By Asef Bayat * The Middle East seems, once again, on the verge of yet another war. The current mood in the region speaks of a deep concern for the spectre of an impending stand-off between two Muslim nations. Iran is said to back Afghanistan's Shi'ite minority, who are suppressed by the Taliban -- the leaders of the Sunni majority. There is, however, more to the conflict than merely a Shi'ite-Sunni divide. The fact is that a religious sect may be divided within itself (as with the Shi'ite community in Afghanistan) or may build alliances with an "opposing" sect -- the political alliance between Iran's Shi'ite Islamic Republic and the anti-Taliban Sunni groups, for example. The Tehran-Taliban conflict is of a political nature; it is about power. But when a power struggle occurs against a religious or ethnic divide, it often reinforces religious and ethnic identities. The source of the current Iran-Taliban crisis lies in a number of grave political changes that Afghan society has undergone since the coup d'état of the Communist Afghan Democratic Party (APDP) in April 1978. These changes, most importantly the continuous crisis of legitimacy and the subsequent emergence of the Taliban phenomenon, have jeopardised the political and economic interests of Iran's Islamic Republic. As a multi-ethnic tribal society, with ethnic groupings ranging from the Pashtuns, the Persian-speaking Tajiks, Uzbeks, Shi'ite Hezarah (25 per cent of the population), Baluchis and Brahuis, Afghanistan has been dominated by the Pashtuns throughout its modern history. This domination is now being challenged by other ethnicities. The legitimacy crisis of Pashtuns and the lack of an alternative seem to lie behind the current troubles in Afghanistan. Under the monarchy, the Pashtuns' hegemony was based upon the traditional authority of King Zaher Shah (1933-1973), who was able to unite the country. When the pro-Soviet APDP came to power in 1978, it tried to secure national legitimacy by resorting to the socialist ideas of equality and justice for all Afghan people irrespective of ethnic affiliations. Pashtun elements, however, continued to hold the key positions in the government. Only since the fall of the Najibullah government, the last pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan, following the departure of the Soviet troops in 1992, has Afghan society gone through a profound change. One outcome has been the emerging modern notion of political participation, which has come into conflict with the political tradition of single ethno-hegemony. According to Iranian social scientist Changuiz Pahlavan, the modern idea of nationalism which emerged in recent years could no longer be based upon the rule of a single Pashtun ethnic community. The mass of non-Pashtun warriors who fought to oust the Russians from Afghanistan would no longer go home and submit to the rule of the Pashtuns. With the absence of a nationally unifying force, the continuing Pashtun supremacy rendered other ethnic groups even more aware of their identity. At a time when there was a need for a national consensus transcending ethnic divisions, therefore, ethnic loyalties were becoming even stronger. Although the Taliban are by and large of Pashtun origin, their emphasis on Islam as the religion of the nation, and their madrasas, which accept students of all ethnic affiliations, succeeded in giving people a sense of national unity beyond ethnicity. Upon the departure of the Soviets, and before the advent of the Taliban, the coalition of Afghan Mujahidin (consisting of different ethnic groups, both Shi'ite and Sunni) also attempted to build a national consensus, even managing to ratify a Constitution in the early 1990s. The Pashtun leaders again reinstated their dominance, however, thus causing dissent among other Mujahidin and undermining the coalition. Pakistan played a key role in instigating the ethnic dominance of the Pashtuns. Pakistan was adamant that the regime in Afghanistan be both Islamist and Pashtun, as the Pakistani army is largely made up of this ethnic group. The Taliban offered such an opportunity. But Pakistan's backing of the Taliban also had other significant advantages. It would give Pakistan a strategic ally in face of the ongoing conflict with India. In addition, because the US preferred the Taliban to the Mujahidin, the latter being close to Iran, it sought to have the pipeline project which is to bring oil and gas from central Asia to the Persian Gulf pass through Afghanistan and Pakistan instead of Iran. This project would provide Pakistan with oil and gas resources as well as rent income. UNOCAL, a US firm, and its Saudi partner Delta are bidding to construct the pipeline. Reportedly, UNOCAL has bribed Pakistani army officials and security forces to ensure their backing of the project. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia, which seeks to support suitable religious groups in the Muslim world, found in the Taliban a force which could undermine Iranian influence in Afghanistan. The US played an equally significant role here. Although the US supported the Afghan Mujahidin in their fight against the Soviets, the Mujahidin's close ties to Iran prompted the US to search for another Islamist group which could also gain the backing of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The Taliban were the candidate. Despite the rhetoric of the US administration and media demonising the Taliban in the aftermath of the bombing of the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, the US had already given the group a green light when their offensives expanded in 1994. Although only three countries (Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the United Arab Emirates) had recognised the Taliban government officially, the US administration declared its neutrality, which in effect meant that it ceased recognizing the Mujahidin's government of national unity, headed by President Rabbani. Behind the US's interest in the Taliban was the desire to ensure the flow of central Asian fossil fuels to the West through the pipe-line project, and thereby to subvert Iran's interest in having the project pass through Iranian territory. It is ironic, but by no means surprising, therefore that the US is supporting the most "fundamentalist" regime on earth, while the Iranian "fundamentalists" oppose it. This alone shows the absurdity of reducing power conflicts to religious principles. Iran, predictably enough, has found itself isolated and frustrated, and is feeling the pressure of regional intrigues. Instability in Afghanistan has made some 850km of Iran-Afghan border vulnerable. Any further escalation of conflicts within Afghanistan is likely to cause a new wave of Afghan refugees to Iran, which has already accommodated some three or four million, both Shi'ite and Sunni. Iran, which offers better conditions for the pipeline project -- less distance to cover and a more advanced infrastructure -- has been rebuffed by the US and Pakistan. It is also concerned about growing drug production and trafficking on the border. Given the collapse of the economy in Afghanistan, the narcotics industry is perhaps a lucrative means of access to foreign currency for the Taliban. Iran's Islamic leaders, moderates and hard-liners alike, are concerned that the Taliban, with their brutality and their "barbaric, stone-age ideas" (in the words of Ayatollah Khamenei), are tarnishing the image of Islam, especially its concept of Islamic rule. The brutal killing of eight diplomats and a journalist by the Taliban was the last straw. The agony and anger seen among Iranian politicians and people should be seen against this background. The images from Iran could remind one of the days of fury against "the great Satan", or revenge against Saddam Hussein. There have even been calls for the head of the Taliban leader, Mullah Mohamed Omar, conjuring up an image of vengeance in a pre-modern battleground. These images, however, can be misleading. Reports from Iran indicate that the majority of Iranians do not want yet another war. The bulk of the print media discourages military involvement. The Afghan-Iraqi parallel is simply out of place at this time -- Iran has not been invaded, the bitter memory of the war with Iraq is still alive, and in addition, Iran has the Afghan Mujahidin to fight for it. But there are elements among the conservative hard-liners in the Iranian regime who would be more than willing to engage in a war game. A war is likely to restore the political hegemony of these elements (members of the Revolutionary Guards, police, the Hizbullah groups, for instance) -- ironically labeled "Taliban" by the moderates . A war would also jeopardise the moderate policies currently in force, re-igniting the mood of militarism, the language of violence, and a strict surveillance of public and private life. As the commander of the armed forces, Ayatollah Khamenei would be placed at the centre of the decision-making process -- to the detriment of moderate President Khatami, who would be marginalised. In a state of war, plans for the extension of political expression, a relative relaxation of the printed media, and the gradual expansion of the language of tolerance, the rule of law, and a rational foreign policy could easily go off course. Thinkers will fall victim to the heroism of soldiers. Already, the conservative hard-liners have begun to take action. Ayatollah Khamenei's recent warning that a "Western cultural invasion" was imminent came on the heels of the banning of a pro-Khatami publication, Tous. Ayatollah Jannati's Friday sermon of 18 September sought to prevent any possibility of a meeting between the US-Iran foreign ministers. He went so far as to call on President Khatami to attack the US when he attended the UN General Assembly meeting on 22 September. The conservatives are adamantly seeking to subvert an ironic but significant possible outcome of the Tehran-Taliban crisis -- official cooperation between Iran and the US. Many Iranians feel that, if a war breaks out, their country is likely to become embroiled in an endless war of attrition. The USSR's 85,000 troops, not to mention heavy artillery, failed to withstand Afghanistan's geopolitics and the guerrilla strategies of the Afghan resistance. After all, what will be Tehran's strategic objective --- to exert pressure? To topple the Taliban? To advance part or all of the way? In a war between two Muslim nations, as Eqbal Ahmad noted recently, both sides are the losers. Israel and its new ally, Turkey, are likely to emerge as the winners in this possible stand-off. In the meantime, the Taliban continue to control over 90 per cent of Afghanistan; they intend to transform the country into an image of the "early Islamic Caliphate". In an attempt to break from Afghan history and culture, they have changed the name of the country to the "Afghanistan Islamic Emirate", and the Taliban leader is the Amir Al-Mu'minin, or commander of the faithful. The economy of this new Emirate is in ruins, women have been forced out of public life, photography has been banned, and songs and music have been wiped out. The Taliban are now planning to move the capital to Kandahar, reconfigure the provincial administration, change the currency and the flag, and forcefully relocate the Hazarah Shi'ites from the central provinces. This, surely, is not good news for the Mujahidin coalition, nor for its Iranian ally. The Taliban's Pashtun hegemony, however, may not last long if Afghanistan's other ethnic associations and political organisations participate in creating a meaningful national consensus. This is a project upon which only the Afghan people themselves can decide. What their neighbours can do is to offer assistance and mediation to facilitate this process. Iran's moderate president, Mohamed Khatami, seems to be pursuing this perspective. Avoiding the language of war, he is adopting the discourse of diplomacy without, however, giving in to the Taliban and their patron, Pakistan. As for Nawaz Sharif, he may find he gets along with the Taliban's "Amir Al-Mu'minin", now that he has taken Shari'a as the magical panacea for Pakistan's social fractures. The Taliban, without the participation of other ethnic constituencies, is unlikely to rule over a stable nation. At most, it will control a collapsed state. In such a state, UNOCAL and its partners will have to settle not for profit but for a "business adventure". * The writer is associate professor of political sociology at the American University in Cairo.
