One problem begets the next

A proposal for the deployment of an "Islamic peace-keeping force" in Afghanistan begs the question of whether such a solution is workable, writes Michael Jansen
During a visit to Ankara last week, British Foreign Minister Jack Straw put forward a proposal for deploying an "Islamic peace-keeping force" in Afghanistan that would be comprised of troops from Muslim countries. "As a member of NATO, Turkey is the obvious candidate to lead an Islamic force," Straw stated. He suggested that Bangladesh and Morocco could contribute contingents.
The task of the force would be to prevent Afghanistan from collapsing into the kind of wide-scale revenge killings, raping and looting that emerged in the chaos and tribal warfare which followed the Soviet withdrawal. While this might seem a reasonable suggestion at a time when many Muslims fear the Afghan conflict is dissolving into a clash between Islam and the West, the Straw proposal is a non-starter.
For one thing, significant numbers of "Islamic peace-keepers" might enter Afghanistan clean-shaven and go home sporting beards. Once in Afghanistan, they could pose a serious threat to the security and stability of the countries contributing troops to the proposed force. In post-war Afghanistan there will be tens of thousands of Taliban sympathisers who will survive a purge of the top leadership of the movement, as well as cadres of the equally Islamist Northern Alliance. These militant elements would be keen to draw peace-keepers to their cause and encourage them to export the Taliban's tribal Islamist ideology and practices to their armed forces and societies.
"The difference between the Taliban and the mujahidin of the Northern Alliance is only one of degree," Mohamed Jalil Shams, a former Afghan deputy foreign minister attending a conference of anti-Taliban activists in Cyprus, told Al- Ahram Weekly. "When the mujahidin came to Kabul, they shut down the theatres and turned the cinemas into mosques. Girls' schools were closed, though boys' schools continued to function [as under the Taliban]. The Northern Alliance are a bit better now because they are watched by the international community. But if they return to power ... " he trailed off ominously.
Once they had driven out the Soviet army from Afghanistan, thousands of US- and British-trained, Saudi-financed mujahidin joined Muslim forces to fight in Bosnia, Kosovo or Chechnya. Others raised the standard of Islamist revolt in their home countries, including Egypt. Since the original "foreign" mujahidin departed, wave upon wave of fresh "Afghans" have been recruited abroad, trained at Afghan bases and sent out into the world. Scores of able, educated young men have completed a full course of indoctrination and weapons training before being dispatched as undercover officers in the global army of holy warriors. The Egyptian suspect accused of organising the US attacks, Mohamed Atta, clearly graduated with high honours.
Less educated recruits are indoctrinated and given short courses in arms training. They join the covert rank and file. These young men, many of them Saudis, allegedly provided the "muscle" for the 11 September operation. At least three, from the Abha region in the southwest, thought they were going to Chechnya.
Muslim soldiers would not have to be trained in the use of weapons but simply be indoctrinated, simplifying the task of clerics out to convert fighters. Thousands of Muslim peace-keepers could provide Afghan "fundamentalists" with, at least, hundreds of "converts" to the cause of spreading the Islamist ideology throughout the Muslim community worldwide -- the "umma."
Muslim countries provide fertile ground for proselytising Islamists. Their societies are characterised by huge inequalities between rich and poor, few opportunities for youth, high unemployment, dismal educational and health care systems, rampant corruption and autocracy. There is widespread alienation and despair amongst the working and lower middle classes, from which the other ranks of armies are drawn. For the deprived and alienated, a radical form of Islam can be the "solution."
Even the hardline secularism of Turkey's armed forces does not provide an effective shield from Islamist subversion. Soldiers are normally devout conscripts from the peasantry and the urban underclass. Recognising the risks, Turkey's former army chief, Major General Cevik Bir, came out strongly against the proposal for Islamic peace-keepers. The serving army command also opposes the plan, while politicians seem to be prepared to jeopardise the country's security in order to garner political favours and financial rewards from the West.
Jordan's King Abdullah, also consulted by Straw, initially reacted positively to the idea but seems to have changed his mind. The former Algerian Foreign Minister, Lakhdar Brahimi, now in charge of the United Nations' political, humanitarian and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, is cool towards the prospect of deploying any peace-keepers -- Muslim or otherwise. "I would like to know which countries are rushing forward to offer troops to mount an operation in Afghanistan," he stated. He could not say whether a force led by Muslims would be more acceptable than non-Muslims to the proud Afghans. These things would have to be examined with care. "The secretary-general must give the [Security] Council what they need to know and not what they want to hear," Brahimi stated.
Brahimi is well versed in the dangers posed by an Afghan operation that could end up importing Islamist trends. In 1992 he became a member of the High Security Council that took power in Algeria following an abrupt cancellation of elections which seemed poised to put Islamist parties in the majority in parliament. Brahimi became foreign minister but resigned in 1993 in protest against government policies.
Mohamed Jalil Shams, the former Afghan deputy foreign minister, flatly rejected the idea of peace-keepers of any kind. "No foreign force, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, will be accepted by the people of Afghanistan ... The only way to bring peace to Afghanistan is to help Afghans to make their own decisions. Let them solve their problems and get rid of Osama Bin Laden and all kinds of terrorism."
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