The Syrian revolution is in a war of nerves with a regime that shows no signs of backing down, writes Abdel-Moneim Said Drop in on any international conference on the Middle East these days and you'll find the participants contending with endless dilemmas, foremost among them is that concerning the future of Syria. Will the Syrian revolution succeed in toppling the Baathist regime and then embark on a transitional period? The question is hardly new to these conferences during the past year. It hovered in the air after NATO entered the revolutionary battle in Libya and it continued to hover as Yemen's fate vacillated between the Gulf initiative and a lost opportunity. Nor did the question disappear after Muammar Gaddafi was no more and even after the Yemeni people signalled their approval, by referendum, of a new president, if only interim. The circumstances in Libya and Yemen may have changed, but the question persists with respect to Syria where the conflict is growing fiercer and the government is becoming increasingly isolated, and where between 7,500 and 10,000 people have died, countless numbers have been wounded, and cities destroyed. It is an appalling sight. But since it is part of the story of the both thrilling and bloody "Arab Spring", onlookers inevitably wonder whether the Syrian case will prove the exception or whether it is part of an ongoing process that is preparing for subsequent and perhaps even more exciting chapters. No one had a definitive answer to offer in the last conference I attended. Most believed that the regime in Damascus would fall like the others, for reasons I will come to below. However, many simultaneously predicted that it would hold on at least to the end of this year, if not longer, and exact an exorbitant toll in the process. The reason why this regime has survived is because it has lost all sense of human decency and opted for extreme brutality, including the use of military force against civilians. Although it tried to prevent media access so as to minimise the international fallout, the press succeeded in reaching the scene. Contrary to expectations, the regime only upped the level of murder and terror. Meanwhile, its so-called attempt at reform has fooled no one, because the regime neither has the ability nor the will to offer real concessions. Nevertheless, its few remaining friends have convinced themselves that it is trying to do something. This applies in particular to Russia and China (not exactly democratic countries either, for that matter), which are grabbing at straws so as to deflect charges that they are condoning a travesty of human rights. The Syrian regime has made it abundantly clear that it is determined to stick to its guns -- literally -- until the bitter end. At the same time, it is taking the fullest possible advantage of its allies in Tehran, Hizbullah and, until recently, Hamas. Their function is to help Damascus deal with its economic crisis or to plump up its image as a member of the "resistance and rejectionist camp" and thereby give it some trappings of legitimacy that no one believes either but that, for some at least, serve a purpose akin to Adam's fig leaf. More importantly, the division of the Syrian opposition between the Syrian National Council, the Syrian steering committees, the Syrian Free Army, and the numerous councils that represent the country's various minorities seem to lend credence to the spectre of rampant sectarianism that the regime is brandishing in order to frighten the world and Syrian society into thinking that the alternative to the regime is civil war and sectarian strife. Still, this regime has been wounded. It has become more and more isolated at home as its legitimacy among the people has dwindled to next to nothing. Even in Damascus and Aleppo, the two principle cities that the regime once boasted had not joined the revolution, the veil of silence has lifted and protesters have taken to the streets. To observers who hold that the fall of the regime is inevitable this is a sign that the revolution now encompasses nearly the whole of Syrian society, an assessment corroborated by the fact that money is now flowing out of the country in larger torrents than ever. Also, in spite of the Russian and Chinese veto, a meeting of the friends of Syria has demonstrated that the opposition is not divided in a manner that should dismay supporters of the revolution. Rather, the different banners, organisations and councils merely reflect a dynamic diversity in which differences signify not conflict but rather a negotiating process between various political groups who find that there is more to unite them to bring down the regime than there is to drive them apart. It is this reality that ultimately persuaded Russia and China to approve the UN resolution to offer humanitarian assistance to the beleaguered people in Syria. It is definitely a complex picture, but not to the degree that it obscures the possibility of surprises, such as a revolt in the Syrian army, an assassination attempt against the Syrian leadership, or the offer of an "honourable exit" should that leadership suddenly bow to the inevitable. It is equally certain that the Syrian clock cannot be turned back or that the situation could return to "normal" as though nothing had happened or that anyone could accept a constitution that gives the president 14 extra years to rule. Not after all the blood that has been shed and all the people that have died. The question, then, is not whether the regime will fall but when and at what cost. This latter variable can be minimised by a better management of the sectarian question, by protecting civilians and by steadfastness against the regime's military machine. The foregoing may represent the prevalent opinion, but there are reservations and exceptions. Syria is the fifth episode in the Arab Spring. In the previous four, the results were not always comforting to many in the international community who may not have been so supportive had they known that one Arab country after the other would fall into the hands of Islamist forces, with regard to which it is still impossible to predict whether they will be moderate or extremist, or whether they will remain forever rooted in the lesser jihad or, instead, move on to the greater jihad of development and progress. It is not surprising therefore that few are in a rush to make great sacrifices in order to resolve the Syrian battle whether by means of a flight embargo over Syrian airspace or actively preventing the swarms of Syrian tanks from attacking one Syrian village after another. Nevertheless, it is still possible to exert a series of low to mid-level pressures that do not include military intervention. Even so, care would have to be taken not to trigger a situation that would propel other parties to intervene and transform the Syrian battle into one that involves not only Damascus, but also Baghdad and Beirut. Because such a prospect is another major disincentive, it looks like the greatest onus of the battle for regime change will continue to fall on the Syrian revolution. The revolution, therefore, will have to fight a war of nerves with that regime and there are no guarantees that the Syrian people will continue to sustain the stress and sacrifices after having already struggled for an entire year with no sign of light at the end of the tunnel. At least, so the argument goes. In all events, experience has taught us that when it is time for a regime to collapse, it crumbles quickly and irrevocably.
