Meeting with revolutionary youth groups recently, the ruling Higher Council of the Armed Forces has been making additional efforts to explain the situation the country faces and to build confidence in its decisions, writes Galal Nassar Caught between the push and pull of domestic controversies and disintegration and regional upheaval and flux, the ruling Higher Council of the Armed Forces (HCAF), which has been steering the country since the departure of former president Hosni Mubarak, certainly has its hands full. Foremost among its problems are the mounting scepticism towards it and the attempts to sow acrimony between it and the people in general and the youth of the revolution in particular. In the weeks that followed the HCAF's assumption of power, security began to break down across the country. This has been attributed to a variety of causes: remnants of the former regime bent on creating chaos, rebellious police officers and conscripts who were refusing to return to work, and foreign powers with designs on tampering in Egypt's volatile internal affairs with the assistance of organisations and groups having religious frames of reference. Simultaneously, revolutionary and national forces made growing demands for the prosecution of the former president, together with his family members and other figures from the former regime, on charges of the abuse of power, ordering the shooting of demonstrators, corruption and the plundering of the nation's wealth, and other such charges that are now being investigated by the prosecutor-general's office and the judiciary. There has also been the country's deteriorating economic situation, due to the long interruptions in production and the waves of sectorial strikes and protests. At the regional level, the HCAF has had to contend with the upheavals and changing situations across Egypt's western, eastern and southern borders. The escalating conflict in Libya threatens to fragment that country into a set of petty states and give rise to a situation of civil war, displacing a million and a half Egyptian workers and hundreds of thousands of Libyans. To the south, Sudan is headed towards armed conflict with the nascent state in the south over the oil- rich Abyei region, even as the problem of Darfur remains unresolved and domestic opposition mounts to the regime of Sudanese president Omar Al-Bashir. Further south and to the east, off the strategic Bab Al-Mandab Straits, Yemen is reeling as a consequence of escalating confrontations between the Sanaa regime and the tribes and political activists demanding its downfall. Meanwhile, pressures are also building to the northeast, due to Israel's opposition to the Egyptian government's decision to reopen the Rafah Crossing with the Gaza Strip. To aggravate matters, the government of Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has been circulating propaganda to the effect that 400 Al-Qaeda operatives are allegedly stationed in Sinai and that security in that peninsula is on the verge of breakdown. The implied threat from Tel Aviv takes on even more ominous proportions in the light of events to the north of Israel. Regardless of the legitimacy of the Syrian people's demands with respect to the dictatorial regime in Damascus, the prospect of the disintegration of the Syrian state and army raises the spectre of the collapse of the Syrian front against Israel. PARTITION PLANS: An indication of the current climate and thinking, at least in some circles in Egypt, came in the banner headline in last Saturday's edition of the newspaper Al-Shorouk -- one day before the commemoration of the Naksa , the defeat in the 1967 war with Israel -- proclaiming that Egypt was the victim of a conspiracy involving domestic and foreign parties. The article below cited Mohamed Abbas, a founding member of the Coalition of the Revolution Council, saying that representatives of the coalition had seen documents confirming the existence of such a conspiracy and that its aims were "to sow acrimony between the people and the police, in order to plunge the country into chaos and wreak economic and social havoc, to sow discord between Copts and Muslims, in order to destabilise the country and project an image of Egypt abroad as a hotbed of sectarian strife, and to turn the people against the army, in order to punish it for having supported and protected the revolution and to weaken the military capacities of the state." The ultimate objective of all this, the article said, was "to fragment Egypt into several petty states (a Nubian state in the south, a Christian one in Upper Egypt, and an Islamic one in the east) and to expel the Palestinians from Gaza into the Sinai, thereby triggering a three-way war between Egypt, Palestine and Israel." According to Abbas, "the conspiracy is part of a larger plan to fragment the Arab states, as has occurred in Sudan, is occurring in Libya and has been attempted in Iraq, and to render Egypt so weak in the face of Israel that the Zionist Entity would become the dominant power in the new Middle East." Commenting on the veiled threat from Netanyahu and other sources in Israel to reoccupy the Sinai, the member of the Coalition of the Revolution Council said that "just as the Armed Forces stood by the people and furnished protection for Egypt and the revolution, the time has now come for the Egyptian people to stand by their Armed Forces." He added that