With Egypt's revolution in danger of getting lost in arcane debate, it is time to return to basics, says Ahmed El-Tonsi* The ongoing debates among our political elites remind me of the famous Byzantine debate about the gender of angels. What seems more serious, beside the futile nature of the debate, is the fact that many of the contenders have hidden objectives, and stirring controversy is an end in itself, targeting the setting of new rules and conditions that serve to achieve short-term parochial interests that may not coincide with the nation's long-term objectives. It is understood that politicians everywhere always seek to assume political power in order to achieve what they perceive as the national interest and what will serve the good of the state and its citizens. This is the raison d'être of any legal political organisation, and it is its legitimate right to act in accordance with such a right. As such, one should not discourage political elites from peacefully entertaining such legitimate rights, particularly after years of limited political participation. It is not uncommon to find such an attraction to politics in communities that have for decades been denied a say in their country's affairs. However, what looks odd today in Egypt is the fact that the political elites, while indulging in their legitimate pursuit of power, resort to raising issues that stir up public controversy. Examples are numerous. For decades, all of the ousted former regime's opponents rightfully denounced the emergency laws. Yet, in a time of unprecedented insecurity voices are now criticising the extension of these laws, decreed by the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the real partner of the 25 January Revolution. Its failure to combat the thugs that have been acting in many cities in Egypt has been the main criticism of opponents of the emergency law. Yet, the ousted regime, capitalising on the emergency law, was not able to predict or prevent the January Revolution. Within the same context, we can see the debate over the referral of civilians to military tribunals, even as many civilians turned out to be armed thugs, or even laymen increasingly resorting to carrying arms. Egypt's borders are meanwhile very permeable to arms smuggling. These debates, with their accompanying divisions, look as if they have been deliberately provoked to gain points against the SCAF in an attempt to alter the political landscape in an opportunistic way. In other words, the moves of some political forces share the same characteristics of the popular demonstrations, with their own set of narrow demands. Sometimes the attitude of some such forces may look as if they have become addicted to staying in opposition, as they have not altered their approach to politics since the Revolution. It is difficult to believe that many such forces have been threatening to boycott the upcoming elections. Yet, evidently many politicians enjoy feeling the victims of oppression, whether actual or fictitious. Debates will continue as long as the current scene is clouded with controversy. Some remarks about that scene deserve mention. First, the January Revolution was a "bullet of mercy" shot into a clinically dead and corrupt regime that had exposed Egyptian state institutions to near collapse. Out of such debris only the military was left unscathed, and the latter is continuing to perform as a normal institution within a system that allows inputs and deliverables. None of the other state institutions, save to an extent the judiciary, has emerged in a form that permits its return to business as usual. Restoring the latter is not a revolutionary objective, and it is not one that has been fully accomplished by many of our state institutions. Because of the Revolution, Egypt was spared further deterioration into a fully- fledged picture of what the philosopher Hobbes described as the "dissolution of the commonwealth," resulting in man's return to the state of nature in which every man is at war against every other. The Revolution has at least temporally restored the national consensus. As such, the Revolution with its two partners, the army and the revolutionaries, has partially arrested the emergence of a state of anarchy. Unlike what some have been maliciously saying, the Revolution's link to anarchy lies in the fact that it has excluded potential anarchy in the state, which could have happened either as a result of a sudden power vacuum or with power transferred to Gamal Mubarak. Second, for an array of reasons the national consensus has unfortunately not been adequately maintained, and we have started to see events that have reflected degrees of anarchy, particularly with the incomplete recovery of the security apparatus. This relative anarchy has further intensified the sense of insecurity, which in turn has drastically impacted national consensus on other issues. Sub-national loyalties across many lines of cleavage have occasionally resurfaced, provoking religious (Copts), ethnic (Nubians) and tribal (Sinai and western Desert) strife and sometimes conflict. No less serious has been the fact that such sub-national loyalties have their own regional, as well as global, or international, ramifications, in which outside forces sometimes nurture and adversely fuel some of these inflammatory issues. Meanwhile, a widening gap, if not a gulf, is on its way towards being entrenched between the masses and the police in a way that impairs a full return by the police to their purported function. Similarly, the judiciary has been subject to criticisms that reflect a growing popular misperception of what have been called light sentences in cases pertaining to corruption scandals. In fact, no stone has been left untouched, and criticism has even touched the SCAF. Third, chaos is a better term than political fluidity in describing the current scene, as it involves many other dimensions, including the economic and societal. It is hard to get out of chaos with a collapsing state and convalescent law-enforcement body. Such chaos is pushing many to enter the political arena and to politicise their demands. The fragmentation of all political forces, associations, parties and even professional syndicates has become the rule. As such, we have seen actors claiming to have revolutionary credentials, and that they have the panacea for Egypt's woes, provided that the elections give them victory. It is not uncommon to find a fragmentation of political forces in a country whose population has just been emancipated after years of being prey to dictatorship or foreign occupation. This typically happened in the ex- Communist states of Eastern Europe in the aftermath of the fall of the old regimes and autocrats. Similarly, following former president Sadat's proclamation of the reform of the Arab Socialist Union and the formation of political forums many groups applied to establish such forums. In today's Egypt, what may look more peculiar, if