When is foreign intervention not foreign intervention, asks Wilhelm Langthaler While the Syrian popular revolt is being massacred by Bashar Al-Assad, some still believe that his regime is defending the banner of anti-imperialism against his people, pointing to the rebel Syrian National Council's appeals for Western help. For the time being direct Western military intervention remains unlikely. But Turkey is increasingly projecting its power onto Syria, though as yet limited by the political constraint to appear in line with the Arab Spring, for which Ankara wants to serve as a model. The Arab revolt is clearly an expression of the crisis of the US-centred imperial system, which is both an economic and political crisis. The popular mass movement began to scatter the anciens regimes in the region. Thus the US needs to re-organise their order. They essentially try to do so by embracing and co-opting the Muslim Brotherhood. But conditions for imperialism are substantially worse than before, as the imperialists will not be able to meet the social demands of the masses. This scenario is valid also for Syria, whose regime was part of the old order, even though Damascus did not completely succumb to imperialism. When the democratic movement in Syria started, there was the hope for quick victory as with its precedents in North Africa. But the Baath apparatus refused to appease the popular movement by sacrificing its head. The only explanation for this inability to respond to the democratic mass movement is the sectarian Allawi character of the Baath regime. As in the other Arab countries the Islamist forces played no driving role in the revolt. The motive force was a milieu similar to that in Tunisia and Egypt. The political demands were the same as well. There has been a strong consensus for remaining peaceful, avoiding civil war, against sectarianism and first of all against foreign intervention. The West and Israel remained hesitant. Al-Assad formally was their enemy but a calculable and toothless one. Meanwhile the Arab revolt seemed out of control. Saudi Arabia as the main promoter of the anti-Iran axis is no friend of Al-Assad, but Riyadh fears the popular revolution at her borders even more. Turkey was playing its own game as architect of the détente with Al-Assad and Iran. So Ankara took the back waiting to see how Al-Assad would manage the difficulties. Beyond the Allawi sect Al-Assad has the support of the business elite and the passive acceptance of the Christian minority. Internationally Al-Assad is backed by Iran as well as the UN Security Council members Russia and China. Politically a Western military attack could even be of political help to Al-Assad, allowing him to pose as the defender of national sovereignty. An attack could prompt a sectarian civil war also spilling over into Lebanon. That close to Israel the US would dislike provoking civil war with unpredictable outcome. Thus the West limits itself to sanctions to force Al-Assad into a compromise with the movement and covert support of rebels. For many in the Arab world Turkey is a model to emulate. The AKP anticipated the triple demand of the Arab spring; namely, more democratic rights and a compromise between secularism and Islam, social development while leaving the capitalist elite and their interests essentially untouched, a more independent foreign policy (Iran, Gaza) without breaking with NATO. Turkey is eager to market itself as a kind of saviour, aspiring to become the leading power of the region. For this purpose Ankara cannot remain an appendix of the US, the EU or NATO but needs to defend the independence and self-determination of the region in the spirit of the multi-polar global design. But Syria is proving to be a severe test of this neo-Ottomanism. Turkey is directing its pressure not to support the social revolutionary and anti-imperialist fraction of the movement, but rather the liberal fraction of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). Despite its socialist past, the Baathist regime has moved towards the neoliberal model favouring privatisation and increased income disparity, in line with the rest of the Middle East. They are now faced with a social revolt by the lower classes, despite the fact that due to severe repression the social aspect is poorly represented politically. Like the other regional dictatorships, Damascus insists it is the guardian of secularism. However, Al-Assad's rule is based on the Allawi sect, which makes it as sectarian, unlike the case of Egypt or Tunisia. As the uprising drags on, this lameness of the regime makes a full-scale sectarian civil war more likely. Al-Assad's stubborn repression has turned any peaceful demonstration into a kind of suicide commando. Hundreds if not thousands of democratic activists of the first stage have been killed so far. It is understandable if the movement turns to armed self-defence against the state slaughter. The Western eagerness to intervene in Libya was because it was seen as easy prey for the empire, now scrambling to get on the right side of the Arab Spring. The more the conflict gets violent the more it gets sectarian. And the more blood is shed the more it evokes the call for a foreign military intervention. The moderate forces and also those inclined to Sunni sectarianism search for a shortcut to avoid a full-fledged revolution, which -- without Western occupation -- would also be also a social one. This is especially true for the MB and its Turkish and Gulf protectors. The task is to increase consensus, to decompose the army and to more and more isolate the regime, preparing for a general insurrection combined with a coup by a faction of the army. As the formation of a political representation inside the country was repressed, the building of a front outside, Syrian National Council (SNC), became a necessity. The SNC is composed of émigré dissidents and the MB, the only force with an organised network including established contacts to Western powers. The very fact that they nominated Burhan Ghalioun, an intellectual with leftist anti-imperialist credentials, shows that the Islamic forces still cannot move alone. The domestic democratic grassroots leadership has been eliminated, encouraging an increasing militarisation favouring better organised Islamic forces. Given the strong repression the call for Turkish military intervention, which is not regarded as a Western imperialist force, is understandable. One could imagine even the paradox scenario where a Turkish intervention might act to stave off a full-scale revolution, saving some remnants of the old regime for the sake of re-stabilising the neoliberal order and to prevent a disintegration of the Syrian state. So far, Syria is not Libya, where the rebels welcomed NATO jets, with Turkey's compliance, with open arms. Certainly the most favourable scenario would be if the revolution succeeds in Syria relying exclusively on its own forces, or the Arab League is able to salvage an acceptable compromise for a new dispensation between the regime and the opposition. Even if the old order is toppled with overt Turkish intervention, it would most probably not mean extinguishing the democratic character of the movement. But, if worse comes to worse, is Turkey ready to spring into action, to take the initiative before it is too late? It would be a highwire act that could be a brilliant coup or a fateful disaster, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu's finest hour or his worst nightmare.