he hoped that the HCAF would support a massive awareness-raising campaign, in order to alert people across the country and in government and private agencies of the threat of this conspiracy. He added that army officials he had met with had promised to convey this message to the HCAF. No HCAF official has either denied or confirmed the existence of this alleged conspiracy. But even so, according to Al-Ahram Weekly sources it is very reminiscent of allegations made by various Egyptian political scientists during the 1980s and 1990s. The late Hamed El-Rabie, for example, published a series of articles in Al-Wafd newspaper in the 1980s under the heading "Egypt and the coming war", which have now been republished by the Islamist author Mohamed Amara in a book called The Coptic Question: Fact and Fiction. In the original articles, El-Rabie warned of a plan to partition Egypt into several statelets. These would include a Coptic statelet extending from south of the governorate of Beni Sweif to the southern borders of the governorate of Assiut, with a westward extension to include Fayoum and a long corridor that would link the south to Alexandria. The later city would become the capital of this statelet under this plan. There would also be a Nubian statelet, extending from Upper Egypt to Dongola in northern Sudan, with its capital at Aswan. There would be an Islamic statelet, or "Islamic Egypt", extending from the Ismailia Canal area westward through the Delta to include the Western Desert, with its borders at the Coptic and Nubian statelets. This partitioning of Egypt, El-Rabie held, would be done in order to allow the spread of Israeli control across the Sinai and into the eastern Delta, pushing Egypt's borders back to the Damietta branch of the Nile and the Ismailia Canal and thereby fulfilling this part of the Zionist goal of resurrecting "Greater Israel from the Nile to the Euphrates." This conspiracy theory was based on a plan leaked in a special bulletin published by the World Jewish Organisation on 14 February 1982 entitled "Israel's Strategic Plans". Appearing on pages 40-59 of this publication, the plan called for the fragmentation of all states neighbouring Israel from the Nile to the Euphrates. It saw Egypt as a "lifeless corpse" in terms of its capacity as a leading power, "especially if we take into account the increasingly bitter confrontations between Muslims and Christians." The article continued by saying that "the partition of Egypt into geographically separate statelets should be our political aim on the western front during the 1990s. Once fragmented, Egypt will lose its centralising power, and fragmentation will spread to such countries as Libya, Sudan and beyond. The creation of a Coptic state in Upper Egypt and other such smaller and less important regional entities will pave the way for historical developments that must be realised in the long run, even if the Peace Treaty has obstructed them for the present." In subsequent paragraphs the authors of the paper wrote that "regardless of how they may appear, the problems on the western front are fewer than those on the eastern front. The partition of Lebanon into five statelets could be a model for what should happen across the entire Arab world. The partition of Iraq and Syria into separate zones on the basis of ethnic or religious affiliations should be one of Israel's chief long-term aims. The first step towards this end is to destroy the military power for these two countries." "The ethnic composition of Syria renders it vulnerable to fragmentation, which could lead to the rise of a Shia state on the coast, a Sunni state in the Aleppo area, and another centred at Damascus. There could also emerge a Druze entity in the Golan, which might also aspire to create its own state, although to do so it would need to annex the Hawran and the northern Jordan River basin. In the long run, such a state could serve to safeguard peace and security in the region. Achieving this goal is within our reach." Turning to Iraq, the paper said that "this oil-rich country, which is riddled with internal conflicts, is on the confrontation line with Israel, and its dismantling is important to Israel, indeed, more important than the dismantling of Syria, because Iraq in the short term poses the most dangerous threat to Israel." REASSURING MESSAGES: In the face of the fear and scaremongering over domestic and regional uncertainties, alarm and alarmism over the economic and security situation, and the scepticism with regard to the HCAF's neutrality, as manifested in the daily accusations on various websites and in every Friday gathering in Tahrir Square, the HCAF had begun to build its media profile and to open dialogue with the whole range of the coalition of the youth of the revolution. In addition, HCAF chairman Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi has begun to make more frequent public appearances, intended to raise morale and reassure the public. During his meeting with officers and soldiers of Egypt's two largest military formations, the Second and Third Armies, Tantawi said that prosperity would come to Egypt on the condition that people applied their total devotion and dedication to helping the country make it through this transitional phase. He stressed the need to boost the economy, to encourage foreign investment and to stimulate tourism, adding that as soon as the situation