What is in store for China in 2003? The People's Republic has blended continuity with incremental reforms to create a promising future, writes Kai-Alexander Schlevogt* Every five years, the curtain rises on an event that influences the future of much of humanity. China's leadership, comprising over 2,100 delegates from all over the country, gather in Peking's Great Hall of the People to discuss the state of the nation. Delegates at the 16th Party Congress will represent the 66 million members of China's 81-year-old communist party, the world's largest. They select the leaders of one fifth of the world's population and determine the strategic direction of the greatest and oldest surviving empire on earth. After regarding itself as the "centre of the universe" for much of history, this oriental powerhouse is well on its way to regaining a new centrality. China's top leaders had made all of their critical decisions beforehand, at an annual informal gathering in the seaside resort of Beidahe, located 280 kilometres east of Beijing. The gigantic Party event that followed offers a view of China's present situation and a perspective on the future of a territorial entity that is more of a multinational continent than a single country. To sum up: Despite politically motivated "concerns" from the Western world and its routine prophecies of political doom, the continuation of China's political strategy, structures and processes, combined with targeted incremental changes in selected key areas, promises further successes for the leadership and offers many lessons for myopic Western leaders. Political analyses are an act of socially constructing and interpreting reality, whereby the territory is fit into pre-existing mental maps. Reports about China's situation at the time of the Party Congress can be classified by two diametrically opposed intellectual camps: China's official press and friends point to the astonishing success of what can be called "China Inc". Simply feeding, clothing and sheltering almost 1.3 billion people can be considered a huge success, since it requires extremely high levels of resource co-ordination and control. What is more, for decades China has scored extremely high growth rates when compared with the rest of the developing world. Of late, China's growth rate means that GDP has been doubling roughly every 10 years. Besides, China has long been among the largest recipients of foreign direct investment (in most years surpassed only by the United States). This suggests that investors appreciate China's system. Yet, Western observers often search for weak spots. It appears that only bad news is deemed newsworthy. Or perhaps the magical China story seems to be too good to be true when compared with Western systems. These "political spoilsports" lament growing unemployment and poverty, corruption and organised crime, environmental pollution and alleged human rights abuses. In fact, these critics do not even approve of the Chinese leadership's strict policy of deterring social unrest (in China, such unrest could cost millions of lives and destroy wealth on an unimaginable scale). What holds true for both these perspectives is that in a country as large and diverse as China one cannot apply Western clichés and stereotypes. In addition to being unrealistic, they can easily be "confirmed" by at least one example, simply because of the size of the country. Instead, the erudite analyst should be concerned with the country's structural development, judging the system by its tangible results, which need to be explained and evaluated from a Chinese perspective and within a Chinese context. Three leitmotifs can be distilled from the Party Congress. These emerged after the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) and can be regarded as the key to the party's success and preservation of power in a world where, for the most part, communism has been relegated to the history books. First, Chinese leaders have put an end to "empty ideology". The Cultural Revolution, a kind of civil war, was an act of creative destruction. Paradoxically, the chaos and devastation it wreaked benefited China, since it convinced a whole class of officials that policy should not be oriented toward divisive theories and paralysing dogmas. For a while, these theories acted as a surrogate for real performance, appealing through their appearance of certainty and stability. In this sense, ideologies that are decoupled from tangible progress are the real opium of the masses, with all the attendant signs of addiction and eventual despair. Rather, the growing prosperity of human beings in a visionary national community that works towards the goals of collective and individual happiness are far more important. Thus, the "evil" cleared the way for the "good". Verbal and conceptual flexibility and virtuosity were the hallmarks of the late Chinese leader, Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997). Despite being perhaps one of the greatest leaders of the 20th century, he failed to become a household name in the West. In 1978, Deng unveiled a new policy of "Reforms and Opening" (gaige kaifang), transforming a centrally planned system, dominated by state ownership, into a "strategically- guided" market economy incorporating private enterprises. Deng continued to influence his country's destiny, even after his death at 93, through the economic choices he made for his nation. Ever the economic pragmatist, he defined socialism as, "everything that increases the productive powers of society". The socialist label, however, remained in a country that had effectively turned to capitalism. Like "democracy" in the West, the umbrella term "socialism" became a construct that legitimised and sustained the system, preserving the power structure that was established by the victory of the communists in 1949. The flexibility associated with the term "socialism" also eliminated potential friction and preserved China's political unity. Second, pragmatic opportunism is preferred over visionary "great leaps forward" and revolutions. The 16th Party Congress continued this pragmatic tradition, by changing the party constitution. From now on, private entrepreneurs