The protests in Iran, writes Amr Elchoubaki from Tehran, are not the state of revolt the US depicts them as being, but evidence of something else altogether The recent student demonstrations in Tehran, which were weakly echoed in other Iranian cities, were variously construed as the beginning of change in Iran and the work of renegades and foreign agents. What is certain is that to understand the development of the democratic experience in Iran we must reject Washington's spurious optimism whereby it gloats over the occasional eruption of protest in Iran as a sign of the imminent demise of the Islamic republic. How frequently the US has criticised Arab regimes for having insufficient freedom of expression, pluralism and avenues of peaceful protest. Yet, when such phenomena do exist, as in Iran, Washington depicts them, not as manifestations of democracy but as a state of revolt, so keen it is on overturning Tehran's elected government and implanting a non-democratic puppet regime as it hopes to do in Iraq. The democratic experiment in Iran is perhaps the most complex and, simultaneously, dynamic of such experiences in the Arab and Islamic world. The product of one of the most radical and sweeping popular revolutions in the modern world, it possessed from the outset democratic institutions and mechanisms. It has emulated the Turkish model for democratisation in that it provides for the rotation of power among diverse ideological and political trends, albeit within strict parameters. If, in Turkey, those parameters are set by the secular system, in Iran they are set by a concept of "Islamic government" in which the rule of Muslim theologians is epitomised in the broad powers given to the Spiritual Guide of the Republic Ali Khamenei, powers that may conflict and sometimes exceed those accorded to the popularly elected president Mohamed Khatami. Indeed, the importance of the Iranian experiment resides in the precedent it has set for applying Shari'a within a modern, democratic framework of government. The president is elected for no more than two six-year terms. It has a parliament whose representatives are popularly- elected in polls that are a far cry from the ballot- rigging culture prevalent in the Arab world. There is considerable scope for the expression of diverse and rival political trends. These can roughly be subsumed under the headings reformist and conservative, which sometimes overlap. The vibrancy of democracy in Iran stands in stark contrast to the experiments in restricted plurality in the Arab world and to those Arab and Islamic regimes that hide their moral and political bankruptcy behind ideological slogans, as was the case with Saddam Hussein's Iraq and the Afghanistan of the Taliban. The paradox of the Iranian experience resides in the fact that it advocated a revolutionary vision of government and sought to export this to the world. Yet, unlike many ideologically inspired revolutions, which have subordinated the business of establishing stable and viable systems of democratic rule to the pursuit of the goals of the revolution, the Iranian revolution remained intent, from the outset, upon developing and entrenching democratic institutions in tandem with the advancement of its ideals. Nevertheless, the Iranian revolution did not fully succeed at rendering this convergence of Islamic ideology and modern government building into a purely institutionalised framework for regulating the polity within the parameters of commonly held principles. The constitutional and legal powers conferred upon specific individuals who are deemed to embody certain religious precepts often conflict with and exceed those conferred upon elected bodies of government. A similar duality existed in Turkey where the military establishment, charged with upholding the secularist system, assumed powers well beyond those necessary to perform its function. If anything, this duality was more pronounced in Iran, where the powers of the clergy frequently override those of modern, democratically elected civilian bodies. In the cases of both Turkey and Iran, the role of the "guardian" establishment has receded. In Turkey, the military no longer intervenes directly in the political arena, and such intervention would be unacceptable unless perhaps to safeguard the secular system of rule. That the military acceded to the government's refusal to permit US forces access to Iraq through Turkish territory perhaps best illustrates this. If Iran has been slower in developing in this direction, we nevertheless find that President Mohammad Khatami has given a powerful boost to the rule of institutionalised government and sovereignty of law by curbing the powers of the militias of the revolutionary guard, which, in the 1980s, had exercised a form of terror not unlike the mutawa'in in Saudi Arabia. Iran did not need an American decision to curb its own excesses. Indeed, the elected Iranian president has given a humanitarian face to the rhetoric of the Islamic revolution. His is an Iran that can address the outside world and contribute invaluable ideas to the dialogue of civilisations. In his recent visit to Beirut, Khatami declared that his country's message to the world was grounded in the advancement of knowledge and morals, a message that encapsulated a tenor of discourse markedly different to the rhetoric of "immutable Islamic tenets" of Khamenei and the conservative elite. Although the duality of the political power structure in Iran remains the most salient obstacle to democratic development, there have been persistent efforts at reaching compromise solutions. Such efforts are not so much a response to the American threat as they are a product of concrete social and cultural realities in Iran. Conservatives reflect the Shi'ite precept of the "rule of the theologian" which vests vast powers in the person of the Supreme Guide, elected by the Muslim clergy. However, the reformists' advocacy of the "rule of the citizens" also has deep roots in Iranian political culture. Conservatives hold that the powers of the Supreme Guide of the Islamic Revolution existed before the revolution and would continue to exist under any system. This was because these powers were conferred on the Supreme Guide by the citizenry through the clergymen they elected and whose institutions had remained independent from the state in Iran. While that may be the case, the situation in post-revolutionary Iran is greatly different to that which existed before the revolution. The Supreme Guide is far more than a spiritual leader. He has constitutionally-stipulated powers and important bodies of government under his authority, notably the judiciary, which poses a permanent obstacle to the civil institutions of state. It is difficult to imagine that this duality in the Iranian system of government can last forever. Nor is there any reason it should. Islam in both its cultural and juridical senses is not, inherently, an impediment to democratic development. Nor does the Islamic revolution, which is still broadly accepted as the political and moral framework for the interaction between various political groupings, necessarily impede the enhancement of democratic values and practices. However, the extraordinary powers vested in specific individuals to act as "guardians" of the values of the Islamic revolution cannot persist. For democratisation to advance, the values of the revolution must be safeguarded in accordance with the provisions of a popularly accepted constitution, not by a select few who dominate the system and control the mechanisms of democratic development. This said, the Iranian experience has succeeded in creating democratic channels for political debate and procedural mechanisms permitting for revision and reform. Because of these channels and mechanisms, Iran, since the beginning of Khatami's term in office, has undergone numerous reforms leading to greater democratisation and political openness. These channels and mechanisms have also made possible criticism of the "sanctities" of the regime, including the powers vested in the Supreme Guide. If the road to democracy is a progressive process, entailing an ongoing grass-roots struggle, the interplay between pressure groups, peaceful protests and the like, Iran possesses the necessary mechanisms to sustain the process. This is why it has not suffered, nor is it likely to suffer, the arterial sclerosis that has affected most Arab and Islamic societies, in which the sudden coup seems always to loom as the answer to political change or where withdrawal from political participation is the only available mode of protest. While democratic mechanisms for change exist, further reforms in Iran will depend upon the preparedness of the conservatives to yield to popular demands and upon Washington ceasing its belligerent policy towards Tehran. Should Iran be left to its own devices, it is possible to predict that in the foreseeable future the Spiritual Guide will assume a role similar to that of the British monarch or the president of a country ruled by an elected prime minister. Ultimately his authority will be transformed to one of a purely moral and symbolic nature while effective rule is assumed by the popularly elected institutions of government.
