By way of building a stable democratic order, Egypt would be well placed to regain prevailing influence in the Arab region, writes El-Sayed Amin Shalabi* One of the most salient signs of Egypt's relationship with -- and place in -- the region is the fact that the Arab League originated in Egypt. In 1945, Arab heads of state held their first summit meeting in Cairo, which they designated as the Arab League's permanent headquarters. At the time, Egypt was still under foreign occupation and under a monarchic system of government. However, its regional status derived from less transient determinants, such as its historic and geographic centrality, its demographic weight and a whole set of factors that fall under what we term today "soft power," namely its intellectuals and university professors who taught successive generations of Arab students, its pioneering press, and its regional lead in theatre, cinema, music and other cultural outputs, all of which thrived in a politically liberal climate that made Egypt a safe haven for Arab politicians and leaders who were fighting for the national liberation of their own countries. However, the turning point that confirmed and strengthened Egypt's regional status occurred with the 23 July 1952 Revolution and the rise of Gamal Abdel-Nasser whose advocacy of Arab nationalism, support for national liberation movements in the region and abroad, and resistance against foreign designs in the region won for Egypt a strong presence and voice in the contemporary international arena. However the burdens, costs and responsibilities of this role proved bigger than Egypt's energies and capacities could sustain. The involvement of the Egyptian armed forces in the Yemeni civil war in the 1960s underscored the discrepancy between the regional "role" that Nasserist Egypt had carved out for itself and the actual "ability" to perform it. This gap between ambition and power reached its height in the developments and decisions that led to the 1967 war, which culminated in a staggering defeat that rocked Egypt's regional image and status. Egypt partially recuperated its status with the October 1973 war, in which the Arabs exhibited a rare cohesion of will as manifested, firstly, in the Egyptian-Syrian coordinated offensive and in the Arab oil boycott in order to back the war effort. However, developments in the aftermath of that war played out in a way that undermined that Arab cohesion and, simultaneously, altered the way Egypt was regarded in terms of its commitment to its Arab obligations and responsibilities. Arab regard for Egypt reached its nadir with President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, which made it explicit that Egyptian foreign policy now placed its own interests first, above the collective Arab interest. The new outlook led to the Camp David summit meetings and to the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty that eliminated Egypt from the Arab-Israeli conflict, in its conventional sense, and redrew the Arab political map. Although the Camp David Accords enabled Egypt to recover occupied Sinai, it did not improve Egypt's regional image or standing. Nor did it restore inter-Arab cohesion or strengthen the Arab regional order. In fact, we could say that it marked the beginning of the disintegration of the Arab order and that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait would never have happened had there been a minimum of cohesion in this order, as was the case when there existed a regional leadership such as that Egypt filled until the mid-1960s. Indeed, Abdel Nasser had forestalled a previous Iraqi attempt to invade Kuwait. However one might judge the Arabs' participation in the US-led international coalition to drive Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait, this campaign paved the way for the foreign military presence in the Gulf. Although Egypt and Syria launched a joint initiative, known as the "Damascus Declaration," that sought to bring the six Gulf States onboard an Arab regional defence pact, the US undermined the drive. It succeeded in convincing the Gulf States that their security was in better hands with the US and they, in turn, signed several security agreements with Washington and some other Western nations. Egypt quickly accommodated to the new situation, which was only consistent with the general policy outlook of Egypt in the Mubarak era whose rule of thumb was to cater to the US and do nothing to upset its arrangements in the region. Political analysts in Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world generally agree that Egypt's regional status and influence receded further under Mubarak because it restricted its involvement to secondary regional issues, managed its regional and international policies in a manner that was increasingly geared to satisfying Washington, and was overly indulgent of Israeli aggressiveness towards the Palestinians and the Arab region. Meanwhile, other regional powers were emerging to fill the regional vacuum and Egypt was to become increasingly bogged down in domestic problems as its ruler clung to the impression that these problems did not require bold solutions and a conciliatory approach. Therefore, it was only natural that the fall of the Mubarak regime would stir expectations for a revival in Egypt's regional role and influence. However, the question is how to bring this about? As a general principle, the regional and international status of any country is contingent upon its internal strength and cohesion, and its possession of the components of comprehensive strength that are sufficient to compel if not fear of it then at least respect and admiration for it. Applying this rule to Egypt, this would mean that in order to regain its regional leadership it must build a stable democratic order that serves as a model for its regional environment; a healthy economic base that drives out poverty, unemployment and corruption; proper healthcare and educational systems to form the healthy bodies and healthy minds of a constructive citizenry; dynamic academic and science and research infrastructure that encourage critical thinking and innovation; and an enlightened culture that is conducive to sustained development and progress, and that serves as a beacon for the rest of the region. Thus rejuvenated, Egypt will then be able to take advantage of its sources of "soft strength" in order to reassert its influence in the region and regain the respect and status it merits. * The writer is managing director of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs.
