Going through the motions

India and Pakistan are noisily beating the war drums, but actual warfare may not be in the cards, writes Iffat Malik from Islamabad
If one were a betting person, the odds on another war breaking out between South Asia's chronically hostile neighbours might appear like a sure thing. Since the 13 December attack on the Lok Sabha, India's parliament chamber, India and Pakistan's habitual state of cold war has been escalating towards what seems like an inevitable "hot" war.
New Delhi set the ball rolling by recalling its high commissioner in Islamabad in protest at what it claimed was Pakistan's failure to crack down on those responsible for "cross-border terrorism." This was followed by the cutting of road and rail links between India and Pakistan and a ban on Pakistani civilian aircraft using India's air space. The Pakistani mission in New Delhi was ordered halved, its remaining staff restricted from leaving the capital. All this in addition to massive troop and weapons deployment along the western border with Pakistan.
Pakistan has watched these developments with indignation. A growing number of Pakistanis believe the whole Lok Sabha incident was stage- managed and Pakistan sees India's real goal as seeking to brand the Kashmir conflict as one of terrorism -- with Pakistan as its sponsor.
Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf attempted to sabotage any such designs with an immediate and heartfelt condemnation of the attack. He promised to punish any individual or group in Pakistan found to be responsible, but he added the condition that Pakistan needed to see proof before acting. India has so far refused to provide any evidence, but it has nonetheless demanded that Pakistan take action against two groups in particular: Jaish-e-Mohamed and Lashkar-e-Toiba.
With the recall of the Indian high commissioner, Musharraf tried to claim the moral high ground by refusing to do the same. But Indian sanctions were countered with tit-for-tat sanctions: the closing of Pakistani air space to Indian aircraft, the halving of the Indian mission and the restricting of its staff to Islamabad. Pakistani troops and weapons have also been deployed along its eastern border.
But Musharraf has constantly stressed that Pakistan wants peace. Both Pakistan and India are well aware that their latest dispute is in essence a competition to win international support for their respective stances on Kashmir. For Pakistan, this means having the armed separatist movement there acknowledged as an indigenous and legitimate freedom struggle. For India, it means acceptance of its view that the conflict is Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. Talk of "international support," however, really means American support.
This puts the White House in a difficult position. Having taken such a tough stance against terrorism, it would be difficult to criticise India for doing the same. However, the Bush administration knows that any emulation by New Delhi of the US's anti-Taliban and Al-Qa'eda strikes in Afghanistan would trigger full-scale war on the subcontinent. US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld clearly stated his alarm at the prospect of Pakistani troops -- currently forming a net along the Afghan border to catch Al-Qa'eda leader Osama Bin Laden and his cohorts -- being moved to the Indo-Pakistani border.
US President George W Bush has, therefore, tried to steer a middle course, favouring neither Pakistan nor India, but at the same time urging restraint. He expressed full support for India's fight against terrorism, but also commended Musharraf for measures taken against Jaish and Lashkar. Behind closed doors, American pressure has probably been applied on Islamabad to clamp down on militant groups.
It is common knowledge -- though never officially acknowledged -- that Pakistan does help groups fighting to liberate Kashmir from Indian rule. In the post-11 September atmosphere of "zero tolerance," it was only a matter of time before Pakistan moved to curb militant groups operating in Indian Kashmir. President Musharraf had already started taking steps in that direction, banning public fund- raising by Islamic militant groups following the 13 December attack.
But changing Pakistan's long-standing policy of support for the Kashmir movement is a much bigger U-turn than changing its policy on Afghanistan. Local support for the Kashmiri people is powerful and many have sympathy for their cause, seeing it not just as one of freedom from Indian rule, but a struggle to be a part of Pakistan. In abandoning Kashmir, Musharraf runs a far greater risk of large-scale domestic opposition than when he threw in his lot with the US against the Taliban. Hence his slow and piecemeal approach to curbing the militant groups.
India's demands for instant and decisive action have put Musharraf in an awkward position. Sooner or later he would have moved against groups like Jaish and Lashkar anyway. But now that New Delhi has told him to do so, he cannot. It would be fatal for him to be seen as acting on India's orders. Many Pakistanis have noted the potent irony that when, for the first time since the Kashmir conflict erupted, the Pakistani government was making serious efforts to control militant groups, India raised the ante -- thereby hampering that effort. There was bewilderment in Pakistan when India not only persisted in its accusations, but followed them up with punitive measures and war threats. The military mobilisation is considered the biggest build-up of forces in 15 years.
The prospect of war with India raises far greater alarm among Pakistanis than the war in Afghanistan. Though Pakistan is a front-line state in the Afghan war, a conflict with India would make Pakistan itself the arena of war. Having just witnessed the damage inflicted on Afghanistan, the last thing Pakistanis want is a war at home. At the same time, however, there is virtually unanimous support for the stance taken by Musharraf. Pakistanis believe India is engaged in a deliberate exercise in bullying.
When Musharraf joined up in the US's war on terrorism, he faced internal, as well as external, opposition. This time, he will have the assurance that his people are behind him. Nevertheless, and despite the hype and drum- beating, the prospect of a war between India and Pakistan still seems remote. International pressure should be sufficient to avert it.
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