Desperate attempts by the Islamic Republic of Iran to resume relations with Egypt after the revolution have seen delegations of Egyptians invited to visit and discuss topics of interest: a delegation of popular diplomats, of businessmen and, as was the case with Hani Mustafa, of filmmakers and critics No doubt Iran is a state that commands a certain regional weight. This did not start after the Iranian Revolution in 1979; it had already existed for thousands of years. But it is the state of conflict with the West characterising the Iranian political plane since 1979 that has lent Iran a political kudos that turned it into a symbol and a role model for a sizable portion of those who believe in political Islam across the Arab world and, in some cases, driven them and others of an anti-American persuasion to go as far as becoming loyal to the Iranian state. The population of Iran is 74 million, but it has such loyalists throughout the Arab and Islamic worlds. This loyalty can take two distinct forms. The first is sectarian, and it means that religious Shiites throughout the world see Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader of Iran, their ultimate reference point. The second form of loyalty to Iran is the dream of the revolutionary Islamic state standing in the face of the West, which is the ideal of political Islam throughout the world. No doubt the weight of Iran is not something Egyptian politicians can afford to ignore where the possibility of opening a new door to relations between the two major countries is concerned. With a view to this, however, the Egyptian Foreign Ministry has stated and unstated demands, the simplest of which is to change the name of the major Tehran street named after Sadat's killer Khalid El-Islambolli. They also include handing over a number of agents of armed jama'at islamiya who, having received criminal sentences, have sought refuge in Iran and continue to live there. It would probably take more than this to resume diplomatic and political relations, yet it is through exchange that the Iranian side has attempted to approach Egypt. Steps Iran has taken include the hosting of popular (unofficial) delegations, religious and economic as well as cinematic. The delegation of which I was part included filmmakers Mohammad Khan, Ahmad Maher and Ahmad Awwas, actor Abdel-Aziz Makhyoun, cameraman Mahmoud Abdel-Sami', screenwriters Beshir El-Dik, Azza Shalaby and Yahya Azmi (also professor of directing at the Film Institute) as well as his wife, the dean of the Institute, the head of the editing department Ghada Gubbara, editor Mona El-Sabban, and critics Mohyieddin Fathi and Mahmoud Qassem. Since the cutting of relations there have been various attempts at reconciliation between Egypt and Iran, which reached a peak during the reformist Mohammad Khatami's presidency in the 1990s. Among the most important manifestations of that rapprochement was the institution of a special department of the Cairo Film Festival in the late 1990s �ê" the heyday of Iranian film �ê" called Spotlights on Iranian Cinema. Yet such rapprochement always broke down under the weight of Egyptian-American relations or as a result of unjustified pressures from Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia. Some attribute those pressures to the Bush administration including Iran, along with Iraq and North Korea, in the Axis of Evil. As such, whenever attempts at diplomatic reconciliation were about to yield results, the situation would be reversed again. A few months prior to the Egyptian revolution, the civil airways of both countries had concluded a deal to institute direct flights between Cairo and Tehran. But the deal was never implemented, largely because of difficulties in obtaining visas. It seems this indeterminate diplomatic dance has been conditioned as much as anything by Saudi pressures on Egypt, which are evidently greater than American pressures since there are diplomatic relations between Iran and many countries, notably in Europe bound by alliances with Washington �ê" all of which seemed clear in the statement of Nabil El-Arabi on his being appointed foreign minister to the effect that it is important to turn a new page in Egyptian-Iranian relations in the wake of the revolution. In recent times, especially during Ahmadinejad's first term, Iran saw a regression in its political role as a result of American pressures, especially in the context of Iran's nuclear programme �ê" uranium enrichment, whether it is being developed (as Iran claims) for purely peaceful purposes or it is really cause for concern; Washington believes that Iran's ability to enrich uranium, whatever its intentions, is in itself sufficient reason to have the programme stopped. *** Participants in the cinematic delegation had a diverse range of purposes from the desire simply to see Tehran or exploring a theocratic first-hand to championing Egyptian-Iranian coproduction initiatives in film or television, from Makhyoun's interest in cooperation between the two countries in the field of children's drama (which he expressed repeatedly to Iranian officials, underlining the two societies' shared Islamic values and his discontent with the westernisation of these programmes in Egypt) to the Film Institute professors' plans for exchange programmes and workshops in the field of film education, facilitating the participation of Egyptian students with their graduation projects in the Tehran Festival, for example. There were those among us who, nationalistically motivated, felt that resuming relations between the two countries would form a front to oppose Israel. It may have been this that drove the Iranians to include in the Egyptian delegation of the Gaza government's present minister of POWs and former minister of culture Atalla Abul Sabah, whose presence was otherwise completely incomprehensible. Yet it seemed as though the Hamas orientation is in line with the Iranian regime's aspiration to turn the Palestinian issue into an Islamic cause. He explained that, as minister of culture, he had started a cultural initiative with Tehran which he hoped to carry through at present, but did not explain the nature of that initiative. Every time the Palestinian minister spoke, rhetorically expressing the