Amani Maged looks for hints of who's who in Iran's exotic political world It had been 10 years since Supreme Guide Ali Khamenei's last visit to Qom. That is quite a long time for an Iranian religious leader of his stature not to set foot in the bastion of Shia learning and home to the highest spiritual authorities in the country. Qom is the nerve centre of the Islamic Republic. No major political decision can be made and no mass following can be gathered without a green light from the marjas (sources of emulation) who wield the most extensive influence in Iranian religious, political and social affairs. Khamenei's recent visit this month to this holy city would naturally draw widespread attention, especially after such a long absence. Observers believe that the supreme guide's main aim was to demonstrate that he could still rally the allegiance of senior clerics and unify their support behind the regime after the crisis that erupted in the wake of the controversial presidential elections last year. The repercussions from the mass protests that swept the country following the announcement of the official election results, the government's handling of these demonstrations and subsequent events continue to reverberate today. Many marjas have criticised the performance of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the candidate that Khamenei so staunchly supported in those elections, and have made no secret of their opposition to both him and the supreme guide. Foremost among these was (with an emphasis on the past tense) Ayatollah Nasser Makarem Shirazi, who had been at odds with the Ahmadinejad government but who softened his stance during Khamenei's visit. The Iranian media this week foregrounded pictures of Khamenei having tea with Shirazi and five other senior clerics known to have criticised the regime. All are smiling. The tea ceremony, observers say, was intended to refute speculation in advance of this visit that many marjas who had criticised the government's campaign against reformers and its means of intimidating opposition clerics would boycott Khamenei during this visit. In their opinion Khamenei played a very clever game in his bid to clear the air between with the clerics. He courted the good will of all, opponents and supporters alike, and delivered an impassioned speech in the packed Astaneh Square in order to fire popular zeal and solidarity against Iran's enemies. That senior clerics, including some Ayatollahs such as Shirazi, welcomed the supreme guide over tea signalled his success in achieving the major objective of his visit, which was to prove that he could still unify ranks. This was no small accomplishment in view of the criticism directed against him from clerical circles in Qom up to the moment he set foot again in Qom. Evidence that their opposition to him has grown increasingly overt can be found in the fact that families of political detainees had sent an open letter to senior clerics, pleading with them to challenge Khamanei. Their plea went unanswered, at least on the surface. In fact, it seems that the supreme guide scored an unqualified political victory, at least until further notice. But the question remains: why now? Why did Khamenei visit Qom this month, nearly a decade since his last visit? Why didn't he make a visit last year at the height of the outcry against the election results, especially since he was aware that many clerics were turning public opinion against Ahmadinejad and him? Some suggested that the reason is to be found in Mojtaba Ali Khamenei, the supreme guide's second son, who, they say, is being groomed to succeed his father as the country's top spiritual and political leader. Khamenei senior is now in his 70s. Mojtaba is still in his robust 40s. More importantly, he is said to be a highly influential powerbroker and is described by some as his father's chamberlain and confidant. Still, observers say, if the young hardline conservative is, indeed, being groomed for succession he will meet stiff opposition. Mojtaba's power first came to public attention at the time when Mahdi Karroubi protested the results of the 2005 presidential elections that brought Ahmadinejad to power. More recently, reformist and opposition circles accused him of spearheading what they refer to as the "coup" against the legitimate election results, and they say that he took over control of the Basij militia that was used to suppress the post-election protests. Among reformists, at least, Mojtaba is viewed as more extremist than his father. Although he has maintained a low public profile and has made no media appearances, rumours of a succession scenario began to gain credence after it was reported that he had attained the ijtihad, the highest level of scholastic learning in Qom, under the tutelage of Ayatollah Mesbah Yezdi who is Ahmadinejad's spiritual advisor. On the other hand, there is no hard evidence regarding his theological qualifications, apart from the fact that he has attended the study session of some of the top instructors at Qom. Meanwhile, rumours of his political ambitions are fed further by reports of his extraordinary influence over his father, with some going as far as to say that he sets the major policies of the regime through the Office of the Supreme Guide. He is definitely known to have strong relations with the Revolutionary Guard Command and extensive influence with top military leaders and politicians in Iran. Nevertheless, Mojtaba Khamenei remains quite an enigma. He is reticent in public and, apparently, does not like being the subject of public attention. Observers also note that as powerful as he is said to be he still lacks the necessary personal, religious and political qualifications to enter the Assembly of Experts. Khamenei senior was an avid reader in his youth, who had many intellectual friends and who spent time in prison with other opponents of the Shah, including Marxists. Mojtaba lacks such erudition and revolutionary credentials. Analysts also doubt his ability to enter the Assembly of Experts, the body that elects the supreme guide. Khamenei might have the necessary number of seats in the 86- member assembly in his favour, but it is headed by Rafsanjani and includes many reformists who would do their utmost to obstruct Mojtaba's rise. Certainly his opponents might take heart from history. Ayatollah Khomeini's son, Ahmed, was fired by similar political ambitions. However, after the death of his father in 1989, Ahmed lost in the presidential race against Rafsanjani who, at the time, was speaker of parliament. Ahmed Khomeini was then called up by the Supreme Council for National Security and charged with the task of overseeing his father's tomb. He died of a heart attack in 1995. The next few weeks and months will tell us whether Supreme Guide Ali Khamenei's reconciliation with opponents and critics in Qom will last. For the moment, only a reading of the residue from the cups of tea that were served during the meeting that took place between Khamenei and other top clerics during this 10-day visit can guide us in determining Khamenei Junior's chances to succeed his father.
