Nothing much happened for the Arab world in 2010, and nothing much will happen in 2011, writes Ezzedine Choukri Fishere*. But business as usual cannot -- and won't -- go on indefinitely 2010 will go down in history, as far as the Arab world is concerned, as the most boring year of the decade -- the year when nothing happened. Look around you: did anything happen -- actually happen -- anywhere in the Arab world? Let's see. Iraq: the US has gone ahead with its preparation for withdrawal, and legislative elections took place where a majority of Iraqis voted their political leaders out, especially Nuri Al-Maliki, only to find the same faces back in office. Syria? Well... hmm... I'm thinking hard... no, nothing really happened. Lebanon? Saudi Arabia? Other Gulf states? Yemen? Even in that sad story (aren't they all?), nothing happened this year. Egypt? We had elections that didn't change much, not even the sitting government. Jordan? They had elections too (maybe we should then call 2010 the superfluous elections years). Libya? Tunisia? Morocco and the disputed Sahara? Nothing much there either. Sudan? A lot of threats, a lot of under-the- table, over-the-table and in your face deals, and then, surprise: the referendum will take place according to schedule, and will result in the splitting of the country as planned. Palestine; it must be Palestine, then, that witnessed major events! After all, this is the core conflict in the region. It cannot be that nothing happened there either. In 2010, US President Barack Obama insisted that Israel freeze its settlement expansion for negotiations with the Palestinians to start (or to continue, nobody is really sure). Israel's prime minister ignored him, expanded settlements, bringing negotiations to a halt, and nothing happened. OK, let's face it: this is a year when nothing really happened. The Arab world, collectively and individually, took no initiative to address its misfortunes. It wasted every opportunity that there was for action on its regional concerns: in Palestine, Iraq, Sudan, Lebanon and elsewhere. The Arab world did what it does best: waited to see what others would do, called on them to take action and to assume their responsibilities, and -- when they failed to do so -- pointed to their failure with innocent consternation. What about Arab internal concerns: decaying education and health services, savage urbanisation and social inequality? Not much, I'm afraid. For these are complex issues and addressing them is both difficult and risky. Therefore, in most Arab countries, 2010 looked like its predecessors: a year where stopgap measures were taken, leaving structural deformations to expand. Wait; if nothing happens and this leads to nothing, then maybe nothing should happen? The realists of Arab politics remind us that this approach (the "don't do much approach") is the most suited to the Arab world environment. After all, they say, this has been the case for decades. The Arab world is like a stacked up apple cart: if you move it too quickly, some say if you move it at all, the apples start to fall off. Better than scattered all over the place. When a shock happens, as in Iraq occupies Kuwait, the apples fall on the ground and everyone intervenes to collect what can be collected, rearrange the cart somehow and then try to prevent further movement. But what about the undercurrents? What about rising anger and deepening frustration? What if these combined sentiments reach a tipping point and then lead to explosion or collapse? Crying wolf, realists reply: the Arab world has always been angry, and all you can do is contain it. With such an approach, it is not difficult to predict what will happen in 2011. Let me tell you what will happen: in his last year of freedom of action as president, Barack Obama will try again to get Arabs and Israelis to settle their conflict. He will do it under heavy constraints and against tremendous pressures, so he will need help. Success in this attempt will require Arab leaders to take considerable risks. They won't. Israel's leaders will use this to exonerate themselves, and ultimately the American attempt will unravel. Palestinians and Arabs will cry foul, on deaf ears. In Iraq, the US will complete its "withdrawal". Instead of seeing this as an opportunity to come in and heal Iraqi wounds, the Arab world will sit on the fence and watch confessional strife grow -- if it doesn't make it worse. South Sudan will become an independent state and no one will notice. North-south problems will continue to dominate the news coming out of Sudan, over the same issues as for the last seven years: Abyei, oil revenues, border demarcation, armed forces deployment, etc. Harsh or mild, these problems will not prompt the Arab world to take action. Elsewhere, it will be business as usual, with keeping the apples in place as both the target and benchmark of success. And the consequences? Nothing dramatic. Undercurrents will continue to gain strength. Deep-seated sentiments will continue to grow. Until when? Until they reach a tipping point. But where is the tipping point? Is the tipping point of failing education when university graduates cannot tell the difference between an " Alef [first letter of the Arabic alphabet] and a cob of corn"? Well, many of them already can't. Is the tipping point of a failing health system where the sick fear hospitals? Many of them already do. Is the tipping point when your youth blow themselves up in anger and in despair? Thousands do. Is the tipping point of social inequality reached when the price of one person's dinner can feed hundreds? No one knows. The beauty of it is that no one can tell where the tipping point lies. You will know it only when you cross it, and then it will be too late. * The writer is an Egyptian author and academic.