stabilised Egypt could realise 70 to 80 per cent of its income target from tourism within three months. He also said that defending the nation and protecting national security was a sacred duty in which there could be no possibility of being remiss. He reminded his audience of the army's role in the revolution: "the Armed Forces had many choices," Tantawi said. "It took the right decision during the 25 January Revolution to stand by the revolution of the people and to adopt their legitimate demands." In order further to set the public mind at rest, HCAF members have issued repeated statements to the effect that the Armed Forces is not above the law and that it has never had a desire to rule and that this remains and will remain the case. In their meeting with the youth of the revolution on Wednesday, 1 June, which was attended by 1,500 representatives of 153 revolutionary youth groups from different governorates, HCAF members admitted that one of their foremost challenges at present was to meet the revolution's demands as quickly as possible. Director of the Department of Morale, General Ismail Etman, said that from the moment that it had issued its first communiqué, the HCAF had contributed to the success of the revolution. General Mahmoud Higazi, who heads the Organisation and Administration Bureau, praised the revolution for elevating the value of citizenship. He stressed that the Egyptian people had the responsibility to oppose attempts to undermine the peaceful character of the revolution. At one point during the meeting, some participants began to chant that "the people and the army stand hand-in-hand," while another group countered with the chant, "the people want to cleanse the country of corruption." General Mohamed El-Assar then quickly stepped in to appeal for calm, asking people not to interrupt others and to set differences aside. He also took the opportunity to reaffirm the fact that the Armed Forces oppose attempts to undermine national unity and to create ill-feeling between the army and the people. Then, in order to indicate that the army was still on course with popular demands, HCAF member General Mamdouh Shahin reassured the participants that the prosecutions of key members of the former regime were moving forward steadily, but that such procedures required proper management and respect for evidence. After this meeting, the representatives of the youth groups voiced diverse reactions. Some felt that the meeting should not have been held in the Al-Galaa Theatre, while others described it as a "one-way dialogue", implying that the youth had not been given a chance to air their demands. Some went so far as to say that the substance of the discussions was positive from the perspective of the Salafist groups, and that the meeting had given fresh impetus to the unification of the Salafist youth movements. Moez Abdel-Karim, a member of the executive committee of the Youth of the Revolution Coalition, said that the meeting with the HCAF could not be considered as a form of true social dialogue, as it had only included 1,500 representatives of the participating groups and had not allowed for an exchange of views over the management of the country's affairs. "What, precisely, was the point of the meeting," Abdel-Karim asked. "I have no idea. It didn't include the participants in the decision-making process with respect to the forthcoming legislation, for example." He added that if the coalition was invited to take part in other meetings conducted in the same manner, which is to say without observing the dialogue mechanisms that the coalition had asked for, it would not participate. He recommended creating a national dialogue page on Facebook, where the HCAF could present its proposed laws. This measure would stimulate greater contact with the youth and generate social dialogue. "There are many ways in which the HCAF could foster closer communication, if it truly wants to," Abdel-Karim said. On a more positive note, Abdel-Karim welcomed the HCAF's pledge that it would not nominate a presidential candidate and that it would work to protect the civil state. "We are grateful to the HCAF for its awareness of the true role of the armed forces, which is to protect the country. Of course, if one of its members wants to run for president as a civilian after leaving the military establishment, he would naturally be free to do so." The Federation of the Youth of the Revolution, another coalition that took part in the meeting, announced that it would not attend further sessions. Its coordinator, Abdel-Razeq Eid, criticised the way in which the dialogue had been conducted, adding that his group regretted having attended. His colleague, Haitham El-Khatib, a member of the federation's executive bureau, said that he had been surprised that people could enter just by showing their identity cards and that many of those present not only did not represent the Egyptian revolution, but also included youth from the dissolved former ruling National Democratic Party (NDP). Moreover, youth from the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist trends occupied most of the seats, he said, even though their representation was supposed to be limited to 10. A fellow member of this federation's executive bureau, Amr Hamed, was equally disappointed. "It looks as if Tahrir Square is the only avenue to achieve the rest of the demands of the revolution," he