not more disturbing, are the divisions among the revolutionaries themselves, resulting in a diminution of their power as a cohesive force that cemented the nation in the heyday of the Revolution. If elections are held, and in a perfect world if they happen securely without complications, then no group will have a majority. To make things more complex still, the constitutional declaration issued in March is unclear about the majority needed to form a new government. Not unrelated to this has been the suspicion of the extra-constitutionality of the new elections law, which may in the aftermath of the upcoming elections cause some to claim that the law is unconstitutional. If the debate over majority rule goes for the latter's right to form a cabinet, then a coalition must be established, which is a condition that is exceptionally difficult first to have, and then to maintain, given the prevalent state of fragmentation on the political scene. Fourth, the SCAF has set a timeframe for transferring authority to an elected civilian government. Yet, the SCAF has not recognised that its own authority rests on the army's two pillars of legitimacy: one that is constitutional, emanating from its role as the safeguard of the state institutions, and the second based on the people's acceptance of the army's historical role, which was clearly manifested in the January Revolution. For many, these two pillars are not transferable, and any civilian government will need the army to continue exerting some of its current role at least for the next few years. In fact, some of the political forces, while proposing supra-constitutional principles, have included an article in a proposed constitution that would empower the army with the prerogative of safeguarding the civilian nature of the state, a role that is close to the Turkish army's now-abandoned prerogative of securing the secularism of the Turkish state. That said, it is obvious that many of the political forces acknowledge their need for the army in case of their gaining power. When this happens, the army will deliver or transfer on a de facto basis an incomplete power structure and set of functions that have been mutually approved and that are practically needed in view of the rising threat of insecurity. The SCAF can deliver this authority, yet the newly formed government or president will have partially to count on the military's power to retain some of its transferred authority, at least for a time. Therefore, the SCAF should reconsider its future role and not set the transfer of authority as the watershed between two periods. Following the transfer of authority to a civilian government, there will be features carried over from the ongoing transition period, such as continuing insecurity and political instability. The legislative and presidential elections are not the end of the transition period, though they are de jure landmarks in the process. Accordingly, certain procedural, as well constitutional, arrangements will have to be undertaken in order to ensure the smooth transfer of authority, while giving civilian rule the essential clout needed to perform its constitutional prerogatives. Fifth, the political parties, whether new or old, have shifted the focus of the transition period from struggling to achieve the Revolution's objectives to pure politics and mass manipulation. As a result, the revolutionaries have been misled, if not abused. Through such maneuvers, the revolutionaries have been changed into lobby groups seeking to influence decision-makers. Many professional politicians participated in the Revolution, and they have added momentum, as well as their long-term experience in dealing with the ousted regime. Moreover, the role of many political groups, particularly Kefaya, was pivotal to preparing the ground for the Revolution long before January's events. Many of the political groups and parties have what can be described as "unfinished business" with the former July 1952 Revolution and its three different regimes. Nasser's regime has been the target of a major onslaught from some liberal and Islamist forces. Regrettably, such a Bourbon-like approach has impacted on such forces' perceptions of the role of the army in a detrimental way. Instead of January's slogan of change, such forces have not changed or learnt from their mistakes. Egypt and the army of 2011 are not those of March 1954.The world is different. Recalling the past while everything is totally different today represents another example of the gender of angels debate that is absurd even as it adds a lot of unnecessary fragmentation. More serious still has been the impact of this attitude by such forces on the SCAF, which has had repeatedly to assert its intention of transferring power to a civilian government. Obviously, some such forces have endorsed what can be described as "historical or political salafism," projecting the pre-1952 era as a kind of belle epoch that they have immortal longings to see return. The January Revolution has become a means for assuming power for many such forces. In their pursuit of office, such forces have repeatedly pressed for amendments to the proposed electoral laws that serve such their interests. Fortunately or unfortunately, the current fragmentation among the political forces, with its inevitable conflicts of interest, has further interrupted the implementation of these highly selective amendments. Sixth, Egypt's borders are all tense, and this is a reason for concern. Egypt's borders pose immense threats to the nascent Revolution and its endeavours to reach stability, particularly owing to the fact that Egypt is a stakeholder in many regional conflicts. These conflicts also have global stakeholders, who are actively engaged in their evolution. The Arab-Israeli conflict, the disputes over Nile water and the new Libya are all conflicts that may escalate into open confrontation. The issue is not that Egypt may be dragged into such confrontations. Rather, any potential settlements should not come at the expense of Egypt, which is currently focused on its internal issues. We have ongoing processes on all three borders that are problematic and dangerous. Realistically, Egypt cannot and should not pursue major foreign policy shifts that may add further risks to its highly volatile internal front and its bazaar of opinions. This is not to say that Egypt should reestablish the ousted president's humiliating "wisdom," with its decades-long record of inaction and submission to his regional and global patrons. On the contrary, Egypt should rejuvenate its regional role, aligning its foreign policy objectives within their three classic circles to its national interests. Seventh, the mass of the population was the missed partner that did not participate in the Revolution, either in forming new political parties or in drafting a new constitution. The masses have not been able to convert the mass protests of 25 January into a