Many are the structural factors that led the Arabs to neglect Sudan. The question now is whether the Arabs have anything to contribute on the issue at all, writes Mohamed Anis Salem* Some 20 years ago, while working for the United Nations in Sudan, I often wondered about the indifference of Arab governments to international humanitarian efforts in that country. Sensitive to the government in Khartoum, Arab governments perceived the humanitarian crisis as an internal affair, perhaps believing that the government of Sudan was "forced" by the international community to accept the international relief effort, smacking of interventionism and limiting its sovereignty. The least form of Arab solidarity was to desist from participation. Yes, symbolic relief flights by Arab countries took place every now and then, with shipments simply handed over to the government of Sudan (notably after the 1987 floods), but no comprehensive Arab relief strategy was designed nor were there any memorable debates on issues such as this in the Arab League. Now, as Sudan approaches division, there is much criticism of Arab -- particularly Egyptian -- policies towards that country. These are portrayed as lacking vision, confused in their priorities and implemented through inefficient diplomacy. Some refer to the attempted assassination of President Hosni Mubarak in 1995 in Addis Ababa, which was traced back to Sudan, as a reason for Egyptian coolness towards Khartoum, and indeed much of Africa. Criticism of Egyptian diplomacy peaked after the failure of the Nile Basin meeting in Cairo earlier in 2010, followed by an agreement between the members of that grouping except for Egypt and Sudan. During a recent series of TV debates between Egyptian political parties on the eve of parliamentary elections, one was struck by the inability of participants to formulate clear opinions and options on Sudan. Looking back, the attitude of Arab indifference/ reticence to the strong possibility of the separation of South Sudan goes beyond individual approaches or even institutional inefficiencies. Indeed, one can trace this approach to three deep structural changes that occurred over the last two centuries: the waning of the ideas of empire and unity that governed the 19th and 20th century; the structural changes in the Arab regional order; and the growth of international humanitarian interventionism. First, the historical driving ideas for Arab -- particularly Egyptian -- interest in Sudan have waned. Throughout the 19th century, the drive south by Mohamed Ali and his successors, awakened by the geographical discoveries of that time, was motivated by a mix of empire-building concepts and the desire to ensure the security of the sources of the Nile. Eventually, this ambition intersected with the competition between European powers for colonies in Africa, with Britain taking on the role of protecting Egypt's riparian interests whilst combating slavery. The 19th century Mahdist movement, and Britain's subsequent direct intervention, curtailed Egypt's influence in the Sudan. Nevertheless, the palace and most Egyptians hanged on to the symbolism of the "King of Egypt and Sudan". This delusion made for an all the more rude awakening once Sudan voted for independence in 1956. The ideas and language of empire were no longer suitable to the post-World War II era, particularly as the new revolutionary regime in Cairo raised the flags of the right of self-determination and independence across the Arab region and Africa. The concept of Arab nationalism and integration became the principle regional leitmotiv for the next 20 years or so, with ideas on Sudan's role as the "bread basket" of the Arab region, and various attempts at regional integration between Egypt, Sudan and Libya. This overarching approach did not dwell much on the particularities of South Sudan, indeed of any non- Arab groups, as Arabism was presented as an all- encompassing concept that integrated all ethnicities. Eventually, post-1967, more particularly in the 1980s, and especially after the Iraq invasion of Kuwait, the concept of Arab nationalism receded as a major influence in the region. The rise of Islamist ideas, movements and alliances further damaged the unifying approach of secular Arabists, which now was defeated in the minds and hearts of the people of the region. It also emphasised the Islamic identity of northern Sudan and deepened the schism with the south. In 1989, when an Islamic regime took over in Khartoum, the dynamics of Sudan's division had progressed irretrievably. The second change that impacted Egypt's policies towards Sudan is related to the regional system of states. The "Arab regional order" has seen deep structural changes with the rise in the fortunes of new players (the oil rich countries), the realignment -- some would say downsizing -- of Egypt's regional role and the growing influence of non-Arab actors (Israel, Iran and Turkey). Meanwhile, as Egypt's dominance of the regional system waned, Cairo had become weary of the complexities of governance in Khartoum, which oscillated between military regimes and short-lived democratic experiences. The "tool kit" applied in the 1950s and 1960s (direct and indirect intervention in the affairs of other Arab countries) was no longer relevant to new circumstances. Even the ability to read events and analyse critical events seemed to have been lost; thus Cairo insisted on dealing with the 1989 coup as a nationalist movement rather than an Islamic takeover that was soon to disrupt the fabric of Sudan irreparably. This reticence was not helped by the absence of a regional effort to focus on any of Sudan's problems: the internal conflicts in the south, west and east of the country, the humanitarian situation, and the potential for economic cooperation. The regional organisation of choice, the Arab League, was ill-equipped to handle such challenges and perhaps there was an assumption that Sudan's multiple crisis were beyond repair or -- at least -- compartmentalised with little bearing on the region. Qatar made a brave effort to mediate on some of Sudan's issues, notably Darfur, but that is where it all stopped. In the end, there was no regional player willing to pay the costs for an effective, long-term engagement in Sudan. The third shift was the growing force of internationalism. Gradually, many years before proposing the concepts of "the responsibility to protect" (R2P) and humanitarian intervention, successive relief operations in Sudan (Operation Rainbow and Operation Lifeline Sudan) had enlarged the humanitarian space and constrained the exercise of Khartoum's sovereignty through allowing cross border relief operations, establishing periods and corridors of tranquillity, and asserting the inviolability of relief personnel and supplies. The machinery of relief operations (UN agencies, donor country representatives, international NGOs, depots, airports and air transport capacity) further internationalised the situation in South Sudan. International media coverage, together with linkages with the global movement for human rights and the internal politics of developed countries (for example, highlighting Sudan during the Obama presidential campaign) further strengthened international preoccupations with the issue. UN debates and resolutions on Sudan, in the context of Darfur and the south, crystallised these trends. As the Arab world seemed to absent itself from engaging with these developments, whether in the humanitarian relief context or on the human rights front, it became more marginalised in its ability to influence the process or outcome. When IGAD (the Intergovernmental Authority for Development) launched its initiative on South Sudan, the abstention of Egypt left a gap that was difficult to fill. There is no surprise in Arab attitudes towards South Sudan, which were only a reflection of deep structural changes in the region's history and political dynamics. The remaining questions are whether the Arabs will be able to formulate a clear strategy to deal with the new entity of South Sudan? What are the "late arrival" options for the Arabs? And can Egypt help galvanise a healthy environment to accommodate and deal with the new state on the block? Yes, alas, it has come down to this. * The writer is director of Development Works International (www.dev-works.org)
