By Amin Hewedy * In his recent visit to Washington, Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa conducted a strategic dialogue with his American counterpart, Madeleine Albright. Also participating in the dialogue were White House officials, members of Congress and representatives from Washington-based think-tanks. The talks took place at a time when bilateral, regional and international tension was palpable -- as indeed it remains. Such differences are normal between two countries whose relations are closer to partnership than to patronage, although Washington, bent on imposing its terms around the world, is clearly uncomfortable with this arrangement. Strategic dialogue in general, moreover, may aim to bolster coordination and cooperation on matters of joint interest. If intentions are not good, however, strategic talks may be used merely as a way to buy time -- "to sit on the river bank for a thousand years in the belief that the fish will eventually come to you". This was the model followed by Yitzhak Shamir in the wake of the Madrid conference, by Netanyahu when he was the official spokesman for the Israeli delegation in Madrid, and again by Netanyahu today. In fact, the Israeli prime minister's obstinacy may ultimately spell his demise. The strategic dialogue between Egypt and the US, at any rate, is not as new as some might imagine. In fact, it began in the wake of the 1952 Revolution, when the US administration dispatched a battery of highly qualified men to conduct the dialogue at close quarters and to witness the situation in Egypt for themselves. It soon transpired that Egypt's new leaders would not be lured into falling in line with America's plans to secure an agent -- and not a partner -- in the region. When Israeli aggression intensified on the Eastern front, Washington answered Egypt's demands for assistance in self-defence with guns and light artillery, suitable perhaps for security guards, but not to equip an army. The CIA also tried to win over the leaders of the revolution with a "bribe" of two million dollars. The Cairo Tower stands as lasting testimony to Abdel-Nasser's refusal to be pressed into a patron-client relationship. The strategic dialogue continued over the years, even if development supplanted arms as the focus of dialogue. The US gave its approval to the building of the High Dam, to be funded primarily by Egypt in conjunction with US, British and other foreign loans. This kind gesture was promptly followed by the withdrawal of funding for the dam, and then by a more severe pummeling in the form of the Tripartite invasion, launched in answer to the slap in the face Egypt had delivered to the West with the nationalisation of the Suez Canal. A few years later, strategic dialogue took the form of the famous exchange of letters between President Kennedy and President Nasser. The exchange represented an attempt to seek some form of reconciliation. Egypt responded enthusiastically, although, once again thanks to the CIA, good words and evil acts went hand in hand. Egyptian policy-makers believed that the young US president, who had surrounded himself by university professors and intellectuals, intended to usher in a new age in American foreign policy, radically different from America's traditional arrogance and domination. The bullets fired by Lee Harvey Oswald brought an abrupt and tragic end to that vision, leaving future generations to contemplate what might have been, had fate not intervened to snatch Kennedy from his seat in the White House. In spite of Egypt's continued efforts to prevent the deterioration in Egyptian-US relations, including temporarily freezing our dispute with Israel, relations continued to plummet as a result of Washington's stubborn refusal to alter its policy. As Henry Kissinger has remarked, "US foreign policy is too American in its relations with others." I could not agree with him more. The US's perception of many issues, including democracy, human rights or development, does not conform with that of other countries. After 1967, Egypt broke off relations with the US, yet continued to keep channels of communications open by receiving US envoys and delegations. We also created communication byways, such as those established with the CIA during my term as head of intelligence under President Nasser. Under Sadat, this channel served to facilitate communications between the Egyptian president and the White House. From the '60s till the '90s, however, strategic dialogue has failed to yield the desired result, in spite of the changes in both countries' administrations. This fact alone refutes the contention that Nasser's extremist policies were the cause of the failure. Dialogue failed because of clashing perspectives on matters pertaining to national security, which essentially determine a country's choice of allies and foes, and the consequent conflict in interests. But other factors, too, have been at the root of this long-standing disagreement. Among these is the ferocious arrogance of US foreign policy. America refuses to enter into dialogue with others as equals, on the basis of the belief that America must be a beacon of light, standing alone. "You're either with us or against us", and "America, right or wrong": such ideas epitomise the US's conviction that others must make unilateral concessions. The condescending attitude towards the Arabs is another factor. To the Americans, the Arabs are still Bedouins in tents who have replaced their headdresses with ties, and whose fight for their rights is a form of terrorism. The Arabs holler and wail, but do not act. They are strong on consumerism and short on culture and science. They have an extraordinary facility to fall into traps, and no skill at extricating themselves. They hate each