One year on, the aims of the 25 January Revolution remain unrealised, threatening further polarisation to come, writes Mohsen Zahran* The 25 January Revolution has recently celebrated its first anniversary with massive, peaceful demonstrations in Tahrir Square and elsewhere in many cities nationwide, recalling the admirable, victorious multitudes of millions during the historic events of 25 January 2011, as well as 11 February, the day of former president Hosni Mubarak's departure. The resounding, persistent demand after one year was the insistence on the continuation of the revolution to achieve its noble objectives of "Bread, freedom, dignity and social justice" which are yet to be realised. The great hopes of change after the relinquishment of power by the former president and the suspension of the parliament during the early days of the revolution have gradually evaporated, due to inexplicable indecision, puzzling procrastination, debilitating stagnation, callous insensibility and devious detours, despite marches, strikes, sit-ins, and multi-million demonstrations spanning several months. Meanwhile, the nation has been suffering politically, economically, socially, and culturally from lack of progress, coupled with regressing development, as evidenced in the reported loss of 50 per cent of foreign exchange reserves, continuing unemployment, a sharp decline in investment, an alarming loss of exports, rising imports, and deteriorating governance, as well as a virtual collapse of local government services and responsibilities. Meanwhile, the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), to which Mubarak delegated the authority to run the country in the dying days of his regime, has ordered military police, in concert with the security forces, to confront and clash with peaceful protestors on several occasions, in violation of their basic human rights, resulting in nearly 400 people being killed and several thousands wounded. This is a painful and bloody toll, equivalent to more than 50 per cent of those who gave their lives and shed their blood for the liberation of their country. These confrontations have generated rising distrust, anger and violence, together with a bitter feeling of betrayal and a sinking realisation of mistrust. These things have prompted millions of people to demonstrate again in Tahrir Square recently and elsewhere in Egypt on 25 and 28 January this year, calling for the continuation of the revolution and the immediate exit of the SCAF from power, as well as speedy elections and the installation of a civilian president. This loud outcry for the immediate surrender of power by the military has been a direct result of the people's realisation that the SCAF is not too keen on having a new constitution be adopted with full democratic processes and transparent procedures, especially after its insistence on the inclusion of certain clauses giving the military special status and exemptions from due processes and rules. It has become crystal clear to the majority of observers that there is a hidden agenda perpetuating the presence and involvement of the armed forces in Egyptian public life. This leading role has continued unabated since the 1952 coup d'état and the subsequent authoritarian rule of ex-military presidents Gamal Abdel-Nasser, Anwar El-Sadat and Mubarak. The stakes, benefits and interests of the military are too great to relinquish or share. To achieve this agenda and maintain the status quo, whether covert or overt, SCAF decisions and actions have included diversionary and divisionary tactics, slow and inadequate declarations of a roadmap and a definitive timetable to end the transitional period, the continuation since last February of insecurity, violence, corruption and lawlessness, the repeated instigation of distrust and clashes between the protestors and the police, and the continued infiltration of political parties, youth alliances, professional federations, labour syndicates and social and ethnic groups in order to initiate in-fighting and induce social instability. Furthermore, revolutionary youth groups have been invariably accused of being thugs, the pawns of foreign circles, unpatriotic, unruly, and disruptive of public order, and aiming at the downfall of Egypt. Mubarak may be out, but the former regime's functionaries and loyalists are still ceaselessly plotting against the stability of the nation. Certain segments of society also have believed in such groundless charges. The classic colonial device of "divide and rule" has been revived, a devious ploy that could culminate in the revolution's self- destruction and stagnation, an old technique and devilish tactic applied by former officials. Many observers are afraid that the revolution is being attacked, betrayed and hijacked. One can only hope that this assumption, supported by ample factual evidence, is actually fueled by exaggerated suspicions or doubts. However, the evidence from actual realities, questionable decisions and lagging performance is too compelling to ignore or disregard. Is it a mere coincidence that none of the objectives of the 25 January Revolution have been implemented, a concern which is causing despair, frustration and even doubt about the benefits of the revolution to the masses who have supported it