Changing from a culture of monopoly of power to one of pluralism and democracy will not happen overnight, even in the best of circumstances, writes Said Okasha* The Higher Council of the Armed Forces (HCAF), delegated by former president Hosni Mubarak to run the country after he stepped down, has had to tackle many issues. Most of the Egyptian people had high hopes that HCAF would quickly deal with the country's many problems, among which are security, drafting a new constitution, holding presidential and legislative elections promptly, recovering embezzled money from figures of the former regime, and expediting the trial of those responsible for the killing of the martyrs of the 25 January Revolution. By looking at this list of demands one quickly realises, first, that it is difficult to meet these demands all at once. Second, we comprehend the impossibility of HCAF reaching a decisive decision on any of the demands in the short term. These deductions may have been only realised by some elite sectors and not by all citizens of the Egyptian population. Thereby, a lot of doubt surrounds the intentions of both the new transitional government, with Essam Sharaf as its prime minister, and HCAF. Moreover, these doubts are sharpened by the government's adoption of a decree that criminalises sit-ins and demonstrations. In addition, governmental executive agencies appear to be dealing with sectarian incidents in the same old way as the ousted regime -- ie cursory reconciliatory sessions. Where is the problem? Any phase following radical change in any given human society is characterised by an elevation of (previously) marginalised populations' ambitions. And whenever there are any signs of reluctance to meeting those ambitions, then the marginalised populations' doubts surrounding the new rulers start to escalate. Citizens do not understand the delay except in two ways: either due to managerial and political incompetence, or complicity favouring the continuation of the old system with new faces. In analysing the current political and social situation in Egypt, analysts referred to one or both these analytical pretexts. However, all analyses of HCAF's performance are problematic because they overlook the exceptional transformation in Egypt, which for the first time in its history got rid of its centralised authority embodied in the president and moved to a decentralised phase where authority is divided among many entities. Historical experiences indicate that the ability of the governing system to accelerate the pace of decision-making is inversely proportional to the number of entities influencing the decision-making process. In other words, decision-making that is dependent on a central authority is monopolised by a limited number of individuals, which facilitates a faster process of decision- making compared to a system dependent on power sharing entities. For further explanation, Egypt's political situation in the years between 1923-1952, which is also known as the first liberal age of Egypt, was characterised by a division of power amongst three poles: the palace, the occupation; and the Wafd Party. Each pole of the three tried fiercely to overrule the other two, thus delaying the response to any of the demands of the Egyptian population, whether related to ending the occupation, achieving social justice, or establishing a competent national political system that represented all Egyptian social forces. This state of power distribution accordingly leads to a state of paralysis sometimes, or political instability most of the time. Exacerbating economic and social demands lead the country into steamy territory. The armed forces took advantage of this instability in 1952 to take over the three poles of power, one after another, replacing them with unipolar system (during the period of Abdel Nasser and for most part during Sadat's period). It is widely recognised that certain international and regional circumstances helped the system of Nasser to thrive and to achieve some of the social and economic demands of the Egyptian people. However, 1952 eventually led to an authoritarian regime that repressed individual freedoms, and that failed to safeguard the nation's achievements, especially after dragging the country into complex external wars. It was no coincidence that voices demanding democracy reappeared after the 1967 war defeat, and after Nasser passed away in 1970. Those voices striving for democracy argued that the 1967 defeat and the deteriorating conditions of Egyptian people were related to the absence of democracy under the centralised system Nasser personified. The ongoing situation presently, following the 25 January Revolution, is opposite to the situation Egypt encountered in 1923-1952. Back then, Egypt suffered from Britain monopolising Egypt's political system until the revolution of 1919. This revolution brought two more political poles into the decision-making equation, a situation that lasted until 1952. Now, authority in Egypt is divided between six poles: HCAF, which leads the transitional phase; the remnants of the old regime (men working for former President Hosni Mubarak, controlling all key state institutions, as members of the National Democratic Party); formerly marginalised political parties (especially the new Wafd Party, Tagammu and Nasserist parties), or the ones oppressed and banned like the Muslim Brotherhood; new forces of the youth, which led the revolution, represented in groups, movements and political parties awaiting licenses; civil society and non- governmental organisations and unions; and external forces anticipating any changes that might affect their benefits. It is true that these six poles are not equal in force, but each has an influence on the decisions made by HCAF. The council being a pole as well as an arbiter is a situation that complicates the process of decision-making. Extra careful measures must be taken to achieve a precise balance between all of these forces. The question that needs to be asked here does not concern what is happening during the transitional phase; rather it is about the future, and how could a society that revolted against the tyranny of singular authority be able to administer itself efficiently amid multi-polar authorities that are inherent to democratic systems? Societies that have cultures that historically lean towards patriarchal and centralised authority trade individual freedoms for stability and minimal subsistence. These cultures often find it difficult to transition to a multi-polar distribution of authority. Despite the potential drawbacks resulting from this latter distribution, it is arguably still an acceptable price for the change that Egyptians long for. Monopolised authority, and the limited efficiency of state institutions, resulted in a catastrophe, demolishing what Egyptian society had achieved in its modern history. Meanwhile, those from among the ordinary Egyptian people who favoured centralised authority were the first to suffer this catastrophe and the system's significant shortcomings. It is crucial to raise awareness about how dangerous this earlier system is and to expose any and all attempts to revive it on the part of those belonging to the old regime. The first step needed presently in Egypt is to crystallise awareness and to enlighten the public about what is happening during the transitional phase. Perhaps a slow decision-making process will continue to be a characteristic of Egypt's political system for years to come, as well as political instability, or public struggles between political forces. These characteristics do not necessarily mean that the ruling authorities are incompetent or that there is a conspiracy to monopolise authority. Rather, it is an inevitable phase that precedes efficient democracy in cultures denied political pluralism for centuries. * The writer is a researcher at Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies.
