While in 2010 Ankara continued to make inroads as a regional power, the Iran dilemma has shown how fragile its foreign policy orientations are, writes Hassan Abu Taleb The closing months of 2010 reveal the probable directions Turkey will take in 2011. At the foreign policy level, the Turkish Foreign Ministry has cautioned Israel and Cyprus over their recent agreement to demarcate their common maritime boundaries, which Ankara fears will jeopardise the rights of Cypriot Turks in the northern part of the island. On another regional matter, senior advisor to the Turkish president Arshad Hormozlo stated that his country does not seek to rival Egypt in the Middle East or to act as a regional hero. It is not Turkey that is searching for roles, but rather roles seek out Turkey due to geographic imperatives that compel Turkey to undertake certain responsibilities, without intervening in the domestic affairs of any other country, he said. Domestically, the results of an opinion poll conducted by Seljuk University 20-30 November suggest that domestic power balances will remain pretty much the same as they are now following parliamentary elections scheduled for June 2011. In response to the question, "Whom would you vote for if the elections were held tomorrow?" 43.7 per cent of respondents said they would vote for the Justice and Development Party, 25.3 per cent for the Republican People's Party (up five per cent from the previous elections) and 13.4 per cent for the Nationalist Movement Party. The three foregoing indicators not only reflect an important part of Turkey's yield in 2010, but also part of what it might yield in the coming year. Turkey's growing influence on various Middle Eastern issues not only brought it a number of gains; it also stirred a number of problems for Turkish foreign policy with other regional powers. Perhaps the most significant gain Turkey scored during the past year was the acceptance by Arab public opinion of a Turkish role in the region that would serve as an asset to offset Israeli arrogance. In order to assess the popular Arab reaction to the new Turkish role in the Middle East, the Social and Political Studies Institute in Istanbul conducted a survey of 2,000 respondents in seven Arab countries: Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iraq. Of those polled, 77 per cent of those polled supported a larger Turkish role in the Arab world, 76 per cent felt that Turkey had a positive effect on peace in the Arab world, 61 per cent believed that Turkey should be a model for the Arab world, and 71 per cent agreed that Turkey had become a more influential player in Arab issues. In addition, 57 per cent supported the membership of this Muslim country in the EU and 64 per cent felt that this membership would have a positive effect on the concerns of the Arab world. Turkey's positive image in the Arab region combined with the increase in trade between Turkey and Arab countries to $32 billion, according to 2009 figures, will certainly contribute to the continued popularity of the Justice and Development Party and add to its electoral prospects in June and its chances of remaining in power for another four years. Ankara won widespread respect over the past two years for the "zero problems" foreign policy of Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu that seeks to put an end to longstanding differences with its immediate neighbours, especially Armenia. The problem is with Israel. The altercation over the maritime boundaries between Cyprus and Israel is only a recent manifestation of a longstanding disagreement between the two countries over the Palestinian cause. Ankara had thought that its vehement condemnation of the Israeli invasion of Gaza at the outset of 2009, which won it resounding support among Arab public opinion, would work to compel Israel to reconsider its brutal stranglehold on Gaza. It had the opposite effect. The Israeli reaction was violent, and took the form of an unprovoked assault on the Freedom Flotilla, which had been organised by Turkish activists in May with the aim of breaking the blockade on Gaza, resulting in the deaths of nine Turkish citizens. It was Israel's brutal way of telling Turkey that it resented Turkey's positions on the Palestinian cause, opposed Turkey's new diplomatic inroads in the region, and rejected a prospective Turkish role in settling the Arab-Israeli conflict. The incident marked a major turning point in Turkish-Israeli relations. Ankara vehemently condemned the Israel attack and set a number of conditions for restoring its bilateral relations with Israel to their prior level. It demanded a public apology, compensation for victims, an international investigation and the lifting of the blockade on Gaza. Even so, Ankara stopped short of recalling its ambassador from Tel Aviv and severing relations with Israel. Also, although Tel Aviv never met any of the Turkish conditions, Ankara deferred to US pressure and opened backdoor channels of communication with Israel in order to contain the fallout from the Israeli attack on the Freedom Flotilla. But the problem did not end there. Observers soon picked up on a qualitative shift in Israeli- Greek relations, exemplified by the visit of Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou to Israel in the second week of August. Then, by the end of the following week, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu returned the gesture with a visit to Athens, which had long been a supporter of the Arabs and Palestinians and critic of Israeli policy. The diplomatic move was again aimed at Turkey and conveyed the message that Israel was dissatisfied with the new role that Ankara was trying to play in the region. As though to drive the point home, Israel and Greece struck an agreement allowing Israeli fighter planes to undertake training manoeuvres in Greek air space, whereas until the Freedom Flotilla incident Turkey and Israel conducted joint military exercises in Turkish air space. Athens and Tel Aviv also announced plans to step up military and security cooperation and expand cooperation in trade and tourism. The agreement over drawing the Cyprus-Israeli maritime boundaries also comes in this context of moves to strengthen the relations between Israel and Greece. Turkey has become a direct party in a political and propaganda confrontation with Israel. The signs are that this confrontation is likely to spread to other vital fields related to maritime boundaries in the region, especially given reports of huge reserves of underwater oil and natural gas. Developments during the past year have also taken a toll on Turkey's image among in Washington. Ankara is now regarded as giving unacceptably free rein to religious considerations in its foreign policy orientations. The support that Turkey gave Iran on the uranium enrichment question raised eyebrows in Washington. Turkey went so far in its opposition to the sanctions approach to handling this issue as to abstain from voting in favour of a new round of UN Security Council sanctions against Tehran on 9 June 2010. The uranium fuel swap deal it had worked out together with Brazil and Iran in May 2010 seemed to present an acceptable solution, but the US and the EU greeted the effort with indifference. The response was indicative of a growing distance between Ankara and Washington Turkey may be moving closer to Iran on the economic and diplomatic fronts, but there remains a deep anxiety in the Turkish security establishment with regards to the nature of Tehran's nuclear ambitions. A document issued by the Turkish National Security Agency, portions of which were published on 28 October 2010, expresses the Turkish quandary. While Syria and Iran were lifted from the list of potential sources of military or national security threats to Turkey, Iran reappeared, alongside Israel, in the list of potential nuclear arms threats. The message was clear: Turkey would regard Iran as equally as dangerous as Israel if it obtained a nuclear weapon, and Turkey would have to reassess its policy towards Iran accordingly. An arms race in the region or a major military operation against Iranian nuclear installations could severely jeopardise the considerable economic achievements Turkey has accomplished over the past five years. Turkey' strategy of "zero problems" has been put to a severe test in the complex and volatile Middle East.
