Sudanese Vice President Salva Kiir prepares to enjoy his hour in the sun even as President Al-Bashir grits his teeth, observes Gamal Nkrumah Big oil business and Abyei, an oil-rich tiny enclave sandwiched between northern and southern Sudan, have become synonymous. On both sides of the Sudanese north-south divide, oil and gas executives are courting politicians. This week matters took an ominous turn. Northern Sudanese armed forces stormed and took control of the main towns in Abyei, and Khartoum's airforce bombarded the villages of Todach and Tagalei escalating menacing tensions between Khartoum and Juba, the respective capitals of northern and southern Sudan. The Sudanese political impasse and the current Abyei crisis call for cool heads. Northern Sudan is not wrong in defending its interests, but not at the expense of the southern Sudanese. Relations between Khartoum and Juba have become noticeably more fractious. The ruling clique in Khartoum needs to bring its Abyei policy to heel. State television in Khartoum boasted that "enemy forces" were expelled from Abyei. The United Nations Security Council expressed deep concern over the escalating violence in Abyei. Sudanese President Omar Hassan Al-Bashir is accused by Western powers and the southern Sudanese government in Juba of offering sanctuary to the Arabised Messeiriya tribal militias that have marauded, extorted and pillaged ethnic Dinka Ngok villages in Abyei. Having handcuffed himself to the militant Islamist elements now dominating the political scene in northern Sudan, President Al-Bashir has found his Vice President Salva Kiir walking confidently on the political pavement towards the independence of southern Sudan in July. Meanwhile, Al-Bashir himself trudges in the gutter by the loss of oil revenues and political prestige after the referendum in January. He is splattered by the muck of every Sudanese controversy from the crisis in the oil-rich enclave of Abyei to coping with increasingly vociferous opposition voices in his own northern two-thirds of Sudan. Al-Bashir's plans for the political and economic prospects of northern Sudan are hardly beyond criticism. Al-Bashir promptly dissolved Abyei's regional administrative council and arbitrarily dismissed the two heads of the Abyei administration causing much commotion in the war-torn enclave. Western powers sympathise with the southern Sudanese cause even though they conceded that the unprovoked attack by southerners on a UN convoy was "deplorable" in the words of United States special envoy to Sudan Princeton Lyman. "We feel, however, that the response of the government was disproportionate and irresponsible," Lyman added. He should heed his own advice and stay out of Sudanese domestic affairs. Al-Bashir has had to tread a fine line between his political identity as the omnipotent executive decision-maker in Khartoum and not alienating a substantial segment of the non-Arab population in northern Sudan. The Sudanese president has already indicated that he will not recognise the independence of southern Sudan scheduled for 9 July if Abyei is considered as part of southern Sudan. He wants the southern Sudanese to renounce claims on Abyei in the southern Sudanese draft constitution. Sudan's Presidential Adviser Nafie Ali Nafie warned against adopting a clause in its transitional constitution that states that Abyei falls under southern Sudanese jurisdiction and is an integral part of an independent South Sudan. The Sudanese president is losing his potency as a spoiler. The problem is that Al-Bashir's colourful language, bellicose posturing and championing of a single cause -- militant Islam and Abyei, and the two are one -- is unhelpful, to say the least. The nub of Al-Bashir's argument is that Abyei is part and parcel of northern Sudan and shall remain so after the independence of southern Sudan come what may. The Sudanese president has many supporters in Khartoum who believe that Al-Bashir is right to be up in arms about Abyei. And, that is not all. The bottom line is that Al-Bashir must learn when and how to budge. This means first and foremost acknowledging that Sudan is a multi-religious, multi-ethnic, and multi-cultural nation and that it cannot be run as a Taliban-style state. The Sudanese president's tendency to think that everything will work out for the best if the people of Sudan just trust him is not confined to politics. It is evident in his attitude towards the economy as well. His policy is that it is best for investors not to know too much about Sudan. The assault by the Sudanese government supported Messeiriya tribal militia on innocent civilians in Abyei was the work of a president who has lost sight of the national interest. By behaving as though his government is above the law, Al-Bashir is steadily alienating African and international public opinion and eroding his own government's legitimacy and therefore the long-term security and political stability of Sudan. Peace would then leave the leader of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) Salva Kiir more able to improve social conditions and deal with the underdevelopment that originally led to the SPLM's rise to power in Juba and to the secession of southern Sudan. Al-Bashir has blustered