Bali may have sealed the political future of Megawati Sukarnoputri, writes Damien Kingsbury from Sydney The bombing in Bali has had a profound impact upon Indonesian politics. But while many hoped that Indonesia would respond by engaging more openly with the outside world, the country has in large part reverted to type by focusing inward. Most are now looking ahead to the country's 2004 presidential elections to see what will be the real impact of the bombing. The one major exception to Indonesia's inward focus has been the acceptance of around 100 Australian and US police and intelligence agents, to assist in the investigation of the bombing. This concession acknowledged the impact the bombing had on Australia, and the technical limitations of the Indonesian police and intelligence. But a proposal by Australian defence minister, Senator Robert Hill, that Australia send special forces to Indonesia similar to the United States sending troops to the Philippines was quickly rejected as being a clumsy copying of American policy. Hill was already running into trouble with the proposal in Australia, as the links between TNI (Indonesian military) and Australia is a political minefield for the unwary. Within Indonesia, responses to the bombing are reflecting public opinion for 2004 elections. Public surveys indicate that most Indonesians are deeply unhappy with the bombing, and in no mood to see politicians benefit from it. Equally, about 70 per cent of Indonesians say they believe that the bombing was the work of the CIA. The theory is that the US wants Indonesia to take a tougher line on terrorism, and that the attack strengthens the hand of the TNI with whom the US wants to restore closer relations. While there will be some pro-US consequences from the political changes brought on by the tragedy, there is no evidence to support a theory of CIA involvement. And Australia's otherwise strong relationship with the US, in the war on terror and otherwise, would be perhaps irrevocably damaged if a link between the events and American intelligence was ever established. In simple terms, if there was a CIA plot they probably would have picked another target. The other main conspiracy theory posits that the TNI undertook the bombing. While the TNI is benefiting from the attack, through increased security powers, its position was already strong under the Megawati administration. The TNI also has significant business interests in Bali, which are now suffering as a result of the attack. Indeed, the main target of the bombing, the Sari Club, is said to be owned by a Javanese army general. The TNI has not escaped entirely unscathed, but greater damage has been done to Megawati. She has responded to this event in her own way, which is to say quite inadequately. Her 'do nothing' style suits the TNI and other élite interests, but it has alienated what was once a strong support base. A few months ago Megawati was still regarded by most to be the likely president after the 2004 elections, despite her failings. But now the prevailing view is that she will not have sufficient support to return as president in 2004. This then has opened up the political field to potential successors. The main problem has been that there is no other leading candidate who is currently regarded as suitable. This means the likely front runners will be either more controversial politicians, or someone with a strong political background but without deep institutional support. Claims to appropriate political credentials are already being tested. The arrest of Abu Bakar Bashir, the spiritual head of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI -- Islamic Community) which is the organisation most believe was responsible for the bombing, was met with a relatively low level of public protest. JI was also being formally identified by the UN and the US as a terrorist organisation, mostly on the strength of confessions of operatives involved in other attacks in the Philippines and a planned attack in Singapore. Under normal conditions and without the glare of the War on Terrorism the arrest of Bashir would have been met with a great public uproar. But his most powerful political ally, Vice-President Hamza Has, has effectively isolated him and Speaker of the Legislature, Amien Rais, has adopted a very studied pose of proper legal concern. Had Hamza Has continued flirting with Bashir and other radicals, he would have been doomed as a potential presidential candidate. Since the bombing, he has said very publicly that such terrorism cannot be tolerated, and that the perpetrator was not a religious person. This was less to deny that a religiously motivated organisation such as JI was behind the attack, than to deny the religious credentials of such an organisation. By distancing himself from religion, Hamza cleverly distanced himself from Bashir, who was quickly placed under arrest. Hamza wants to construct a coalition built on Islam and nationalism, both of which benefit from the CIA conspiracy theory. This Islamic coalition would draw support from disenchanted Megawati supporters, and probably from the party of former President Suharto to give Hamza the presidency. Similarly, Amien Rais has made little secret of his presidential ambitions. However, his inconsistent political position and role in dumping former president Abdurrahman Wahid have not endeared Amien to voters or potential coalition partners. In an attempt to control the damage, Amien has been trying to construct a moderate image in recent times. Despite being a former leader of the 28 million strong Muhammadiyah religious organisation, Amien has also distanced himself from more radical Islamists. On the periphery, however, the picture is more ambiguous. Just days after the Bali bombing, the notorious Laskar Jihad (LJ) militia announced its disbanding. This decision was said to have been made 12 days prior to the bombing, at a meeting of its parent organisation. This disbanding was formally based on the LJ having completed its putative task of protecting Muslims in Maluku and Central Sulawesi. However, the LJ had also run out of money, and its efforts to destabilise the presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid concluded in mid-2001. LJ fighters are now returning home, and some may pursue militant Islam by other means. In the background, the economic impact of the Bali bombing will be significant, with forecasts of economic growth being reduced by one percentage point, due to lost tourism income and foreign investment. In response to all of this, many Indonesians are remembering the relative certainty of the Suharto era with nostalgia, and calling for a strong new president. The political and security minister, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, looks to be in a good position to take advantage of the turmoil, and has previously expressed a desire to become president. However, having no political support base, he would at best be a compromise candidate between political parties. As a Javanese and a retired, reformist lieutenant- general, Yudhoyono has some credentials. A dark horse in the race might be his cabinet colleague, National Intelligence Agency Head Hendropriyono. Hendropriyono is less politically savvy than Yudhoyono, but as a former -- and less reformist -- lieutenant-general, he has better links to the TNI. Hendropriyono is certainly regarded as a 'strong' man. Both Yudhoyono and Hendropriyono have been given the task of running Indonesia's new anti- terrorism campaign, and in reality have probably been the two most powerful individuals in Indonesian politics for some time. But the accession of either of them to the presidency would be widely viewed as putting the TNI back into power. After Megawati, and the Bali bombing, the possibility of a politically secular candidate who is not a former general seems remote.
