News that US forces killed Al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden in a raid on a compound in Pakistan this week may mean more than meets the eye, writes Abdel-Rahim Ali The final phase in the hunt for Al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden began in August 2010 when -- according to the US narrative -- the CIA obtained information that enabled it to track one of Al-Qaeda's couriers to a fortified compound in Abbottabad, 50km from the Pakistani capital Islamabad. The 3,000-square-metre compound was surrounded by five-metre-high walls topped with barbed wire and guarded by two security gates. Situated in the middle was a three- storey building, its second-storey balcony concealed from view by a 21cm thick wall. There were no telephone lines or other communications cables leading into the compound. In February 2011, after another six months of thorough investigations, the CIA was able to confirm that Bin Laden was hiding in the compound. Intensive planning and preparations were then set in motion, culminating in this week's raid that ended with Bin Laden's death from a bullet in the head. Before any assessment of the future of Al-Qaeda following the demise of its leader, it is worth considering this US narrative. It contains many riddles, the answers to which can help in discerning the future of the world's most notorious terrorist organisation. However, any attempt to answer these riddles is likely to give rise to further questions that can only be answered in the light of future developments. Last December, the London Times ran a report citing anonymous Middle Eastern officials to the effect that Iran was giving "direct assistance" to Al-Qaeda. The report stated that in September 2010 the Iranian Revolutionary Guards had released a number of senior Al-Qaeda members, allowing them to travel to Afghanistan. Foremost among these was an intelligence officer, Mohamed Makawi, whose nom de guerre is Seif Al-Adel, together with Abu Mohamed Al-Masri, one of the organisation's most notorious commanders, Abul-Kheir Al-Masri, Suleiman Abul-Gheith, a former Al-Qaeda spokesman, and three members of Bin Laden's family. Not long before this in April 2010, US intelligence forces had succeeded in hunting down Mustafa Abu Yazid, Al-Qaeda's commander in Afghanistan. One of the organisation's senior officials, he was killed when a missile from an unmanned drone hit its target of a magnetic chip planted in his house. Before it was joined by Egyptian Jihad in February 1998, creating the International Front for the Fight against Jews and Americans, Al-Qaeda was headed by Bin Laden, whose subordinates included Ali Amin Al-Rushdi, aka Ubeida Al-Banshiri, drowned in Lake Victoria in 1996, Subhi Abu Sitta, aka Abu Hafs Al-Masri, killed in the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, Mohamed Makawi, aka Seif Al-Adel, and, lastly, Abu Mohamed Al-Masri, a notorious explosives expert. It is legitimate to ask whether Iran's release of Seif Al-Adel and Abu Mohamed Al-Masri was connected with a change in the US handling of Bin Laden, who was suffering from an illness that hampered his ability to act as the guiding spirit of Al-Qaeda. Had Bin Laden become a burden on US performance in the global fight against terrorism? How else are we to understand the timing of the present events, which have given US President Barack Obama a virtual blank cheque to remain in the White House after his chances of a second term seemed to have dwindled to nothing? It is worth noting that the Iranian release of the two Al-Qaeda leaders occurred around the same time as the US claims that it had located Bin Laden's whereabouts and had begun to consider ways to dispatch him. Then there is the matter of the bullet in Bin Laden's head. Why were the Americans reluctant to let the world ascertain the cause of death? Bin Laden had sworn on numerous occasions that he would never allow the Americans to take him alive, confirmed by his former bodyguard, Nasser Al-Bahri, aka Abu Jandal, who said that Bin Laden had told him to shoot him if it appeared that the Americans were about to capture him. Could this, in fact, be what happened? Abu Jandal left Al-Qaeda several years ago, but could his replacement have been the one to fire the fatal bullet? Lastly, what was the Pakistani role in hunting down Bin Laden? Did the CIA manage to infiltrate Pakistani intelligence and obtain crucial information from this source? Or could Pakistani operatives have lured Bin Laden to the house near Islamabad in order to allow the Americans to mount their attack? Perplexing as these questions may be, they raise hypotheses that may lead to something close to the truth. Bin Laden had lost his usefulness for the Americans in view of the revolutionary changes that are sweeping the Arab region, and these changes are opening up other means for Washington to manage its interests in this part of the world. The future of Al-Qaeda is connected to such questions, and the character of the organisation's next leader, the backdrop of international relations and the state of Al-Qaeda's franchises in Arab countries such as Yemen, North Africa, Somalia and Iraq will all set a course for the organisation and for the war on terrorism. Seif Al-Adel is the most senior leader of the organisation after Bin Laden and hence the most eligible to succeed him if changes following the alliance between Al-Qaeda and Egyptian Jihad are discounted. If not, then El-Zawahri, the current second in command, is poised to step into Bin Laden's shoes. From Al-Qaeda's perspective, the most suitable candidate would probably be Seif Al-Adel. One of the organisation's longest- standing leaders, joining in 1987, Al-Adel could give the organisation fresh impetus, drawing on his close connections with Iran and radical Islamist organisations such as Hizbullah, as well as on his operational experience. When these things are considered, and given Bin Laden's declining abilities, reportedly in a poor state of health due to kidney disease, we are probably looking at a new phase of violence on the part of Al-Qaeda. However, the direction and the scale of this violence will depend to a large extent on Iran, Seif Al-Adel's and Al-Qaeda's most powerful ally, as well as on the pending issues between Obama and the Ayatollahs in Tehran.
