Chaos, economic deprivation and political division will quash the revolution if Egyptians pay too much attention to the former regime and not enough to the future, writes Khalil El-Anani I was not all that interested in the trial of Hosni Mubarak. After he was deposed on 18 February, I decided to put him out of my mind now that he was a part of the past, in spite of the many crimes and catastrophes that had occurred during his rule, the effects of which will continue to weigh on us for quite some time to come. Were it not for the farcical nature of the trial and its ridiculous staging I would not have paid attention to all the attendant din and hyperbole. Many might have hailed it as a "historic trial" and "the trial of the century," but I saw no "miracle" in the Mubarak trial, especially when compared to the drive to out him from power, which only took 18 days. Not for a moment did I think that this "bedridden" man in the defendants' dock merited the attendant ruckus. Even if he did rule for 30 years, ultimately he is a citizen being tried on charges of murder, corruption and embezzling public funds. If there is any benefit from this trial it is that it may help dismantle that "psychological" complex that has long governed the relationship between the ruler and the ruled in a country steeped in political Pharaonism and the deification of the ruler. To me, current developments in Egypt are much more important than the trial and far more deserving of serious national attention and concern -- if not fear -- over Egypt's future. The anxiety stems from the disequilibrium and deficiencies that are growing increasingly grave with every passing day in this transitional period. Political science literature speaks of three factors that can jeopardise democratic transformation in any country, regardless of the degree of its social cohesion and its political centrality: the security factor, the economic factor, and sharp political divisions. The security factor involves more than just the individual's sense of personal safety, that psychological state of stability and peace-of-mind that strengthens the individual's confidence in the possibility of embarking on an experience of democratisation. It also entails dimensions related to restructuring civilian-military relationships in the post-revolutionary phase. The greater the security challenges in the transitional period, the weaker is the hand of the civilian elites in their negotiations with military elites whose legitimacy is strengthened by virtue of their greater capacity to maintain security. As a result, the average citizen will become more and more convinced of the need for the military, not just as a guarantor for a safe transition but also as the preferred alternative in the event that political elites fail to produce a civil option capable of performing the security function with the same efficacy. In such a case, the perpetuation of military rule becomes less a question of some "hidden agenda" or "secret intent" and more a product of a "popular" demand for security and stability. Egypt may not have reached the stage of total anarchy, but the intermittent yet increasingly frequent incidents of violence (such as the recent events in Minya, Al-Arish, Sayyida Zeinab, Sohag and, before them, in Suez and Imbaba) are a tangible indicator that we are heading in a direction inimical to a safe and speedy democratic transition. Moreover, it only aggravates the situation if the military or whoever is in power attempts to politicise the security question. One effect of this, whether deliberate or not, is to promote a disregard for deterring immediate security threats (such as thug violence, theft and aiding prison escapes) on the grounds that police agencies are incapable of confronting these dangers since the revolution, or simply out of fear of confronting segments of the public that have been emboldened by the lack of restraints. Another effect is that it promotes the tendency to restrict the greater margin of civic freedoms that was one of the victories of the revolution. In addition, it works towards prolonging the process of democratisation and the transfer of power to a civil authority (by postponing parliamentary elections from September to November, for example, or by issuing decrees of law without first discussing them with concerned parties). In a sense, the Mubarak trial could be seen in this context of a trade-off of democratisation for security since it can be turned towards sapping the impetus of the revolution, silencing calls for the implementation of the revolution's demands and the forceful suppression of protestors. This would naturally lead to heightened military-civilian tensions, not only as the consequence of the military's involvement in politics, which would inevitably diminish the quality of the democratic product, but also as the result of the creation of a new flashpoint for conflict, namely the status of the military in the forthcoming political order. According to a recently published study, 25 experiences in democratic transition in the world have suffered severe setbacks or reversals in favour of authoritarian rule because of the security factor. The economic factor is axiomatically integral to democratic transformation, not only because economic hardship is a prime motivator of popular uprisings and revolutions, but also because economic hope is a chief guarantee for the perpetuation of the process of democratisation in the post-revolutionary phase. Admittedly, economic growth and democratic transformation are not necessarily directly related; however, the provision of a minimum degree