wholeheartedly, and who amount to 40 per cent of the total population? Is it mere coincidence that the Muslim Brotherhood, the best-organised religious/political movement on the Egyptian scene, has on several occasions supported the military's decisions and roadmap and has also accelerated its presence and dominance of Egyptian public life? The Muslim Brotherhood, along with the Salafi movement, a right-wing Islamist party, claimed nearly 70 per cent of the parliamentary seats during the December/January elections, whereas the revolutionary youth won less than five per cent of the seats in the 500+ seat parliament. While an unprecedented 60 per cent of total registered voters cast their ballots in the elections for the parliament's lower house, the maglis al-shaab, a mere six per cent voted in the elections for the upper house, the maglis al-shura, more recently, which is an unmistakable indication of the people's disappointment and disgust with the ongoing state of affairs. Suspicions point to a de facto alliance between the Brotherhood and the SCAF, a fact attested to by the group's refusal to partake in the massive demonstrations called by the youth movements on 11 February in Tahrir Square, the first anniversary of Mubarak's departure, in order to demand an immediate transfer of power to civilian rule. Furthermore, the organisers have called for a gradual escalation in civil disobedience in order to maximize the pressure on the SCAF, something that both the SCAF and the Islamist parties have condemned. Because of Egypt's leading role in the Middle East, Arab nations in the Gulf region have not overtly supported the Egyptian revolution and have aligned themselves with former members of the former ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), Mubarak's former party, as well as with officials of the old regime, in order to fund and instigate unrest, thus causing disruption, violence, instability and insecurity in various governorates in Egypt, coupled with attacks against public buildings and institutions throughout the country. Certain parties, groups and individuals have also hastened to claim their share of the pie after the revolution, in order to reserve influential positions of power and further their interests in the new Egypt. By claiming a majority of the parliamentary seats, the Muslim Brotherhood is now practicing the same role and modus operandi as the NDP. Media columnists and public personalities who were the mouthpieces of the old regime have now become revolutionaries, gleaming in the limelight of their own TV talk shows. Despite the ongoing trials of Mubarak, his sons and former officials on charges of ordering the killing of peaceful demonstrators during the revolution, corruption and bribery still infest every level and corner of Egyptian public life, as evidenced in the state of lawlessness and the defiance of the law everywhere. Flagrant violations and illegal practices are witnessed daily in the thousands of unsafe building going up everywhere, as well as in the massive urban sprawl that is invading and destroying precious agricultural land, something which is prohibited by law. Meanwhile, the police, who have pledged a sacred oath of office to safeguard the life, security and human rights of all Egyptians, have betrayed their oath and have caused fear, terror, insecurity and the loss of human life. They have neglected and abandoned their duties, thus hardly protecting citizens from daily attacks by thieves and thugs or even safeguarding them from criminal acts by armed gangs or violators of the law. This neglect of duty and subsequent state of lawlessness have motivated some people to long for the "good old days" of stability, security and safety, regardless of the authoritarian rule, corruption, rampant poverty and national decline that went with it. It has been evident to everyone from last March that the SCAF has been responding too little and too late to the repeated protests of millions and the tragic loss of life suffered by many in confrontations with the security forces. Such incidents are now too many to count, from the Maspero massacre, to the events in Mohamed Mahmoud Street, Cabinet Office, and the Port Said Stadium massacre, all reportedly instigated by former regime loyalists, or frequently accused and scarcely identified "third party" plotters. The belatedly announced review of the roadmap for the transition to democracy now calls for presidential elections in June (now May, after the 2 February clashes and the killing of 20 youths and the wounding of 2,000). The SCAF has also promised to transfer power to civilian rule by 30 June 2012. However, it is doubtful that even with the election of a civilian president, and not another ex-army general, real power will not still be held by the military, supported by a hidden alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood. If this happens and the noble objectives of the January Revolution are betrayed and remain unfulfilled, the consequences could be disastrous. The poor, angry masses could ignite another revolution, for example, this time of the masses, the hungry and the hoodlums. This would be terrifying, violent and bloody indeed, or even catastrophic. * The writer is professor of urban planning at Alexandria University.
