Pakistan Army followed by the coordinated triple attack on security establishments in Lahore. The army is now the principal target after its largely successful operation in Swat, and because of the major offensive ongoing in South Waziristan. The Swat operation was a milestone in the counter-terrorism campaign. It was made possible only by building public, political and media support, on which the sustainability of the effort depends. For the outside world and Pakistan this spate of attacks raises a number of questions. Is the security situation deteriorating? Will the military, paramilitary and police forces be put on the defensive with heightened public insecurity eroding public morale? What response strategy can deliver? The US media has criticised the army's security for not stopping the attack at the outermost security cordon perimeter. To analyse what the present situation portends one must view this struggle between forces for a progressive Pakistan and the militants' vision of a theocratic Pakistan in the context of national dynamics, international parallels and of the timescale and resources required to win this battle for the soul of Pakistan. As far as the Pakistan Army is concerned, while lessons should be learnt, the attack on its headquarters was contained and took time to end only because of the hostages taken. The United States, the most advanced country in the world, was unable to prevent 9/11. The Mumbai attack virtually took another metropolis hostage. Despite massive military and monetary intervention in Iraq, the security situation has forced the US into an exit strategy. While even more resources and troops are being poured into Afghanistan, attacks against civilians and the military are far higher than in much larger Pakistan. Pakistan, like most developing countries including South Asia, is a fractured society with significant gaps between the haves and have- nots. Developmental efforts have not been well planned or competently administered due to lack of political stability or good governance and deteriorating state institutions. The hegemonic ambitions of India and its unwillingness to move on the Kashmir dispute necessitated large defence expenditures. The erosion of the government's public education system has divided the youth into three streams: those who attend private schools and reap available opportunities; those going to government schools who are at a grave disadvantage; and the resource-starved multitude attending the madrasas, which had a revered place in Muslim education but since the US sponsored Afghan jihad have become the catch-all for discontented youth. The battle against the militants has become multi-dimensional. In border regions, military counter-insurgency coupled with re-establishing administration and development will dominate. In settled areas, urban warfare with terrorists using asymmetrical acts of explosive violence and precision attacks against the symbols of the state will have to be dealt with through different tactics, including better intelligence gathering and coordination to more aggressively utilise existing military and civil resources. The strength of the militants and their access to arms from Afghanistan is dependent on funding. Some comes from drug money and hostile intelligence agencies across the border. A small part is raised within Pakistan. However the largest amount is received by transfers using both banking and illegal channels. This is borne out by the fact that while from documented remittance flows some $7 billion a year come from overseas workers remittances, another $4 billion come from remittances from other parties. Pakistan must forcibly address this problem with known conduit countries and by activating its investigative and regulatory mechanisms. Certainly the United States has the muscle to do more on this vital external funding front. It will take five to 10 years to defeat the militant threat. The East Punjab insurgency in a far smaller area took 10 years to overcome, the LTTE 30 years. It will take a generation to reverse causational social conditions. That is the scale on which to assess whether or not the security situation in Pakistan is deteriorating. The militants have been hard hit and are fighting back to break public and governmental resolve. Military operations in South Waziristan and elsewhere will lead to an increase in terrorist attacks, but the losses they inflict should be far less than what is meted out to them. While democracy must be strengthened, the army remains the strongest and most cohesive force in Pakistan that can tackle the terrorist threat. Its counter-insurgency and surveillance capabilities must be improved. Equally important, socioeconomic development has to be accelerated. The Kerry-Lugar Bill contains some clauses that should have been modified. However, the controversy misses the main point that if the US and its Western allies are serious about defeating terrorism their assistance must be at least three to five times more in order to help Pakistan overcome this threat -- part of a global terrorist network strengthened by the US occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan. Pakistan must also diversify incoming assistance and add value to its exports to generate its own resources. Without adequate multinational economic and military support, and also action by the Extra Regional Forces to control the border from the Afghan side, the battle for Pakistan will be long. It is also in India's interest to fully live up to its declared objective of wanting good relations with a stable Pakistan. * The writer is a retired Pakistani diplomat who teaches on strategic issues.