that behind the calls for a referendum in Abyei to determine whether or not the oil-rich enclave joins southern Sudan lay the hand of the SPLM. The loss of face Khartoum would soon suffer because of the secession of southern Sudan is nothing compared with the steady loss of legitimacy it is now stomaching. Unquestionably, there is a crying need in Sudan to uphold human rights and full citizenship rights for all its citizens, Arab and non-Arab, Muslim and non-Muslim. But, Khartoum's own lawless behaviour serves as a recruiting sergeant for pockets of resistance like Abyei, Blue Nile and South Kordofan states to follow the southern Sudanese example and opt for secession. The spectre of the Balkanisation of Sudan now looms large. Al-Bashir's heavy- handedness gives secessionists in outlying predominantly non-Arab regions kudos at a time when southern Sudan is gearing up for independence celebrations. Yet while the unfortunate episode in Abyei allowed Al-Bashir to flex his muscles, it also demonstrated graphically the limits of his powers. Al-Bashir's failure is part of a pattern of enforcing authoritarian populist government that weakens the already enfeebled institutions of Sudan and cows independent voices in politics and civil society. Al-Bashir's is a baroque story in a country ill-suited to support such a setting. Political Islam if analogous with extreme pessimism about the political future of Sudan is unwarranted. It can even become, God forbid in the worst case scenario, a self-fulfilling prophecy. Al-Bashir is on the warpath. The attack on Abyei is part of a broader offensive. He believes that if he lets the SPLM get away with acquiring Abyei then other marginal and outlying areas of northern Sudan will follow suit. Western powers are increasing their humanitarian and development aid and assistance to southern Sudan and border areas such as Abyei would like to benefit from Western largesse. The European Union this week pledged to donate 200 million euros to South Sudan and the EU has already donated 150 million euros to address the needs of the most vulnerable people of southern Sudan. In sharp contrast, Kiir's criticism of Al-Bashir in particular and Khartoum in general has been carefully structured and oblique. "Let us have free and fair elections or a referendum in which the people of Abyei will determine their own political future. The people of Abyei, too, are entitled to national self- determination," Kiir explained. The calculus seems to be purely political: if not now, then never. If the future of Abyei is not determined now, once and for all, then it will set a dangerous precedent in which military might rather than the ballot box will determine the political future of marginal, non- Arab areas of northern Sudan. For all that, Kiir's talk contrasts with the blunt tactics of Al-Bashir. While there is certainly a debate to be had over citizenship in Sudan, and particularly after the independence of southern Sudan, this looks like a bid to bring Al-Bashir to heel. The suggestion by cronies that he is irreplaceable is untenable and is indicative of their self-serving machinations. Although Khartoum denies their authenticity, the evidence is overwhelming for the reports seeping out of Abyei that the Sudanese government forces are resorting to the use of excessive force and intimidation tactics. And this matters. Khartoum must learn to take the bitter pill of relinquishing its role as the national hegemon. There are deep-rooted historical reasons why the medicine will be bitter to swallow. That would test the moral mettle of Khartoum. Juba and Khartoum are in the midst of a delicate rapprochement. And, Abyei hinders bilateral relations and complicates an already murky picture of post-independence southern Sudan. Things are going to get grim if no solution to the vexing Abyei question is found. The cosy relationships between key cabinet ministers in the southern Sudanese government and giant multinational corporations has emerged as a hot topic of discussion in the country. The response to overtures by oil magnates courting southern Sudan in Juba was one of unconcealed delight. Not much love is lost between Al-Bashir and Kiir. Oil is paramount, and the Sudanese president intends to hold on by all means necessary to the oil producing border areas of northern Sudan such as Abyei. But this is a weak argument. There are tougher conundrums afoot as the Abyei files demonstrate. The Messeiriya tribesmen, referred to by distinguished Sudanese political scientist Abdel-Wahab Al-Effendi as "ferocious fighters", are used by the Sudanese government as "proxy militias". Southerners object to giving such seasonal nomads citizenship rights, although they are prepared to concede grazing rights to the Misseiriya for the time being. It is in this context that Umma Party leader and former Sudanese prime minister Sadig Al-Mahdi called for the creation of a National Wise-Persons Committee to resolve the Abyei dispute. The Sudanese president should take Al-Mahdi's suggestion into consideration. Before it is too late, Al-Bashir should safeguard his own legacy by charting a more accommodating deal with the SPLM over Abyei. He must desist from taking the slippery slope to fanaticism and despotism.