will be allowed to enter the party as regular members. Instead of designing a fixed and inflexible economic plan, the communists understood a key development pattern, leveraging it to their advantage. In this case, they removed the economic and political obstacles faced by private entrepreneurs in China. These entrepreneurs have been the driving force behind the Chinese economic miracle. This economic success secured the party's credibility. Indeed, material progress became particularly important for the Party after the suppression of the student revolt in 1989. The expanded representation of the grassroots implied by the inclusion of capitalists in a communist organisation further legitimises the Party, increasing its chances of survival and power retention at a time when economic gains are distributed unevenly. It also begs an interesting question: What is the purpose of a parliamentary multi-party system if pluralism and democracy are promoted within a single united party, which at the same time, offers all the advantages of centralised strategic leadership. Besides, the new policy prevents any potential opposition from forming a rival power grouping at the outset by integrating it into the Party's organisational structure. The communists seem to apply the principle that if you cannot beat your opponent, you should team up with him. With entrepreneurs advancing into the highest political decision-making bodies of the country, the quality of decision-making is also likely to be improved. However, it will probably be very difficult for the entrepreneurs to steer final decisions completely in their favour, since they lack the organised power base and political skills of the "traditional" communists. The admission of entrepreneurs, who were formerly labelled as "exploiters", also underlines the capacity of the Party to evolve without losing its grip on the country, the ultimate fate of many "reformers". The Chinese leadership has been particularly good at pushing through change while claiming it as a continuity. One Party magazine even went so far as to claim that entrepreneurs are, in reality, workers too! Third, a technocratic elite enjoys absolute power. Mao Tsedong (1893-1976), the founder of the People's Republic of China, was an intelligent political and military strategist, but, given his rural background, had a limited understanding of economics and business. Additionally, the "court" which grew up around him could offer little help. In stark contrast, a collective leadership has firmly held on to the reigns of power since 1978. Indeed, successions of power have proceeded in an orderly fashion, contradicting Western theories that power transfers are always associated with bloodshed in a non-democratic society. Keen to build a strategy for China, Deng Xiaoping and his political allies focused on policy content and methods supported by a "solid system architecture". These imbue the nation with a high degree of unity and a capacity for collective action and progress. This marriage of content, methods and organisation has led to a strong collective performance. Above all, it manifests itself in China's new-found prosperity. This new oriental way may inspire some Western leaders, too, who are stuck in an ethnocentric mindset and are therefore either unable or unwilling to take note of political innovations in the East. Apart from some dissidents, most leaders and members of the general population pursue and support the same strategic themes: economic reforms coupled to political stability, an international openness and a commitment to world peace. In order not to undermine these long-term goals, they tolerate the constant humiliations emanating from the US, which often classify China as a "dangerous country". The West spends much time on fruitless debate and sham fights, while often failing to deliver tangible results. This often leads to a spiral of "diminishing expectations". In contrast, China prefers concrete action over empty theoretical abstractions. It prioritises implementation and carries out its plans with an unbending resolution. Western observers need to understand that only the pragmatic ideology of pursuing factually proven success can maintain nations and preserve systems in the long-run. The West suffers from its firmly rooted "democratic" system, which results in an oligopoly of the rich. They finance elections, spread propaganda through the media and advertising, and control the legal system. This system gives birth to a class of political salesmen, who orient their policies towards the lowest common denominator. Always focused on the middle ground, they end up with mediocre results. To gain a majority of votes, they rob the capable, using these resources to finance the incompetent and lazy (including themselves). Socialist parties even profit from making people poorer, since using this approach enables them to sell their "social" policies to more people! Because democratic structures divide, politicians hardly ever gather enough supporters to implement major reforms. Reforms are usually blocked by adherents to the status quo, whose special interests are often organised and enshrined in lobbying groups. To cover up for the failure of this system, attention in the West has been shifted to alleged terrorist threats and neo-imperialist conquests. While most other areas of society constantly innovate, the constitutions, political mindsets and entrenched interests of the West prevent a political system, which was designed for the world of many centuries ago, from improving. Fortunately, it is no longer true that democracy, with all its faults, is the best available option. Western nations would be well advised to study the Chinese success story, which offers an interesting political alternative. Political logic begs the ultimate question of whether it should not be the West that must learn from China instead of the other way around. * The writer is a China specialist who taught at Harvard University, was the first permanent foreign professor at a Chinese University in the history of the People's Republic (at Peking University) and published The Art of Chinese Management (Oxford University Press, 2002)