change anticipated by the Palestinians after the 25 January Revolution, he said that the three major countries of the region, Egypt, Iran and Turkey should always cooperate in every field and that it is coordination among them that will stop the Zionist project. What is important about these encounters, however, is the excessive political content in the context of cinema. The Palestinian issue, which lives in the hearts of Egyptians, becomes the principal point of reference where Egyptian-Iranian cultural relations are concerned. Makhyoun too spoke of the importance of the horizons of such cooperation in the face of the Western and Zionist tide, precisely the same formulation adopted by the Iranian Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance Mohammad Hoseini in his meeting with the Egyptian delegation; so did the undersecretary of the ministry for cinematic affairs Javad Shamaghdari speak of coproduction in the face of a cultural invasion from the West led by America. Other representatives of Egypt, however, insisted on expressing their views however shocking they may be to the Iranian government �ê" their host. These included Khan, Maher, Shalabi and the present writer, who all expressed extreme discontent with statements and questions that attempted to impose an Islamic character on the Egyptian revolution every time a member of the delegation spoke with a representative of the government, vehemently denying the notion �ê" reiterated, ludicrously, as fact �ê" that the Egyptian revolution is but an extension of the Islamic revolution of Iran. The truth is that the Egyptian revolution carries only humane goals and has absolutely no theocratic orientation, its principal demands being freedom, dignity and social justice. *** What remains true is that Iranian cinema really is different, but there is also a difference between what we see of it in international festivals and what is screened for the benefit of the local audience �ê" something especially evident under conservative presidents like Ahmadinejad. Iran also offers comic and social drama films that are intellectual much simpler and often with an underlying propaganda message: a kind of cinema not unlike soap operas. Yet another Iranian cinema is that made on the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, which is remarkable in its own right but somewhat similar to films made all over the world. Directors in that department include Dariush Mehrjui. As for art films known to the experts, which raised the profile of Iranian culture throughout the world despite its directors' more or less oppositional stance, that started with Abbas Kiarostami's Palme d'Or winner The Taste of Cherries (1997) if not Where is the Friend's Home, which earned him the Bronze Leopard at the Locarno Festival in 1987. The same may be said of Jafar Panahi's The Circle, which earned him the Golden Lion in 2000. The importance of Iranian cinema derives from several factors, one of which is the fact that its makers resist censorship of intimacy and violence: making art films under such conditions forced many Iranian filmmakers to forge a new low-budget cinematic language and seldom relying on professional actors and often relying on the locals of the area where they film. No doubt such censor-dodging genius was an inspiring development; it certainly produced a new vision of cinematic realism in the world. Perhaps Iranian cinema during its early stages also perhaps influenced other cinemas which began to produce realistic films on extremely low budgets. The incumbent kudos had to do with Iran's long history in filmmaking since the beginning of the 20th century, however. And even now Iran expresses pride in its cinema through a museum of film in Tehran, where the visitor finds out that Merza Khan was among the earliest filmmakers in the world, establishing the first film theatre in Tehran in 1904. This museum contains many stills from Iranian silent movies and antique equipment, but �ê" more importantly �ê" a whole room is dedicated to prizes awarded to Iranian filmmakers, one wall of which is the property of Abbas Kiarostami. Surprisingly, there is also a wall dedicated to Panahi, who was jailed for two years after supporting the Green Revolution against the results of the presidential elections in 2009. The House of Makhmalbaf, on the other hand, displays prizes awarded to Mohsen Makhmalbaf, his daughter Samira and other filmmaking members of his family �ê" even though Makhmalbaf is another dissident. Thus the Iranian government takes pride in Iran's filmmakers even when they are against it. Studying the conditions of Iranian cinema may well open up horizons to making a new low-budget cinema in Egypt, which would draw on the drama of life in various sectors of Egyptian society. Such research could be undertaken by studying the films themselves, however: it does not require the posited and as yet unclear Egyptian-Iranian cooperation. The latter would involve market mechanisms which are very different in each country: in Iran many films �ê" those screened locally �ê" are funded by the government, while art films often rely on funding from outside Iran as well. In Egypt, by contrast, we have private production companies that depend on an oligarchy of distribution companies: this is profit-making entertainment in the worst sense. As for art cinema which competes in international festivals, it is either produced by the state (the ministries of culture or information) or are coproductions with western companies, as in the case of the late Youssef Chahine's company, the only one that is good at receiving funding from France especially. Cooperation between Egyptian and Iranian cinema and television would face a number of obstacles including the multiplicity of producers in Egypt and censorship issues on both sides. Iran's efforts towards reconciliation with Egypt are legitimate and perhaps commendable, but the Iranian side's insistence on describing the revolution as Islamic turned the encounters into a defence of the civic nature of the revolution in Egypt and cast doubts on the organisers' intentions. Still, cultural and artistic exchange will nonetheless be beneficial so long as both sides are aware of their differences from each other.