said, "because it is clear that there is no genuine intention here to listen to the voice of the youth and to realise the demands of the revolution through negotiation." Hamed urged the forces of the revolutionary youth that had been brought together as a result of the revolution to unify in the search for a way forward. Echoing many of these sentiments, Shehab Abdel-Maguid, a representative of the Youth of the Gabha (Front) Party, urged the HCAF to convene what he called a "real conference". This would include all youth groups having memberships of more than 1,000 people, of which they are currently 20 or so. The conference would have to take the form of "a forum for dialogue and not just a lecture", he said. On the large turnout of Muslim Brothers and Salafis at the meeting, Abdel-Meguid maintained that these groups and the HCAF were essentially of the same mind on many crucial issues, which is why they were not interested in an alternative point of view, namely that of the revolutionary youth. Indeed, his suspicions seemed to be borne out by Salafi activist Ibrahim Abaza, who represented many of the Salafi participants. In an interview, Abaza told the Weekly that the Salafist and Brotherhood youth coalitions had conducted intensive coordination, in order that they could bring together their positions with the aim of forestalling the political unrest that some liberal groups, he said, were trying to stir up. Among the liberals' tactics, according to Abaza, were their calls for the drafting of a new constitution before the parliamentary elections and for the creation of a civilian presidential council to run the country during the interim period instead of the HCAF. Abaza said he was working to arrange a larger meeting between the Salafist and Muslim Brotherhood coalitions to be held in the coming days. The HCAF meeting, he said, "was a springboard for coordination between the Islamist coalitions at the national level, with the aim of unifying our vision and demands and fighting attempts on the part of certain liberal groups to foment political unrest." Describing the meeting with the HCAF as being "very good", Abaza added that the participation of the Salafist and Muslim Brotherhood groups had "proved to all that there are other voices in Egypt apart from liberal ones." He used the occasion to lash out at the behaviour of some of the liberal participants, who, he said, "have forgotten how to hold a civilised dialogue" and had frequently interrupted speakers. In his opinion, the meeting had reflected a consensus among all national forces over the revolutionary demands, with the exception of two of them, though he was not worried by this divergence of opinion. "We have received assurances from the HCAF that there will be no subversion of the will of the people and no caving in to pressures from the political minority that insists on having a constitution before parliamentary elections are held," he said. "The HCAF has also pledged to hand over power to an elected authority," Abaza added, appealing to other groups not to press for "contentious demands". At one point during the meeting, the Al-Galaa Theatre erupted into shouting matches and competing choruses of slogans after General Mahmoud Higazi asked what the situation would have been like in Egypt had the Armed Forces not stepped in to protect the revolution. One contingent started to shout, "the people want the referendum results to be applied!" Another chimed in with, "parliamentary elections first!" Yet others proclaimed, "the army and the people, hand-in-hand!" General Mohamed El-Assar appealed for calm and restraint. "We are still in a state of revolution stemming from our opposition to the practices of the former regime and the spread of corruption," he said, adding that people had to work together during this delicate transitional phase and that he hoped that the meeting would produce positive results. He went on to explain the many challenges that the HCAF has had to contend with since 11 February: the security breakdown after the police withdrew; the more than 23,000 escaped prisoners; and the theft of arms and ammunition from police stations. Then, there had also been the economic deterioration, the flight of tourists and the complete standstill in the tourist industry since the revolution, and the halt in foreign investment due to the strikes and sit-ins that had cast a shadow over investment stability in Egypt. On top of such problems, some forces had begun to incite sectarian strife, he said, saying that "we -- the Armed Forces -- will not allow the enemies of the nation to strike at the country's security." Nevertheless, El-Assar said, the army was also facing a fourth challenge in the shape of the media. "Some segments of the media are working to drive a wedge between the army and the people. In a single week, from 21 to 27 May, we noted 23 talk shows in which there were 82 personal attacks on members of the HCAF." El-Assar said that the HCAF had had to contend with people's impatience at delays on the realisation of their demands. He assured participants that "we -- the HCAF -- study all positions in the light of political, social, cultural and legal considerations, and we hear diverse points of view that often do not listen to one another." When Ismail Etman opened the meeting between the HCAF and the revolutionary youth, representatives of some 135 youth groups