Winning elections does not give Islamist forces the right to undermine or bend to their narrow interests the institutions of the modern state itself, writes Azmi Ashour* The first year of the revolution was like a public opinion market in which everyone displayed their wares. In spite of the pessimistic gloom that has infected many due to various developments, there is no denying that the previous year has been rich in ideas and visions on the future of Egypt. There has also been considerable rhetorical diversity, starting from the resolute rhetoric of the youth of the revolution who remain adamant on principles and ideals of the revolution. Among the other forces on the political spectrum, the Islamists' rhetoric also stands out, whether that of the Muslim Brotherhood, which had become familiar to Egyptian society during the past 80 years, or that of the Salafis which seemed so unconnected to the realities of Egyptian society that the remarks and statements of Salafi leaders frequently caused broad segments of the public to shudder. Every feature of the Islamist discourse speaks of an attempt to deviate from the revolution and the secularist forces in society. They simultaneously throw into relief a mindset that essentially holds that "those who are with us are divinely blessed and those who differ are damned." There is little doubt that this is the type of mindset that would prevail in the event that they gained control over key institutions of government, an eventuality safe to predict given the course of developments that has run counter to the aims of the revolution, which never included a takeover, even via the ballet box, by an exclusivist faction with claims to possessing a religiously correct political vision and the right to impose this on others. Events at the beginning of the second year of the revolution have confirmed this. Suddenly the Muslim Brotherhood, winners of the parliamentary majority, found themselves facing the revolutionaries shouting at them from in front of the parliament building and from the squares, "Go ahead and sell it out. Sell out the revolution, Badie." Mohamed Badie is the supreme guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, which the revolutionaries now openly accuse of betraying the aims and aspirations of the revolution. From the perspective of the revolutionaries, the elections mean little. Egypt had had 60 years of thinly disguised military rule in which there were various elections and referendums and in which the rulers justified their perpetuation in power on the grounds of ambiguous causes such as national security and on the basis of assorted laws and decrees that worked to exclude society from decision-making processes and to suffocate civil and human rights. Undoubtedly, the revolutionaries and other secular forces fear that the Islamists are bent on replacing the military's "national security" mandate with their own "religious" mandate. Such terms and expressions as "God's law", "electoral legitimacy", and "popular legitimacy", on all of which they claim a monopoly, have raised the alarm and have become increasingly strident since the Islamists in parliament have been forced to face the fury of revolutionaries directed against them from the street. The Islamists' rhetoric has inadvertently betrayed how strong the grip of theocratic authoritarianism is on their creed. For example, on 10 December 2011, well before he was elected speaker of parliament, Freedom and Justice Party leader Saad El-Katatni stated: "We will not impose the veil or prohibit alcohol consumption in the privacy of the home or in hotels." Many statements by Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist leaders have had a similar ring. The question they beg is who is to do the "imposing", the Muslim Brothers or the state as embodied by its institutions and laws? Does the fact that the Islamists won a parliamentary majority give them the right to abolish the state, as a set of secular institutions and a legal edifice that had evolved over the course of 200 years and to replace it with a vision of their own conception? Consider, too, that each faction of the Islamist trend has its own conception of government and its own perception on crucial issues that touch directly on essential questions of personal and civil freedoms, which form the very heart of the cultural, legal and constitutional structure of society, the sustainability of which is contingent on their uninterrupted continuity. This question will probably continue to plague Egyptian society because of the widespread tendency to regard government authority not as a system of institutions and laws but as an all-powerful leader who controls everything in the state, from the manufacture and implementation of laws to the appointment of key figures in all the various agencies of government. The tendency is a major characteristic of a political culture ingrained by decades of dictatorship. Clearly, a parliamentary majority does not give the Muslim Brothers the type of legitimacy that entitles them to conceal the gains in individual freedoms that they, themselves, had logged under law over the course of the evolution of civil life in Egypt. Nor does it give them the right to destroy the legal and constitutional heritage that guarantees these rights. By the same token, they do not have the right to dismantle the edifice of the state that has gradually accumulated over the past 200 years and that has given us the executive offices and ministries and the judicial institutions that we know today, not to mention the parliamentary institutions that the Muslim Brothers have entered by means of the electoral system. Indeed, the Islamists, as would apply to any other majority bloc in parliament, are duty-bound to safeguard that institutional edifice that has become a social and cultural reality that defines the primary features of the Egyptian state, regardless of how the dictators of the previous era may have abused those institutions. We should not forget that before the past 60 years of dictatorship, Egypt experienced an era of democracy (1923-1952) under these institutions, which even continued to exercise a certain tempering moral influence under the subsequent dictatorships. If the Islamists try to pursue their agenda by supplanting the constitutional, legal and cultural legacy and wealth of Egyptian society, even if they do so through the legislative assembly they control, they will in fact be setting into motion the collapse of their own project. This applies even if the nation's ruler is one of their own. Surely their function is not to create yet another despot who takes advantage of the powers at his disposal to trample on the legacy of the past on the pretext, this time, of "Islamifying" government and applying Sharia law. Rather their duty is to abide not just by democratic mechanisms but also by the democratic spirit that brought them to power and that obliges them to further the cause of justice through established institutions. In such a context, and under such conditions, there can be no president who can assume dictatorial powers. Any president or head- of-state, whether Salafist, Muslim Brother or otherwise, will be bound by the institutional and legal framework of government, by the checks and balances between the authorities with which he will have to work, and by the institutions that shape public opinion, prime among which is a free and robust press. In other words, that head-of-state must function not as though he were omnipotent, capable of changing anything at whim, but rather as though he were one part of a large impartial entity that belongs to every Egyptian citizen: the Egyptian state. In the context of the institutionalised state that has evolved in Egypt, society has nothing to fear should some ideological faction, whether religious or otherwise, come to power through democratic processes, as long as all abide by the rules of the game. At heart, these rules are to respect the fundamental rights and principles connected to the relationship between the individual and the state, and the rights and principles connected with the relationship between all members of society. These are fundamentally humanitarian principles that should apply equally to all without discrimination on the basis of religious or ethnic affiliation and in the spirit of the acceptance of others. As long as these rules and their underlying spirit prevail, no harm can come if a Salafist is elected to power, as long as he continues to work within the framework of the modern state. If he succeeds in bringing good to society through the promotion of his points of view through appropriate channels and procedures, then he will be re- elected. If he fails, the people will vote in another candidate who they believe will be better fit to serve them. Nor will the change cause disruption, because we will have created a culture that seeks to safeguard the institutionalised state, regardless of the character of the individual in power who will no longer be able to abuse his authorities towards his own narrow ends or those of a particular clique. The further we move in this direction, the closer we will come to realising a true victory for the revolution and, simultaneously, the more we will alleviate current tensions between Islamists and other political forces. * The writer is managing editor of the quarterly journal Al-Demoqrateya published by Al-Ahram.