other more than they hate their common enemies. Nevertheless, they would be a formidable danger were they ever to unite. In contrast, the US has been unfaltering in its efforts to make Israel a great power in the Middle East, even at the expense of the rights of others. From the US perspective, Israel alone has the right to deterrent military power, to an extensive arsenal of traditional, non-traditional and nuclear weapons. Its purpose, ostensibly, is to keep the region stable. The concept of peace does not enter into the equation. Stability for whom and with whom also remains a mystery. Finally, although the US president is the primary formulator of foreign policy, Congress is his counterbalance. Congress is particularly irascible when it comes to the Middle East, and US policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular. Influencing US foreign policy is thus not merely a question of bringing the executive branch around to a particular viewpoint. However responsive it may be, the chances are that Congress will disapprove -- all the more so if the president is a Democrat and Congress is dominated by a Republican majority, as is the case at present. Against this backdrop of heated animosity and cool friendship, our foreign minister went to Washington to hold a strategic dialogue. The purpose of the dialogue was to attempt to resolve differences between the two countries and to seek ways of achieving closer coordination and cooperation in matters of mutual concern. Unfortunately, the statement issued at the outcome of his visit suggests that the results were disappointing. It called for "the strong commitment of both countries to regional peace and stability and to working for a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East". One is reminded of the story of the sage who was asked to explain the constitution of water and who, after considerable deliberation, said it was made of water. The statement also told everyone what both sides wanted, but said nothing of the means and capacities to meet these objectives. Wishing is one thing; the ability to fulfill one's wishes quite another. One is given to suspect that the statement is no more than a reflection of those good intentions that have left such a bitter taste in our mouths for half a century. Perhaps that is because, while we have changed and taken enormous steps backwards and forwards on so many issues, the other side refuses to budge from its entrenched position in spite of changing times and circumstances. An assessment of the American attitude toward Egypt at the time of the strategic dialogue suggests that the US media is on a rampage against us. Congress is trying to reduce levels of economic aid and to introduce legislation linking foreign policy to the status of minorities. Secretary of State Albright has expressed her displeasure at President Mubarak's recent visit to the ailing President Gaddafi, saying "one visit is enough". The official US State Department spokesman has objected to the agreement between Baghdad and Damascus to transport Iraqi oil via a pipeline to Syrian ports on the Mediterranean. The strategy of dual containment is still in place, and the Lockerbie crisis continues unabated. Meanwhile, the Israelis have outdone themselves in insolence. I am uncertain, amidst these indications, how the foreign minister managed to conduct a serious dialogue. I imagine, however, that he focused on three issues: namely, the interest of the US and the countries of the region in a true settlement, based on the principle of land for peace and the creation of a Palestinian state; second, the danger posed to Israel and the region by Netanyahu's repeated clamouring for more arms from the US, and the US administration's enthusiastic willingness to comply and to turn a blind eye to Israel's nuclear capacity; and, third, the fact that the Arabs, and Egypt above all, will never agree to Israel's formula for an imposed peace. Perhaps, too, Moussa stressed the need for the US to take a look at its interests in the region, much as a wise man will try to see the forest rather than the trees. Yet I very much doubt whether Madeleine Albright gave very satisfactory responses to these vital issues. She continues to see Israel as the guardian, by proxy, of America's regional interests, even though the Arabs are willing to guarantee America's need for oil and military bases. As long as the US, the self-appointed guarantor of Israeli security, remains so obligingly and blindly forthcoming in the weapons department, the Arabs must take decisive action to move the peace process forward, if only because the US is unable to impose the appropriate solutions to this intractable problem. Egyptian and Arab national security is at stake. The vast policy divergences still exist, of course. This is only natural. National security needs have not changed in the new world order, despite free market ideology and rampant globalisation. The US views Israel as a partner that shares strategic policies and interests, and therefore will continue its unswerving defence of Israeli security. The US attitude towards the Arabs, on the other hand, is nebulous, equivocal and detrimental to our national interests. National interests, not the charm or shrewdness of a leader, are the point here. And as long as strategic dialogues ignore the issue of mutual security guarantees -- as long as Washington refuses to budge -- the dialogue can go on forever. One side can sit on the bank of the river, waiting for the fish to leap out of the water; as for the other, it will continue to alter geographical and demographic realities on the ground -- to raze the river banks, and divert the water's course. *The writer is a former minister of defence and chief of General Intelligence.