were present, including representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Salafis and the Al-Azhar University youth. One noticeable absence was the Central Youth Coalition, even if some of its representatives from governorates outside Cairo were on hand. The beginning of the meeting was marked by brief flare-ups between advocates of and opponents to parliamentary elections before a new constitution has been drafted. In the course of the meeting, the Armed Forces distributed a survey headed "Egypt First", consisting of 23 questions on developments in Egypt. Some of the questions solicited suggestions regarding the current transitional phase and potential threats to the revolution. Others asked respondents to assess the performance of the HCAF, as well as that of the government led by Prime Minister Essam Sharaf. There was a multiple-choice type question on the choice of presidential candidate. The choices were Amr Moussa, Mohamed El-Baradei, Ayman Nour, Hamdeen Sabahi and Kamal El-Ganzouri, although respondents could also supply the name of another candidate of their choice. They were asked what type of government they thought the Egyptian people wanted, what their favourite television programmes were, how to restore security, and their assessment of the new political rights law. CAN THE CRISIS IN CONFIDENCE END? The question that inevitably arises whenever relations between the army and revolutionaries are strained is whether confidence between the two sides will collapse and what could happen if it did so. Both sides, however, are aware of the sensitivities and support of the other. Both also realise that the Armed Forces are the last line of defence in Egypt and that the army is the only Egyptian establishment in the field that is ready and able to serve as a safety valve. However, some also naturally wonder at the HCAF's relationship with the Islamist movements, asking whether the two have struck a deal to ensure the smooth implementation of the roadmap for the transitional phase. Certainly, the HCAF has gradually become familiar with the balance of forces on the ground, although from the outset the situation, as one military strategist put it, was akin to a minefield: in order to perform the mission assigned to it, the HCAF has had to tread with extreme caution in an area for which it has had no map identifying potential tripwires or booby-traps. This is why progress on the road back to stability had been relatively slow. Every time a decision has had to be made, HCAF officials have had to study the pros and cons of each alternative and gauge public reaction, so as not to further rock stability that is already fragile due to the security breakdown and the interruption in government. Because of their appreciation of the precarious territory that they have had to find their way through, the HCAF leaders have realised how important it is to take into account the size, power and influence of religious rhetoric and the ability of movements with a religious frame of reference to move the masses, however wrong this might be. At the same time, it has become clear that some parties have been bent on deliberately setting off mines, such as sectarian strife, accusations of torture or other human rights abuses, the Sufi versus Salafi conflict, the class issue triggered by charges that the revolutionary youth do not appreciate the economic straits of the working classes, and the idea of "remnants of the regime" engaging armies of thugs to create chaos or help them accomplish other designs. Most observers believe that the HCAF should now make clear decisions for the coming months and take definitive measures to defuse such mines lurking beneath the shifting sands. For example, such observers say, the HCAF should settle the debate over whether or not to hold elections before writing a new constitution. They also suggest that the HCAF produce a set of guarantees in order to alleviate anxieties over the designs of extremist Islamist trends, such as issuing an explicit declaration affirming the civil character of the Egyptian state and criminalising mixing religion with politics in the electoral campaigns and the creation of political parties on a religious basis. In addition, the HCAF should also consider demands to modify the tasks and improve the performance of the Sharaf government, if not to change the government entirely, in accordance with the exigencies of the current phase and, in particular, the need to restore security and stability and stimulate production, tourism and investment. Some observers have further stressed how important it is for the HCAF to quash tendentious rumours that surface from time to time and that help to trigger violence and bloodshed. Indeed, the HCAF may already be taking such advice on board. The Weekly has learned that it is considering setting up a television channel that would express its points of view, broadcast its communications, and reflect its ability to sense the pulse of the street. This channel would also serve as a link between the HCAF and the many among the general public who are unable to access the Armed Forces website on the Internet, allowing them to become informed about the HCAF's positions on what the media are publishing or broadcasting on public affairs in Egypt and the HCAF's actions in particular. The HCAF also decided to cancel the curfew imposed from 2am to 5am starting 15 June.
