The revolution has not yet touched the heart of the institutions of government, and so is vulnerable to counter-revolutionary acts and dissension, writes Abdallah El-Ashaal* I doubt that the Port Said massacre will be the last tragedy we see in this phase in Egypt. The conditions that allowed it to happen still exist and they will continue to exist until there is a radical overhaul in the handling of security and until responsibility for this matter is placed in the hands of persons who understand the challenges of this phase and are capable of addressing them. The Egyptian people are both distraught and fed-up by this train of tragedies, the causes of which the parliamentary investigatory committee will hopefully unveil. The people had never anticipated such agonies on the road to change they set out on with their peaceful revolution, and they certainly have a right to know. The problem with the Egyptian revolution, so far, is that it has not touched the central agencies of government and sources of wealth. Until it does, Egypt will be prey to forces bent on sewing dissension and undermining the revolution. Among the many issues and concerns that preoccupy Egyptians on the street and in their various assemblies, some that have surfaced recently appear more designed to stir discord and strife than to stimulate rational thought. The Egyptian revolution was a truly grassroots movement in which all the people participated. But, after the fall of Mubarak, the interim phase entered that rugged and dangerous terrain in which a host of crucial daily life concerns and vital questions of security and economy converged. Unfortunately, those in charge of administering this phase felt that they could exploit these circumstances to drive wedges into society, undermine the revolution and reverse the priorities of society. They must have thought that after the conditions of people's lives had been entirely ground down by mounting unemployment, security breakdowns, and rising prices, the Mubarak regime, which is still intact with its cliques, networks of relations, laws and policies, would prevail again. Certainly the Mubarak bands have been given the green light in various ways, most obviously by the way regime figures that are standing trial are being shown every possible legal indulgence and personal pampering while malicious aspersions and trumped up charges are hurled at everyone who opposes the policies and attitudes that have been steering the interim phase. Since the revolution, Egypt has been caught between two camps. On the one hand there is the people who had arisen as one and then placed their hopes and aspirations in the hands of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). On the other, there is SCAF, which soon appeared bent on stalling the people's drive towards the realisation of their aspirations as though it were merely waiting for the Mubarak regime to recover from its shock and reassert control. Ample evidence of this is to be found in the security breakdowns, the smuggling of personal fortunes out of the country, the false reports on the recovery of stolen assets, the unfulfilled promises to the families of the dead and wounded, the deliberate targeting of the revolutionary youth, the laxness towards organised thugs, and other such attitudes and practices that have caused the people to change their view towards SCAF. It is little wonder that the people are uniting, again, behind the call for the generals to leave and that anyone who urges patience and careful deliberation is regarded as an ally of SCAF and is ignored. Indeed, the presidential candidates who continue to meet with SCAF have become the subject of popular suspicion, regardless of their records of integrity and how honourable their intentions may be. Then the People's Assembly convened. As a new player in the field, it suddenly raised a number of potentially divisive questions. Has the People's Assembly become the alternative to Tahrir Square or is "the square" still the basis and parliament an ancillary? Should popular pressure focus on SCAF or on parliament? Is there a conflict between the legitimacy of parliament and the legitimacy of the square? One body of opinion maintains that parliament is not a faithful mirror of the street and, therefore, that the street should remain the source of legitimacy with parliament serving as an extension of the street. This, too, has contributed to the climate of contention as it fed a general wariness of parliament and a tendency to find fault with it and provoke it. Much of this has been aimed at the Muslim Brotherhood, in particular, who many accuse of striking a deal with SCAF and even of defending its stay in power under the pretext of the need to complete the interim phases outlined in the Constitutional Declaration. Some have gone as far to charge that the Brotherhood's demand that the military hand over power to the speaker of parliament until presidential elections are held is actually a bid to seize control over the key authorities of the state: parliament, the cabinet and the chief executive. Such suspicions and anger against the Muslim Brothers erupted during the second "Friday of Anger" on 28 January 2012, held to commemorate the hundreds killed and thousands wounded in the first "Friday of Anger" a year ago when police forces were suddenly withdrawn and people were left exposed to plainclothes security, organised thugs and convicts released from prisons. This year, the commemoration of that nightmarish day was marred by ugly spats and brawls, in spite of the fact that all those present in the square last Friday are partners in the revolution that was waged against the former regime and the failings of the current regime. Such acrimony and division is most unfortunate at a time when the people need their forces to remain combined against a single enemy, which is those bent on turning the revolution to their own narrow ends and who are conspiring in word and deed to undermine the efforts of the people and divert them from their course. Among the many means that have been used to dissipate the people's energies are fabricated controversies, such as whether the anniversary of 28 January 2011 should focus on the commemoration of the dead and the renewing of revolutionary resolve or on celebrating the accomplishments of a great revolution. Why should the two be inherently contradictory? Yet, some acted as though the revolution had served its purpose now that they were out of jail and sitting in parliament and issued various statements hostile to the revolutionary youth of the sort that have become familiar over the past year. Meanwhile, the opposing camp ignored the accomplishments and focused only on the revolution's unfulfilled demands, above all the tragedy of the martyrs whose killers have been acquitted, inflicting insult upon injury to the families who have seen neither justice done nor due compensation from the state. Another divisive question has surfaced recently, which is whether the constitution should come first or presidential elections. While not as heated as the controversy over whether the constitution or parliamentary elections should come first, this latest issue opened another front of polarisation. On one side are those who maintain that as long as the rules of the Constitutional Declaration prevail, the president will have the same powers as those stipulated in the 1971 Constitution and that, therefore, a new constitution should be drafted first so that prospective candidates know their boundaries beforehand. Indeed, this camp argues, some nominees might withdraw their candidacies if they know that the system of government will be a parliamentary one rather than a presidential one. Meanwhile, the proponents of "presidential elections first" want to bring these elections forward in order to hasten the handover of power to a civil authority. Moreover, some members of this camp propose that the first elected president serve only for one year for the purpose of overseeing the drafting of the constitution. The chief reason for this, they argue, is to minimise SCAF's influence on the drafting of the constitution, as exemplified by the so-called El-Selmi Document that sought to confer a special status on the military in the constitution and to exempt the military budget from parliamentary oversight. The futility of this controversy becomes clear when we take into account the fact that SCAF appears to determined to remain in power at least until the end of the stipulated transition period, scheduled for June, regardless of whether the president is elected now. In other words, there is no guarantee that SCAF will hand over power to the president immediately after he is elected, which could present another problem, especially if the elected president does not meet with SCAF's approval. Perhaps the best way to lay the contention over this controversy to rest is to set the presidential nomination process in motion as soon as possible, after amending the presidential election law and ironing out the flaws in other relevant laws and regulations. Then, candidates should be given a maximum of three months to campaign so that elections can be held by the end of May and the victor can assume office in June. By that point, the constitution will have been drafted, the system of government will be established and the country will be at the threshold of renewed order and stability. Meanwhile, Tahrir will remain the conscience of the nation. If certain groups are gambling that the revolution will die or that the Egyptian people will lose their ability to pursue this option they are deluding themselves. At the same time, parliament is the live embodiment of the will of the people and all political forces beneath its dome and outside it are among the finest minds of the nation. Hopefully, they will summon the resolve to keep the focus of their differences trained on what is best for the country as a whole and the ways to realise this. * The writer is former assistant to the Egyptian foreign minister.