fully- fledged revolution to redeem their long- denied political and social rights. Rather, they "upgraded" the Revolution, in as much as they needed social justice and a share in the distribution of national wealth to remedy one of the worse periods of inequality in Egypt's history. In fact, social justice is a missed objective that has barely been touched on. The masses will not let the Revolution end up in the current debates. Instead, they will reclaim the Revolution in order to have a say, as well as a share, in their country's new economic and social order. The masses will eventually abrogate their current delegation to the other two actors to act on their behalf in addressing their grievances, alleviating their poor living conditions, and giving them a fair share in their country's national wealth. The transition period is about to elapse, while the situation has not shown dramatic improvements in terms of security, economy, political stability and social cohesiveness. Therefore, the transition period has not fulfilled many of its objectives. Many reasons lie behind this, and to be fair all the revolutionary partners, the SCAF, the youth and the masses have participated in such an impasse. As such, we are witnessing a serious situation, with risks and uncertainties that cast shadows on the performance of the SCAF, the transitional government, the revolutionaries, the political forces and the masses. Doubts will remain among many of the forces on the political scene, and elections may only intensify such doubts, reaching a stage of mutual mistrust. With conspiracy-oriented minds among the political forces on the one hand and the SCAF on the other, conflict, if not collision, will take place. If this happens, there won't be a square one to return to. It is time to think once more of what we can do to overcome the current debacle. "Back to basics" is a common paradigm to identify an appropriate approach, as we too stand at a crossroads. The nation is the source of all authority. In Egypt, the SCAF has been entrusted with the mandate of reestablishing the state. Accordingly, the SCAF must remember that its mandate is to rebuild the state, not just transfer authority to civilians. The people's mandate was confirmed in the popular referendum in March, and this mandate is still valid as a legitimate delegation from the masses to the SCAF. This fact should not be overlooked when discussing the pre-election period. And in the aftermath of the transition, as per the predictions of the political forces and commentators, no party will have the majority of the votes. This does not match with the army's popularity and the near consensus on its patriotic role in safeguarding the state before and after the elections. A difference exists between power and authority, and this should be clearly understood in order to have a real sovereign state with viable institutions and clear lines of authority that demarcate such institutions' powers and the powers needed to execute their constitutional prerogatives. Currently, the SCAF holds both the legislative and executive powers. However, designing the new system of the state is a formidable task that is too serious to be left to any single person, political force, or institution. This, of course, will be the major issue when drafting a new constitution. The SCAF should have its own body of trustees assigned to formulate, develop, deliberate, and propose decisions that allow a smooth transfer of power to take place and not just of authority to an elected government. Such a council was proposed by the veteran journalist Mohamed Hassanein Heikal in the last years of Mubarak's rule. It is important to realise that the establishment of the next political system is of paramount importance, as it is the cornerstone of the process of building the modern state that we have so far been late in founding. This is the real challenge that we have to tackle, not just the elections and their related laws. There has been much ado about nothing, and we should not miss our third opportunity, after those of Mohamed Ali and Nasser, to lay out the basic premises of a modern state that is based on viable institutions, a vibrant civil society and a national consensus on overall national objectives. A real state, not just a democratically elected government, should be our focus. In essence, the council should be assigned the legislative function as performed by the SCAF, though the main task of the council will be to streamline the transition period, particularly in building the new political system. The council should also work on developing an economic stabilisation programme aiming at solving the volatile economic situation in order to bypass the transition period as well as the early period of the civilian administration. On the other hand, the SCAF, working with the caretaker government, should direct its capabilities to its executive role, while putting its main thrust behind restoring the worsening economic and security context. Both the economy and security have been seemingly deferred to the next government, while they are urgent priorities. Members of the council should enjoy sound popular consensus or trust. They should be non-partisan, and they should be without political ambition. They should be people who do not ask what is in it for me, and who have not declined joining the current caretaking government on the pretext that they did not want to be burnt out, while not skipping a single talk show decrying the government and the SCAF. If we cannot identify such people among 90 million Egyptians here and abroad, then we have problems. It would be beyond belief if Egypt did not have a limited number of such persons to drive the sacred mission of building a modern state. The membership of the council should include representatives of the Revolution, namely the youth and the army. These two sectors should be represented in as much as Egypt is not just made up of civilians or the older generations. Both sectors need to have a say in the evolving state system. The army in particular needs to have a say regarding its status in the new state. Such delicate issues need not be left to partisan politics when drafting the new constitution, and it is an integral part, though invisible in the core, of the ongoing debates. Two points are worthy of note: first, the SCAF should hold a popular referendum on the establishment of this council in order to overcome opposition from certain political forces that have been waiting for power; and second, the council should be dissolved once the new constitution is approved in a referendum. Now is the time of truth for all Egyptians, whether they prefer to have a modern state or continue with the black comedy. For those preferring the latter, a quotation from Madame Roland is not inappropriate: Liberté, que de crimes on commet en ton nom! (Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy name). * The writer is a political analyst.
