Nader Habib reviews Al-Taghyir: Tariq Masr Ila Al-Nahda (Change: Egypt's Way to Revival) by Wahid Abdel-Meguid, published by The Egyptian General Organisation for Books I bought this book four years ago, but could not finish it at the time. It seemed like science fiction, too idealistic, too improbable. But I picked it up again the other day and read it all the way through. This time, in the wake of the 25 January Revolution, it was like a prophecy that was waiting to happen and is now a dream come true. Wahid Abdel-Meguid is the director of Al-Ahram Centre for Translation and Publishing and a much-respected political analyst. He wrote Change: Egypt's Way to Revival in 2007 at a time when the National Democratic Party (NDP) was in control of all aspects of life in this country, when change was hard to perceive and corruption was quite rampant. Even so, the NDP's real scope was not revealed until a few weeks ago. Reading through Abdel-Meguid's book, I could not help thinking what would have happened had the men of the ousted regime paid more attention to what he and other reformative authors had written. His was reasoned advice, delivered in a reasonable tone and backed with potent arguments. But the powers that be were too busy being powerful to see the writing on the wall. Perhaps now that they are out of job, and out of favour, they will have time to read it, although I doubt that they are interested. Oddly enough, the book was printed at the printing house of the Egyptian General Organisation for Books and was a special edition for the Family Library, pet project of former first lady Suzanne Mubarak. Printed on the back cover is her message to the nation: "I dream of a book for every citizen and a library in every home, since culture is the means through which nations make progress and achieve development." Abdel-Meguid, who was writing right after the 2005 presidential elections, discusses the constitutional amendments that made it possible for the people to choose the president from multiple candidates. He notes that 139 years had passed since Egypt embraced the parliamentary system when in 1866 Khedive Ismail allowed for a council of representatives to be elected. Ismail wished for a rubber-stamp parliament, or at best a consultative body, but within two years the young parliament was making laws and holding the government accountable. Egypt was ahead of several parts of Europe in terms of democracy, Abdel-Maguid says before turning to assess the manner in which Article 76 of the constitution was amended. He notes the excessive restrictions the amendments place on future presidential candidates and assesses the implications. At the time critics were calling for serious reform, but instead the regime introduced deceptive measures that made democracy more elusive than ever. And it got away with it, mostly because of the public apathy then prevalent. The author sets out by comparing the political conditions in the Arab countries with those in democratic societies. He then addresses the pressures for democracy that certain Western countries were placing on Arab countries, and how these were being resisted by the local elites. Abdel-Meguid then discusses at length some of the social and economic problems facing Egypt and offers alternative ways of addressing these problems. Reform, he asserts, could offer a remedy for most of the country's pressing issues. He argues the need for a consensual reform leading to full democracy. According to Abdel-Meguid, the political stagnation that one sees around the region is because of the reluctance of the regimes to address long-awaited reforms. Instead of moving their countries forward through continual reforms, the regimes dithered and dissimulated. As the foreign pressures for reform gathered force following 9/11, the local regimes resisted, hoping to hold on to their unfettered power. What these regimes failed to understand was that true reform was the best way to resist foreign pressure. By denying their nations reforms, these regimes were not only alienating outsiders, but more importantly they were antagonising their own people. The world was changing at a fast pace, and yet the local elites hoped to keep doing things the way they had always done, without accountability, power sharing, or acknowledgement of basic freedoms. Abdel-Meguid launches into a historical analysis of Egypt's political dilemma. One reason for its current problems was the policies of the 1950s and 1960s, when Arab socialism, which was at best an exercise in state capitalism, inflated bureaucracy and stifled entrepreneurship. This phase would give way to the open-door policies of the 1970s and 1980s, where crony capitalism replaced the state-run economy and corruption became a standard practice in all dealings involving the state-run public sector and the fast-growing private sector. The whole scene failed to bring prosperity to the nation at large, but led to the illicit enrichment of a select few of well- connected individuals. The writer Ahmed Bahaaeddin once referred sarcastically to the open-door policy as the policy of "anything goes". What we ended up with was a deformed economy driven by