Hydar Jemal (or Geidar Jemal as he is known in Russian transcription) is a philosopher, public figure, ideologist of political Islam and chairman of the Russian Islamic Committee. He talked to Shohdy Naguib in Moscow of the Arab states' political ineptitude vis-à-vis Russia In the aftermath of the hostage crisis that hit Moscow on 23 October and after the unanimous ratification of Security Council Resolution 1441 regarding Iraq, could you give us a general outlook of the relationship between Russia and the Islamic world. The Islamic world has unfortunately lost Russia as an ally and it can only blame itself for this unfortunate development. There can be no doubt that Russia was a potential resource for the Islamic world in its struggle for survival in the face of Western pressure and here I am primarily talking of US dominance. The ruling elites of the nation states that comprise the Islamic world are so slow and indecisive when it comes to interpreting a political map -- so pathetically incapable of forecasting and coming up with sharp moves -- that they are all the time being beaten by their strategic rivals. For example, why do you think the first Chechen war started? There is one visible cause for it. Back in 1994, it had become clear to the Kremlin that the Caucasian Diaspora were extremely successful in developing the Russian business sector. The Caucasians amassed huge wealth in the course of the privatisation process and since monetary reforms were about to take place at the time, it was expected that the greater part of Russian business would be controlled by them. Being the most prominent of the Caucasians, the Chechens were known and much feared for their ruthlessness and unbending intent. One could not play any of those "court order" games on them or tamper with their property by sending armed police or whoever else, for that matter. None of this would produce the desired results. In a broader sense, such a development meant that the money in the hands of the Caucasian businessmen was not likely to migrate to the West. The export of the $400 billion that there is so much clamour about nowadays would simply never have happened. This is due to the fact that the Caucasian diasporas are not oriented towards the West and, unlike the Jews, they have no project of building their future in a foreign state. In other words, they have nowhere to run. This huge amount of money would have been invested in Russia itself. The Caucasians also possess the political will for enhancing the state. Their expansion into Russia would have been accompanied by a form of restructuring aimed at transforming [the state] in order to influence the outside world. In other words, had the strong Caucasian business warlords taken control, we would now have a new Russian empire exerting its pressure on the international scene. Such an outcome would have been extremely favourable for the Arabs and the Islamic world because the Caucasian business elite would have acted as a perfect bridge to pool their investments into the Russian economy. If only the leaders of the Islamic world had paid closer attention to Russian affairs back in 1991, their involvement would have made the Chechen war practically impossible. The geopolitical awareness of the ruling elites in the Islamic and Arab world is so low that it borders on infantilism. They simply could not grasp that it was possible to help your allies by co-operating with the enemy through investment projects that would give them power. Saudi Prince Abdullah Turki arrived in Moscow for high-level talks just a day before the hostage tragedy unfolded, and it was widely rumoured that he was offering Russia a large sum of money in return for its support on the Security Council resolution on Iraq. What has happened to this "deal" after Turki had to leave Russia abruptly amidst the turmoil the crisis brought? Russia's international position is so visibly slumped that it is useless to address it on such an issue. No one in Russia today is authorised to make such a deal, not even President Putin, who is managing a different foreign agenda. His survival as a member of the international political elite is contingent upon his compliance with pledges made to members of that club. Russia can no longer be seen as a natural geopolitical ally for the Muslims and the Arabs in the round that just ended. Today, the Islamic world must strengthen its ties with Europe for it is the last remaining force that can pose any serious opposition to the US plans of producing a global crisis in which it would again act as an arbitrator and eventually become the "ultimate recipient of dividends". I am envisioning the emergence of a strategic triangle that would include the Islamic world, Europe and Russia. The Islamic world has a great potential for resisting the new global order. The emergence of a strategic axis between Europe and the Islamic states will radically change the situation and Russia will inevitably be pushed to join in. Thus, Europe is the key to Russia in the next round. The methods to achieve this are obvious: lobbying, making use of European Muslims and attracting European sympathisers. As a political ideology, Islam is capable of appealing to the consciousness of modern women and men and offering a broader vision for the future. What can be done at the practical level to tilt Russian public opinion towards a better understanding of the common interests that bind Russia with the Islamic world? There is an informational paralysis on both sides. While the Arabs often lament the disappearance of the Soviet Union as a superpower to counter the US, they are totally blind to Russian politics and they have no understanding of the processes that have swept this country during the last decade. A paradox is evident: while appealing to Russia in the face of US expansionism, they are, at the same time, not interested in promoting Russia's traditional allegiance to the Arabs. Inefficacy and lack of a strategic vision has put the Islamic world where it is right now. In the 1990s, we established the Badr Bank -- an Islamic bank that functions under the Shari'a rules of financial transactions -- in order to strengthen ties. However, it was quite frustrating for us to encounter a total lack of understanding of the strategic opportunities that were now open to Arab and Islamic businesses. The media, which is now controlled by corporations, is also neglected by Muslims. This is all the more incomprehensible when there are reiterated complaints about the Russian media supporting Israel and distorting the Arab position. Why not create new media outlets promoting Arab and Muslim interests? What I regard as passivity on the part of Arab and Islamic countries is the lack of political will to assert themselves on the international scene. When you move away from the centre of the Islamic world, you encounter positive movement. For example, the Iranians are more active in Russia than all of the Arab countries combined. Pakistan and Turkey are comparably active, while peripheral Muslim states like Indonesia and Malaysia demonstrate the highest levels of political interest and initiative. They also exhibit the required patience and business acumen to successfully conclude business deals. All these qualities are sadly lacking in most Arab countries. The address of the Russian site containing Jemal's articles, lectures and essays on the Internet is www.kontrudar.ru Related stories: Russian roulette 7 - 13 November 2002
