The Asian connection

As the US casts its searchlight into Al-Qa'eda's shadows, countries in Southeast Asia veer into view, writes Nyier Abdou
Being accused of sponsoring terrorism -- always a serious charge when levied by the US State Department -- is all the more discomfiting in these post-Taliban days. As it looks for places to take its ambitious war on terrorism, the US is scrutinising any lead, any tenuous connection to the Al-Qa'eda terrorism network. In November, US Vice President Dick Cheney said that there may be "as many as 40 or 50" places around the world where Al-Qa'eda cells are lurking. High on this list are places like Somalia, Iraq and Yemen, but Southeast Asian countries -- primarily, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore -- have also repeatedly been cited as possible places where Islamist extremist elements could flourish.
It is difficult to gauge how significant the threat of Islamic extremism really is in Southeast Asia. "One reads much about the possibility of Al-Qa'eda operatives being in Indonesia and other parts of Southeast Asia," remarks Simon Philpott, coordinator of Asian studies at the University of Tasmania, in Hobart, Australia, and author of Rethinking Indonesia: Postcolonial Theory, Authoritarianism and Identity. Noting that it is likely that Muslim militants have trained with Al- Qa'eda outside Indonesia and the Philippines, Philpott cited sectarian conflicts in the Indonesian provinces of Maluku and South Sulawesi as places that have seen Muslim fighters imported to "add to the troubles." But he added that most "informed" observers of these conflicts are wary of "overstating the importance and influence" of militant groups.
Philpott, who is currently a visiting professor at York University, in Toronto, pointed out that with the discovery of an American and Australian among the foreign Taliban in Afghanistan, we now know that at least a few people in Western nations have trained with Al-Qa'eda. "It seems to me that part of what peripheral governments like Australia need to do is create a certain amount of anxiety, to make sure that there is strong and continuing support for the war effort," he told Al- Ahram Weekly.
Ron May, senior fellow at Australian National University's Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies in Canberra, says he would not identify any Southeast Asian country as a "hotspot," but he does admit the possibility that international terrorists -- "whether Al-Qa'eda-linked, or simply disgruntled individuals" -- could use countries like Indonesia and the Philippines as temporary bases.
The US has strong relations with countries like the Philippines and Indonesia, and both Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri have made visits to Washington after the 11 September attacks. A general toning down of criticism by the US regarding human rights abuses in conflict areas will probably extend to Southeast Asia as well. Indonesia, long attacked for abuses by the military in containing separatist violence, is already finding itself on better terms with the US.
Even so, angry protests in Indonesia at the outset of the US-led war on Afghanistan marked a dangerous point of divergence between Megawati's government and the Indonesian people. Radical Muslim groups like the Islamic Defenders Front (IDF) threatened attacks on US installations and foreigners, and the group's leader, Al-Habib Mohamed Rizieq Bin Hussein Syihab, denounced the US as a terrorist nation -- rhetoric resembling that of Al-Qa'eda leader Osama Bin Laden. It is also claimed that both the Islamic Defenders Front and the militant Laskar Jihad have received funding from Bin Laden, though both deny ties to Al- Qa'eda. Last Tuesday, radical Islamic leader Abubaker Bashir, head of the Mujadeen Council, issued a call for the implementation of Shari'a. Before 11 September, this kind of local grandstanding would be nothing but a blip on the international crisis radar, but today it is proof of Indonesia's perilous position as a possible depository of Al-Qa'eda "sleeper cells."
Reports of powerful dissent can be misleading, however. Jeffrey Hadler, assistant professor at the Department of South and Southeast Asian Studies at the University of California at Berkeley, told the Weekly that compared to protests in the last few years, recent demonstrations were neither particularly large nor widespread. As for "high- profile" groups like Islamic Defenders Front and Laskar Jihad, Hadler notes that many of their activities are more akin to brutish terrorising than an anti-Western jihad. Until September, the IDF was known more for running protection rackets and offering mercenary strong-arm service in Jakarta, than for its radical rhetoric. "Laskar Jihad cadres were a common sight at crossroads in Yogyakarta, sporting samurai swords and requesting donations for their holy war against the Christians of eastern Indonesia," adds Hadler. "Creepy, but hardly reflective of a well-funded terrorist outfit."
Megawati is evidently in a tight spot, with Indonesian Vice President Hamzah Haz leading a large and influential Muslim party. An increased crackdown on extremist groups could invite further public ire and Megawati may be tempted to funnel counter-terrorism efforts into her pet cause: cowing separatist movements in places like Irian Jaya and Aceh. Branded with the powerful terrorist label, freedom fighters like the Free Aceh Movement could end up fighting a worldwide coalition in their quest for independence.