ill-conceived policies that widened the gap between rich and poor. Egypt stagnated, having lost its sense of direction. Everywhere one looked, the scene was one of random decision- making and unsocial modes of behaviour. The growing corruption that the regime spawned was one of the reasons behind the 25 January Revolution. As public dissatisfaction mounted, the regime ignored demands for change. Some of the regime's key figures kept their jobs for many years, just entrenching their power and preventing new ideas from surfacing. The randomness in government policies led to chaos in various aspects of life. As the capital grew uncontrollably, informal housing sprouted all around it and traffic became unmanageable. Cultural and artistic creativity were among the first victims of the country's loss of moral compass. The author offers a colourful allegory of Egypt's failure to embrace new ideas. He says that the whole country was like food that had passed its shelf life and should have been thrown out of the refrigerator. Instead, it stayed on the shelf, stale and moulding and getting more poisonous by the day. Totalitarianism blocked all hope of change. The country's bureaucracy, underpaid and undertrained labour, held the economy back. And the public resentment at the government's heavy-handed ways increased progressively. The country's troubles were mounting, and yet the nation's chances for political participation were being curtailed. During the March 2011 constitutional referendum, I heard a joke that reminded me of Abdel-Meguid's book. One man says to another, "The president used to make things easy by answering all referendums on our behalf, and now that he's gone we have to line up to vote. How about that?" Still, old habits die hard. I heard of clerics urging the people to vote "Yes" in the referendum, suggesting that it would be sinful to vote "No". Abdel-Meguid's position on such behaviour is clear. For him, the reluctance to separate state and religion has been among the country's main failures. The use of religion in politics is not only opportunistic, he argues, but can lead to an escalation of sectarian tensions. Abdel-Meguid suggests that to defuse social and economic tensions a timetable for reform should be drawn up. The country cannot address its accumulated problems without thorough and systematic reforms, he says. According to Abdel-Meguid, Egypt needed to turn itself into an information society, one where everyone uses the Internet. How prophetic does this seem in hindsight? An information society is by definition a society of intellectual freedom, scientific freedom, and freedom of speech. We are not there yet, but the revolution has definitely brought us closer to Abdel-Meguid's concept of an information society than we had ever dreamed of becoming. There are obstacles in the way, however. One that of despotic government has been removed. However, Egypt still has to address the hardline fundamentalism and entrenched conservatism that may keep holding it back. You cannot have an information society without creativity and innovation, and you cannot have those without freedom. During the 25 January Revolution the authorities cut off the Internet to stop the protests, but it was already too late. Even with impaired communications, the nation went on defying the regime. How telling that the regime's last attempt at survival involved depriving the nation from their means of communication. What Abdel-Meguid portrays in his book is a regime in a state of denial. His analysis remained valid until the last moments of the regime's life. When former president Hosni Mubarak attended a parliamentary session at the end of 2010, he made fun of the opposition. "Let them have fun in their parallel parliament," he told his aides. The regime's resistance to change was such that its members blatantly refused to implement court rulings annulling the election of several members of parliament. The regime kept on ignoring the warning signs, thinking that it was immune to all accountability. Its arrogance brought about its downfall. Reading Abdel-Meguid's book, one cannot help but think that it had to happen. Abdel-Meguid foresaw the revolution, but he was not the only one. Many intellectuals and artists envisaged the upheaval to come. Many warned that the regime could not go on repressing the opposition and ignoring public demands forever. In the end, it all happened without forewarning, and much faster than many thought possible. There was a time when it seemed that the president might change his ways. Many thought that the death of his grandson two years ago might entice him to reconsider his position, but that was wishful thinking. In the end, the change came about the hard way, with protests and street battles and the rest of it. The risk was immense and the fears were great. Suddenly, security collapsed and marauders were roaming the country, slashing and burning, robbing and killing. If it were not for the valiant popular committees, organised on the spur of the moment, things would have become much worse. Finally, though, we have the change Abdel-Meguid was hoping for, and if he is correct this will be the way for revival.
