Mohamed Sid-Ahmed probes possible scenarios for the post-Iraqi war situation With the battle for Baghdad, the war on Iraq will enter its most decisive stage. This stage was preceded by preparatory stages, including a diplomatic stage in the Security Council, which ended with America's decision to wage the war outside the scope of the Council and in the face of strong opposition from great powers vested with veto rights, led by France and Russia. There was also a preparatory military stage, which was meant to unfold according to an original, pre-established, battle plan. But what was actually implemented differed greatly from that plan. The first digression from the plan was the timing of the actual start-up of military operations. Just before the date initially set for the commencement of the campaign, it was decided to change the plan and launch missiles on a site where, according to intelligence sources, Saddam Hussein and some of his top collaborators were hiding. As it turned out, the information was wrong but it was too late to revert to the original time-frame. The result of the decision to lay aside the original war plan in favour of a lightning strike to "decapitate" the regime was that the war began on the southern front (i.e. from Kuwait) not according to the preset plan, while the northern front (i.e. Turkey) could not be activated because of the unexpected decision by the Turkish parliament not to allow US troops to launch attacks from the Turkish border. But the greatest surprise of all was the failure of the assumption that the Iraqis would welcome the invading forces with flowers, as liberators rather than as occupation forces. The Bush administration had banked on the hatred the Iraqis nursed for their despotic leader, as well as on the inter- communal animosities between Sunnis, Shi'ites and Kurds. What the Americans did not anticipate was the strength of Iraqi patriotism and the fierce resistance they would encounter from ordinary Iraqis, who were this time around at the receiving end of an invasion and not, as was the case in 1990, the perpetrators of one. It was believed that, as soon as the battles began, there would be mass defections by Iraqi troops and a flood of refugees fleeing to neighbouring countries. But what actually happened was just the opposite: Iraqi regular and irregular troops continue to offer strong resistance, while thousands of Iraqis living abroad returned to take part in the resistance movement against the invading forces. The battles in the preparatory stage have not been as favourable to the coalition forces as expected. But nor have they ensured Saddam's survival. The fate of the war, of the entire region and not only Iraq, indeed, of the world order itself, hinges on the outcome of the climactic battle for Baghdad. The Iraqi capital is a densely populated city of over five million inhabitants where the regime remains firmly in control and the air defences, though degraded, are still functional. It is likely that American forces will be caught in the dreaded scenario of street-by-street fighting that will do little to endear them to the Iraqis. Can America, in such conditions, achieve a decisive victory? And if it fails to do so, what will be the alternative? The declared objectives of the war on Iraq are disarmament, regime change and the introduction of democracy into the country. In an address of Congress, Colin Powell declared that the commander of the war, General Tommy Franks, will be responsible for disarming Iraq and controlling its army and that a transitional government will be formed under the leadership of a retired general to ensure that the new regime does not include any remnants of the old. He also said the United States would maintain a strong presence in Iraq until the country's future is secure. He envisaged an important role for the United Nations in the post-war reconstruction of Iraq. Meanwhile, Bush pressed Congress to approve his request for $74.7 billion to cover the costs of the war, a figure some congressional Democrats predicted could double before the war is over. Of the sum, $62 billion are earmarked for fighting the war, 7.85 billion for humanitarian relief, 4.24 billion for domestic security and 1.4 billion for allies in the war coalition. However, it is hard to see how the democratisation of Iraq can come about at the hands of a foreign military occupation in the wake of an invasion that has claimed hundreds of civilian lives so far (with many more casualties expected in the days ahead) and destroyed much of Iraq's basic infrastructure. Far from being a "walkover" as optimistically predicted by the Bush team the invasion is facing vigorous resistance from the very people it claims to be liberating. Instead of planting democracy in Iraq, the American military rule is more likely to try and consolidate Iraq's relations with Israel, allegedly the only "real" democracy in the Middle East. Indeed, it is not conceivable that the new Iraqi regime installed by the US, and which is meant to be the very opposite of the previous Iraqi regime, will remain aloof from Israel, especially if it is headed by a retired American general, and with the Bush administration's known links with the ultra-right government of Sharon in Israel. The post-war map of the region is thus almost certain to include a new axis made up of the United States, Iraq and Israel, and the Arabs need to ask themselves at this point how they will deal with the emergence of a new power alliance that is bound to introduce new political dynamics to the region. The real question is not how the radical Arab regimes will react to the axis, but how moderate regimes like Egypt and Saudi Arabia will deal with such a development. Will they gravitate closer to this new axis than to the countries making up what the Bush administration calls the "axis of evil"? Moreover, a conclusive American victory will encourage the Bush administration to step up its campaign against the "axis of evil". Bush will be in a position to berate the countries that opposed the war for their unwillingness to take on the forces of evil. He will be able to tell them that while they did not have the guts to assume their responsibilities and face up to the danger these forces represent for world peace and security, he, with only Britain on his side, managed to destroy one of their main strongholds and is now planning to move against other countries that offer sate haven to terrorists and provide them with weapons of mass destruction, against Iran, Syria, Libya, Sudan and all those who dare step out of the American line. Emboldened by his victory in Iraq, however hard- won, Bush will demand unconditional support for the task ahead from those allies who refused to join his war on Iraq. The only way to avoid an expansion of military operations into new arenas is to demonstrate that the Bush administration was unable to score the victory it aspired to in the Iraqi arena, to demonstrate, in fact, that unipolarity is not the only viable alternative to the former bipolar world order. The whole world has an interest in establishing that the alternative to bipolarity in the post-Cold War era is not a unipolar world order in which one superpower gets to decide the fate of humankind as a whole. But this would require going back to diplomacy rather than leaving things to be decided on the battlefield. The US should be made to accept the principle of resolving disputes, however difficult, through negotiations, not war. This will depend, first and foremost, on the continued valiant resistance of the Iraqi people and on the support the international community can offer them in this regard. At the international level, the mass demonstrations that marched through cities all over the world have been a tremendous help. Meanwhile, the Arab world has yet to live up to its responsibilities towards the suffering people of Iraq. The price of its failure to do so will be paid by all the Arab peoples, not only by the Iraqis, especially if we take into account the disastrous consequences of a new American-Iraqi-Israeli axis in the region. A particularly heavy price will be paid by the Palestinian people. Unless the Arab parties improve their performance, dealing with the Palestinian problem will be made to depend on the US victory in dealing with Saddam Hussein. We could very well witness proposals to implement the Palestinian "right of return" through the intensive resettlement of Palestinians in given enclaves in Iraq. Sharon's objective to expel as many Palestinians as possible from Gaza and the West Bank could also be achieved in this manner. The Hashemite Dynasty might even be restored over Iraq, not only over Jordan, thus extending the scope of the American-Iraqi- Israeli axis and setting the foundations for a total transformation of the Middle East map. It is worth underscoring that not only the Arab world has an interest in seeing the American drive for global domination defeated. It is an interest shared by all forces which advocate the emergence of a multipolar world order in which the global decision-making process is no longer monopolised by one superpower but is shared by other powers such as Europe, Russia and China. Even Blair, who has systematically stood on the side of Bush, is now calling for Europe -- and the UN -- to assume a major role. But much in the final analysis will depend on the battle of Baghdad.