Indonesian expert Philpott says that Megawati will need to "tread carefully", but he also points out that militants do not really have wide-ranging support. "There is a history of the [mainly Muslim] Indonesian army cracking down on what are perceived as dangerous Muslim movements, so it can happen," Philpott told the Weekly. "But Islam is more confident and assertive these days, so crackdowns are perhaps more difficult -- though not in Aceh."
Following the ghastly aftermath of the UN- organised East Timor referendum in August 1999, the US Congress cut off ties with the Indonesian military (TNI) pending efforts to bring perpetrators of the extensive violence to justice. Successive governments in Jakarta have failed to do so, and yet the US has included Indonesia on its list of countries that will receive counter-terrorism training and support. Berkeley's Hadler says there are "frightening reports of savage, internecine violence" perpetrated by Laskar Jihad on the island of Sulawesi, east of Borneo, but "Megawati has done nothing."
Now that Congress has earmarked funds for counter-terrorism in Indonesia, this can only mean an enhanced role for Kopassus, the much-feared Indonesian special forces. Believed to be behind the murder of West Papuan independence leader Theus Eluay last month, Kopassus was notorious for its torture and oppression methods during the reign of Suharto. "The lack of a real rule of law, and the continued involvement of the military in political life, are the two greatest obstacles that Indonesia must overcome," says Hadler.
In neighbouring Malaysia, 15 alleged terrorists with the extremist group Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM) have been arrested since 9 December under the country's Internal Security Act. Though the Islamic party PAS (Parti Islam SeMalaysia), Malaysia's largest opposition party, has been gaining political ground, anti-American protests organised by the party in October were not able to muster the kind of passion seen in Jakarta. Patricia Martinez, senior research fellow for culture and religion at the Asia-Europe Institute, an arm of the University of Malaya, in Kuala Lampur, suggests that there is a "cultural element" at play. "Dissent is rarely, even in normal interaction, displayed openly," by Malay Muslims, Martinez told the Weekly. "To do so is considered crude." By extension, street protests and violent demonstrations of anger -- commonplace in Jakarta -- are not the preferred method of reacting to political issues. Martinez also suggests that Malaysians are more comfortable with Western culture, having had decades of intimate contact through study programmes in the US and Europe. "This exposure and first-hand experience of [all that] America stands for is a significant factor in the way Malaysians interpret the post- 11 September actions by the US." That said, Martinez still stressed that there is sparse popular support for the bombing of Afghanistan.
Stronger economic ties to the West may also be contributing to more muted anti-US sentiment in places like Singapore. Still, Vedi Hadiz, a professor of sociology at the National University of Singapore (NUS) and a specialist in Southeast Asian politics and society, suggests that it is in the "institutional interest" of militaries in the region to "play up the hotspot idea", given the potential for military aid and international support. Earlier this month, Singapore -- a strong supporter of the US war on terrorism -- announced the arrest of 15 suspected terrorists, most linked to the supposed clandestine organisation Jemaah Islamiya. Like the terrorism arrests in Malaysia, the suspects were rounded up under the country's Internal Security Act, meaning they are being held without trial.
Singapore also directed the arrest this week in the Philippines of Fathur Rahman Al-Ghozi, a Filipino of Arab descent whom authorities claim is a member of Jemaah Islamiya. Asked if he thought Jemaah Islamiya and Malaysia's KMM were part of Al- Qa'eda's international network, Hadiz said that given the number of Afghan war veterans from Southeast Asia, he would not be surprised if there were links "at the individual level." But he said that strong institutional linkages were doubtful.
Donald Emmerson, senior fellow at the Institute for International Studies at Stanford University and an authority on Southeast Asia, warns against lapsing into "purely psychological or tactical explanations" of official reactions to indications of Al-Qa'eda- related terrorism in Southeast Asia -- most of them purveyed by the international media. "To be sure, the evidence should not be exaggerated into a massive, monolithic, and imminent regional threat," Emmerson told the Weekly. And yet, we cannot afford to dismiss the danger as groundless fantasy. Asked if he thought there was a sense of desperation to prove that Islamic militants are under control in the region, Emmerson was confident that governments are hardly sweating over being labelled terrorist states.
