If the Egyptian revolution has taught us anything it is that traditional assumptions can be reversed, writes Mohamed Anis Salem* Everybody has a pet theory. Iranian officials hailed Egypt's January uprising as a step towards an Islamic Middle East. Some Sudanese inside the Khartoum regime predicted an Islamic Nile Valley. Palestinian voices hoped for a tougher Egyptian stand in the face of Israeli transgressions. Israelis were concerned with the possibility of a Muslim Brotherhood threat to the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. One writer predicted a rise in the fortunes of Saudi Arabia and Iran, while another, recalling the days of Gamal Abdel-Nasser's regional activism, called for Egyptian military intervention in Libya. In response, there have been views, indeed criticisms, that the 25 January Movement was not concerned with international or regional issues. No wonder that the multiplicity of expert opinions has been described as the "Explanation Olympics". The devil as always -- especially in the Middle East -- lies in the detail. Indeed, a closer look at the dynamics and geopolitics of the region tells a different narrative of current events and presents an alternative picture of the future. One key factor, often overlooked, is the influence of debunked assumptions, confirmed by the inadequacy of old wisdom in understanding the dynamics of change in the region, let alone predicting events. Despite massive investments into the research industry, the inability to foresee the Middle East uprisings, their timing, driving forces, interrelationships, and sequence, left external actors unprepared and unable to cope with the surprise factor (lets face it, they have larger resources than local actors to analyze and predict events). Ideally, there is a need to differentiate between various sets of assumptions held, respectively, by a) international actors and observers, b) those in power in the countries of the region, and c) by those in opposition inside the Middle East. If we cannot, indeed dare not, provide comprehensive explanations and chart accurate predictions, two things remain possible: to review several of the old assumptions (debunking some, confirming some) and to introduce new ones. Here is a selection of some of the most commonly held, and emerging, assumptions. ASSUMPTIONS DISMISSED: One assumption viewed the intransigence of autocratic models of governance as an unchangeable fixture of the Arab scene. As a result, at best, soft reform was advocated as a strategy for saving regimes from themselves. At worse, active collaboration was undertaken as part of realpolitik. How else would one explain Hillary Clinton's early insistence on the "stability" of Mubarak's government, then her call for an "orderly transition", until she arrived at the concept of a "perfect storm." In contrast, there was the view of Mohamed El-Baradei, initially perceived as platonic, that the regime was "made of cardboard" and would collapse once a million people take to the street. Another given was the idea that economics would solve the problems of politics. In an antiquated discourse on political economy, Mubarak's officials spoke of the trickle down effect, citing the numbers of mobile phones and air conditioners in the country as evidence that the people had "never had it so good". At the same time, parliamentary elections were blatantly forged; the president's son was being groomed for succession; and bloggers were thrown into prison, tortured and, in the case of Khaled Said, killed. When it came, the revolution was about dignity not bread. A third erroneous idea was that of the disconnect of the Arab region. The lack of any serious effort towards integration or coordination between its governments, the limitations on the performance of the Arab League, the petty jealousies between the neighbourhood club of kings and presidents, all combined to create the impression that Arab nationalism had become a spent force. And yet, the electric impact of the Tunisian Jasmine Revolution, the speed of regionalising the chant "The people want the end of the regime", the role of Al-Jazeera television, the innovative use of social media, and the replaying of the cycles of protests, repression, resilience, concessions, rejection, and regime change, all emphasised the strength of Arab bonds and their impact on shaping history. ASSUMPTIONS CONFIRMED: In an article published in 1998, Kemal Dervis and Nemat Shafik provided two visions of the Middle East and North Africa in 2010 ( The Middle East Journal, Volume 52, Issue 4, 1998). One of these was a doomsday scenario with a huge youth population, high levels of unemployment and frustration reflected in violence. The Arab youth bulge has become a fact of life and its impact on politics has been well demonstrated. Indeed this is part of a major challenge facing the region which will probably double its population by 2050 to around 650 million people, while economic growth lag behind. Linked to this is the fact that the Middle East has become one of the most urbanised regions in the world, with mega cities taking a disproportionate share of power, funds and services. Another assumption is the central role of the "Egyptian model" in influencing the region. One analyst wrote: "in the realm of politics and culture, what starts in Egypt always ends up spreading to the entire region. From Pharaonic empires five millennia ago to Islamism, socialism and Arabism in the past century, from peace treaties with Israel to modern cinema and Salafist terrorism, major phenomena born in Egypt spread to the rest of the Middle East and sometimes to the world. We should expect history to repeat, as Egypt pulls out of a self- imposed mediocrity and marginalisation of the past four decades and regains its role as the dynamic centre of Arab ideology, politics and culture." Yet, the Egyptian model in itself is influenced by other forces in the region, as was shown by the lessons rapidly learned from Tunis's Jasmine Revolution. Indeed, Yemen's President Ali Abdullah Saleh explained the movement for change in his country as an "influenza imported from Tunisia and Egypt". A third thesis is that international interventionism has reached a level where the choice of leaders in Egypt requires an American and an Israeli endorsement. Recently this proposition was defended by referring to the significant number of phone calls made during the crisis by US officials (Obama, Biden, Clinton, and Pentagon chiefs) to their Egyptian counterparts (Mubarak, Suleiman, Tantawi, and Anan) and the Israeli position of supporting Mubarak in his last days. Since Mubarak's departure, there has certainly been a stream of Western officials visiting Cairo. While the details of this analysis may be contended, the reality is that there is a high level of external concern and influence in the region, reflecting the national interests of external powers. NEW ASSUMPTIONS: More interesting is to explore some of the emerging assumptions that are now being drawn from the quick succession of events in the Arab region. Naturally, while the evidence in favour of this new wisdom is based on recent events, and thus may be contentious, it deserves to be reviewed and tested in the years ahead. One of these new theories is the efficacy of non-violent strategies for political change in the Arab world. The array of strategies deployed in Tunisia and Egypt, and to varying extents in other popular movements in the region, included peaceful demonstrations, engaging police forces in dialogue, neutralising the role of the military, and mobilising international pressure. The fact that they have succeeded is proof that these approaches work, under certain circumstances, albeit the Libyan case presents a counter thesis. A second assumption is that social media is a strong instrument to build an anti-regime movement. This relates to the importance of the youth population in the countries of the region, the cumulative impact of the large numbers of those going through the education system (whatever its sins may be) and the high level of Internet access. The constraints remain daunting; high levels of illiteracy, relatively low Internet access and deliberate government policies, in some countries, to limit online freedoms. A third assumption is that the role of the military, and religion, remains central in Arab politics. This has been extended to include references to the relevance of the Turkish and Indonesian models of democratic transformation, particularly to the case of Egypt. To a large extent, propositions about "the man on horseback" are old, dressed up and returning strongly. In a reversal of traditional roles, the Egyptian military has vowed to hand power back to civilians within six months, while politicians are asking them to extend their stay to ensure a smooth transition. Another thesis is that the Middle East, far from being a region of stagnation, is undergoing deep changes in its key actors, its interactions and normative systems. Some of the change is sudden (war, revolution, and big events like assassinations), some of it is gradual (demographics, unemployment, environmental changes). Yet, the forces of the status quo are alive and well, especially when augmented with huge amounts of cash, traditional social structures and ideologies and, in many cases, strong international support, as is the case in the Gulf. Fasten your seat belts. This may be an interesting ride! * The writer is director of Development Works (www.dev- works.org).