of economic "security" and social justice in the post-revolutionary phase is an indispensable safety valve for the completion of the democratisation process. Unfortunately, this condition of economic security and justice has not materialised tangibly since the revolution. This problem has less to do with poor economic performance and declining growth indicators in the leading economic sectors such as tourism and services than it does with the day-to-day commercial transactions that affect people directly. The danger of this economic condition is twofold: it obstructs democratisation on the grounds of lack of sufficient resources and it generates a negative socio-psychological climate. The longer social injustices persist as a consequence of poor economic policies in the post-revolutionary phase the greater are the chances that many among the disadvantaged classes will not only grow frustrated with the revolution but also will turn against it and demand the return of the paternalistic caretaker state. In view of the deteriorating conditions in the current phase, this potential threat to the transition to a democracy built on the pillars of freedom and justice may be greater than the "coalition of counter-revolutionary forces". Sharp ideological differences -- the third factor abovementioned -- are tearing society apart along cultural, intellectual and identity-based divides, some of which are authentic while others are clearly fabricated. The situation has reached a stage in which cracks and fissures are fracturing formerly unified drives and movements. It is sufficient for my purposes here to register the following observations: irst, the Islamist-secularist divide reflects no small degree of recklessness and ��short-sightedness on both sides. In my opinion the greater portion of blame falls on the liberals and secularists not only because one presumes they should have better epitomised the qualities of openness and acceptance of the other, but also because of their resentment against the sudden and heavy influx of Islamists into the public sphere, a sentiment that has recently escalated to demands to exclude Islamists (which are not an ideologically or politically homogeneous bloc) from the political process on the grounds that they pose a threat to the revolution. Whereas some of the Islamists' slogans and rhetoric have been truly disturbing, these should be placed in the framework of their exclusion from political life over the past six decades. Certainly further exclusion can only yield further ideological rigidity and polarisation and an intensification of the types of "confrontations" that we have seen during the past weeks and that have soured the post-revolutionary climate. Second, if differences in opinion are a positive sign of a new openness to all political trends and the potential for political pluralism, the shift from respect for differences in opinion to mutual hostility and ostracism is the first nail in the coffin of the process of democratic transformation, especially when highly charged symbolic dimensions, such as religion and identity, are summoned into the fray. Egypt is one of the few countries in the region in which identity and national character have merged into one over the centuries. Nevertheless, the types of ideological controversies that we are seeing today, especially under conditions of increasingly acrimonious and anachronistic political entrenchments, still have the power to distort and rupture this harmony in identity and shatter its underlying social structure. Third, perhaps the most dangerous feature in the current state of ideological division in Egypt today is not just that it came very early on in the revolution but also that it extended beyond temporary matters and exigencies to include essential and lasting issues. While the initial dispute between political and religious camps may have focused on a roadmap for the transitional phase (and particularly the dispute over whether or not to hold parliamentary elections before drafting a constitution), its effect was to catapult society to questions that need years if not decades to resolve, such as the relationship between religion and the state, the relationship between religion and society, and the delineation of the civil and religious realms in the public sphere. Fourth, the disputing parties appear oblivious to the fact that they are not alone in the public sphere. Other classes, sectors and groups are there as well and may act to defend their interests in the event that they feel these are being ignored as a consequence of the rival ideological camps' obsession with their own concerns and the intensive media focus on this rivalry. Fifth, while the current divisions have a prevailing ideological character, this should not blind us to their underlying dimension as a class conflict over social and political interests in the post-revolutionary phase. Liberals and secularists largely come from the upper and upper middle classes of society and they were primarily instrumental in setting the Egyptian revolution into motion. The Islamists, on the other hand, represent the lower middle class, and some of them participated in the revolution from the outset. On the whole, what strikes one most at this juncture is that while each side is scrambling to promote its interests and jockey for position, they appear to have forgotten that Egypt is more than able to embrace everyone, but on the condition that everyone assumes a healthy degree of objectivity and self-sacrifice. The writer is a researcher at School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University.