Citing a "unique mix of concerns", Emmerson maintains that Southeast Asian countries are using the American-led war against terrorism to their full advantage. The Philippines and Singapore, for example, are emphasising their "firmness" in dealing with "local manifestations" of terrorism, in order to enlist wider American support -- including economic and security cooperation. In Malaysia and Singapore, governments are also seeking to lessen American disapproval of "more or less Draconian local instruments of internal security" by using them against groups and individuals identified as "terrorists." In Indonesia, Emmerson points to a "wavering" between claiming and dismissing the existence of local links to Al-Qa'eda.
One of the high-profile Islamic militant groups coming under scrutiny is the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the southern Philippines. ASG has grown infamous for its brutal beheadings and dare-devil kidnapping of Western tourists and local residents, but after 11 September, it miraculously grew in stature enough to be called "among the most feared terrorists in the world" in a 16 January New York Times profile. The Philippine government has been trying to stamp out Abu Sayyaf for some time now, but banditry and lawlessness have so far prevailed in the jungle terrain of Jolo and Basilan Islands, where the estimated 800-strong group is headquartered. Though Abu Sayyaf says it is fighting for an independent Muslim state, it lacks the legitimacy of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), which signed a deal with the government in 1996 that created the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), or even the splinter group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which is still in negotiations with the government.
Most experts agree that ASG is nothing more than a group of bandits and thugs, and yet the Philippine military has suggested that the recent spate of kidnappings by the group "bear the fingerprints of Al- Qa'eda." The connection is weak, however, as Bin Laden and his network are believed to have been concerned primarily with attacking US targets. Even an alleged plot to assassinate the pope during a visit to Manila in 1995 was a grandiose and symbolic scheme. Yemen -- thought to be another potential Al-Qa'eda haven -- is also known for kidnappings, but it is unlikely that either kidnapping industry is related to Al-Qa'eda. Unfortunately, the attention could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. By lending small, rogue groups like ASG more importance, the increased focus could ultimately encourage them to go international.
Thomas McKenna, associate professor of anthropology at the University of Alabama at Birmingham and author of Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines, suggests that the Bin Laden link "seems to be real, but is both weak and old." He dismissed the idea that ASG has the capability of going international, however. Comparing Ramsi Youssef, who is serving a life sentence in the US for helping to plan the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, and the infamous ASG leader "Commander Robot" is "just silly," says McKenna. "Youssef is a truly scary, maniacal genius with global reach. Commander Robot is a local kidnapper with some vague Islamic rhetoric, fast boats, and a cell phone." McKenna maintains that the ASG and other rogue groups are "targets of convenience" because of their manageably small size and willingly inflamed rhetoric. "They have limited reach and they are operating in states that are willing to cooperate with the US," explains McKenna. "They certainly present easier targets than the Iraqi military, or even Somalia. They are also easier to track down than makers of shoe bombs in Europe."
Political analyst Ron May agrees, noting that the link between ASG kidnappings and Al-Qa'eda is "far-fetched." This is not to deny the possibility of links between Abu Sayyaf and Al- Qa'eda, he said, "so much as to recognise the essentially ad hoc and localised nature of most of [Abu Sayyaf's] activities." May did add, however, that he has been told of ASG supporters running guns to Indonesia and fighting with Laskar Jihad. "There is little doubt that there is regional and international networking," he said. "But the question is how well-organised such networking is."
"Kidnappings have a long history in the Philippines -- a history that predates the emergence of Osama Bin Laden into world affairs," concurs regional specialist Philpott. "I doubt the capacity of ASG to go international, though it may receive further international support." Philpott did leave open the possibility of significant US intervention: "It [the southern Philippines] is an 'alien' area for the majority of Filipinos and it might be possible for the Philippine government to quarantine it for the purposes of a joint military action between the US and the Philippines. But the problem would be proving a link between ASG and international terror," he said.
Last Tuesday, joint military exercises began between the Philippine military and an advance team of US special forces posted to Zamboanga. Some 160 US special forces will be deployed in the southern Philippines, joining some 7,000 Philippine soldiers, for a period that will last at least six months and could extend indefinitely. The vanguard force will soon be rounded out by a group of 500 "support and technical personnel" -- a presence that is sure to agitate Filipinos. A US colony from 1898 to 1946, the Philippines harboured a US military presence until 1991, when the bases in Subic Bay and Clark were finally emptied at the Philippine government's behest. Though the US forces are banned from taking part in combat, they will be armed and authorised to act in self-defence.
May suggests that Arroyo may have welcomed some "technical assistance" from the US, but he does not see other countries taking kindly to US strong- arm tactics. "I don't think the US possesses the local knowledge to play a significant role other than the provision of selected technical services," says May. "Moreover, unless it were to act with extreme sensitivity to local political circumstances -- and perhaps even if it did -- American involvement in anti-terrorist operations in Southeast Asian countries could be counter- productive."
