Whatever the outcome to the current Syrian crisis, the US may find itself in a win-win situation, says Ali Younes* Ever since the beginning of the crisis in Syria that started last March in the southern city of Daraa, President Bashar Al-Assad seems not to have been able to grasp the enormity of the events that are taking place in his country. From the very beginning, Al-Assad and his inner circle have decided to use the maximum amount of force to crush the protesters in Daraa and to cow the rest of the citizens into submission. However, to his surprise, using brute force and killing innocent people seems to have been working the other way around. Indeed, protests have spread to other cities, and Al-Assad, along with his brother and other ruling Syrian Baath Party leaders, are now facing international scrutiny. While international pressure in the form of condemnations and sanctions is mounting, it is clear that Al-Assad is getting mired knee-deep in Syria's quicksand, and the more he tries to extricate himself, the deeper he sinks in. Given Al-Assad's predicament, US President Barack Obama has positioned American policy towards Syria in a win-win situation, with or without Al-Assad in power. One clue about the American strategy toward Syria lies in US reluctance to withdraw its recently appointed ambassador there, Robert Ford. Another clue lies in the language Obama used in his 19 May speech about Syria, in which he remarked that "President Assad now has a choice. He can lead that transition, or get out of the way." It is unclear, however, how Al-Assad, who presides over a totalitarian regime that stifles any impulse towards democracy or prospect of civil liberties, can lead a transition towards democracy. In other words, Obama has called on Al-Assad to switch from dictatorship to democracy, which in itself implies stepping down from power, or "getting out of the way", which is an unlikely prospect. If Al-Assad eventually succeeds in crushing the citizen rebellion in Syria, which is not clear at this point, and is able somehow to pacify the restive cities, he will come out of the situation severely weakened, isolated and vulnerable. He will find himself in a situation similar to that of former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein after the 1991 invasion of Kuwait, during which time Saddam was subjected to crippling sanctions and international isolation, ultimately leading to his demise. From the perspective of American strategic planners, a weak and vulnerable Al-Assad will be useful to US objectives in the region in several areas. As such, Al-Assad will be more motivated by his survival instincts to compromise on issues that he has long used to leverage against the US and its Arab allies in the region. As a result, the US and its allies will push a crippled and isolated Al-Assad towards compromising (or even sacrificing) his relations with Hamas, Hizbullah, and, more importantly, Iran. Removing the Syrian pressure valve from Hamas will push Hamas towards greater flexibility with the Palestinian Authority (PA). As for Hizbullah, a weak Al-Assad will deliver a severe blow to its standing within Lebanese politics and will deprive it of a key lifeline in the event of a regional war with Israel. But the key prize for the US when deciding how it should deal with Al-Assad is Iran. If Al-Assad can be convinced to give up his alliance with Iran in exchange for him and his Baath regime being allowed to remain in power, it will be a major victory for the US against Iran. Iran in this case will lose its key and only Arab ally and therefore will be pushed toward the negotiation table over its nuclear programme. According to this scenario, Al-Assad will also be more enthusiastic about signing a peace treaty with Israel that will be more favourable to the latter. Israel will in this case agree to give up parts of the Golan Heights, while other parts, including a buffer zone inside Syrian territory, will be demilitarised along the lines of the 1975 Sinai Agreement with Egypt. The other winning scenario, from an American perspective, will be if the current revolt succeeds in toppling Al-Assad from power, in which case the new Syria will look very different from the Syria of Baath and Al-Assad family rule. The leaders of the new Syria will be in no mood to reconstruct the old alliances the Al-Assad family used for decades, chiefly to ensure its own survival. Rather, they will be more concerned with reconstructing the country on a more democratic basis. In this case, Obama, as he mentioned in his 19 May speech at the state department in Washington, will provide financial and political support to ensure the country's financial stability, promote reform and integrate the emerging Arab democracies into the international economy. * The writer is a policy analyst based in Washington DC.