In Indonesia, American engagement could be far more explosive. Philpott notes that there is a long political tradition of anti-Western sentiment in Indonesia and US intervention "would certainly enable that sentiment to coalesce into something rather dangerous." Given these circumstances, Philpott says he could see Muslims "rallying to the cause" of anti-US imperialism and "travelling to any site of conflict to resist the US." Recalling the angry remonstrations over Australian military intervention in East Timor, Philpott shrugged off US military action in Indonesia as "quite literally, unimaginable."
Suwit Laohasiriwong, director of the Institute for Dispute Resolution at Thailand's Khon Kaen University, concedes that there are some places in Southeast Asia where extremist elements could grow, but dismisses any intervention by US troops as "definitely not appropriate" -- a sentiment widely echoed by experts on the region. Vedi Hadiz, of the National University of Singapore, describes any direct military intervention by the US as "foolhardy", while regional expert McKenna warns that the US is "not particularly well-informed about the region, especially about its ethnic and religious complexities."
"The hawks in the US are on a 'high' because of the Taliban's demise, but [Southeast Asia] is a completely different ball game," cautions Hadiz. What is likely to come out of current anti-terrorism efforts, Hadiz suggests, is that the military in countries like Indonesia -- formerly estranged because of human rights violations -- "can now resume close relations to the American military."
The University of Malaya's Martinez dismisses any idea of the US masterminding operations in Southeast Asia as an affront to the sovereignty of regional powers. "While some sort of firm response was justified in the immediate aftermath of 11 September by the US against the perpetrators, to enlarge this wielding of unilateral action and power under the rubric of ferreting out more Muslim terrorists is completely unacceptable," Martinez said.
Stanford's Emmerson is equally cautious, noting that terrorism needs to be understood in the context of its local setting -- and this takes careful and sustained attention to the politics and cultural ethos of the region. Even if a foreign power were able, to act unilaterally to neutralise local political violence, Emmerson notes that without extensive indigenous cooperation, "the phenomenon could flare up again once the foreigners are gone." For a "long-run solution" to terrorism, Emmerson insists that there is nothing that can beat basic, good government. A stable government that is "honest, effective and accountable" will be "far more productive" than any foreign intervention.
One wonders if the dreaded "clash of civilisations" has found its way to Southeast Asia. The Institute for Dispute Resolution's Laohasiriwong is unconvinced, insisting that no such "clash" is mounting, while political analyst Hadiz groans at the question: "Huntington's clash of civilisations idea is one of the silliest ever produced in the social sciences," he says, leaving the matter to pundits and media wars.
But Malaysian Islamic scholar Martinez is willing to play along. Noting that there is a general feeling that the US has been either ignorant of, or underestimated, "the long-simmering frustration and anger about Palestine and Iraq" in the developing world, Martinez is willing to tentatively call the present circumstances a "clash of civilisations." But she adds that it is a clash "beyond religious difference." Instead, she points to "disparities in the dispensation of justice" and the "disparity of economics" between the parts of the world "that have just about everything", and populations "who subsist on next to nothing."
Asked if he thought the US could hold its own running anti-terrorism efforts in Southeast Asia, regional expert Jeffrey Hadler was doubtful. "There are thoughtful and well-informed Indonesianists at the US embassy in Jakarta and in the Department of State," he said. "But I don't think that either [Defence Secretary Donald] Rumsfeld or the NSA [US National Security Agency] have any desire to listen to them."
Private intelligence reports in Indonesia have identified what is believed to have been an Al- Qa'eda training camp near the port city of Poso, on Sulawesi island, the Washington Post reported. But Hadler described reports of terrorism mushrooming in the region as the product of rumours snowballing dangerously: "A Spanish newspaper quotes an anonymous source about a secret Al-Qa'eda training camp in Aceh. Other newspapers report this as 'West European intelligence,' and soon it becomes a fact." Using what Hadler described as a "repressive colonial artefact" -- the Internal Security Act -- Malaysia and Singapore then arrest alleged Al-Qa'eda terrorists.
"Are these really trained men with plans and bombs? Or are they swaggering youths talking a bit too loudly? It's hard to say. But nobody in the government wants to be remembered as the person who ignored or dismissed the one true threat," Hadler said. In sum: "US intervention in Southeast Asia would likely be used to political advantage by Southeast Asian militaries, resented by the general population, and disastrously ill- informed at the top."
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