Mustafa Al-Labbad rereads the occupation of the American Embassy in Tehran 25 years after "The occupation of the American Embassy is a second revolution, greater than the first" -- Imam Ayatollah Khomeini The time: Morning on 4 November 1979. The place: Al- Talaqani Street in the middle of Tehran, the Iranian capital. This street, in which the American Embassy now stands, already has something of a history. Before the revolution it was known as Takht Al-Tawwous, or "The Peacock Throne" -- a symbol of the Pahlavi dynasty that ruled Iran. Its history has also seen it known as "Franklin Roosevelt Street", a reflection of the close friendship that characterised relations between Washington and Tehran from the end of World War II until the Iranian Islamic Revolution. Snow now covers the streets and the high peaks of the mountain chain that both surround Tehran and stretch in a great arc thousands of miles from Turkey to Afghanistan. The revolution has been victorious, the Shah has fled, and Imam Khomeini has returned from exile abroad. The army has been sidelined and an interim government formed to organise a popular referendum. At this historical point in the Iranian revolution, a crossroads, the political battle lines have become confused, extending to encapsulate almost all internal factions whilst the country itself remains open to the outside world. Both the political process and the process of revolutionary change face an entrenched crisis. This is best summed up as the conflict between the "rule of the theologian" -- the Revolutionary Council led by Imam Khomeini, and the interim government, a collection of political movements, diverse in their beliefs and orientation under the leadership of Mahdi Bazrkan -- who were opposed to this idea. With the most radical supporters and the religious authority of Imam Khomeini, the supporters of theocracy are building up influence, gradually dominating centres of power in the state via a proactive strategy. Meanwhile, the opposition parties conduct their side of the battle as reactionaries, conscious of the gradual concentration of power in the hands of Imam Khomeini, but lacking any symbolic leader or unity. Now, while Tehran is covered with snow, it is boiling beneath. Both sides have their chance. Yet it is in Iran's political scene that appearances are truly deceptive. This week is the 25th anniversary of the occupation of the American Embassy in Tehran. It is a date laden with significance and contradictory meanings, the very significance that prevents it from being forgotten despite the passage of years. The importance of the embassy takeover is linked to the profound changes that appeared in US-Iranian relations at that time, relations that until this day have been characterised by tension and conflict. Yet its significance is not confined to relations alone, as the nature and appearance of the Iranian revolution was profoundly different from that of the Iranian state that succeeded it. This was in ideology, orientation, the composition of its ruling elite and its mechanisms for re- production. With this in mind, the occupation of the American Embassy can be seen as a crucial moment in the development of the Iranian political system. So, when we examine 4 November 1979 and assess its significance today, we shed light on the political development of a key player in the region. By placing these developments in their historical context, we can attempt a new reading of what is perhaps one of the most radical developments in the history of the whole region. For although the wheel of history continues to turn in unanticipated directions, it never fails to pass through decisive moments in the development of societies and political systems, something that is only too true in the case of the occupation of the American Embassy in Tehran. It was on this day that hundreds of Iranian students gathered beneath the walls of the American Embassy, chanting slogans of the revolution that never failed to excite the masses worldwide. The voices grew louder, chanting "Allah Akbar" and "Marak Bar America", meaning "God is Great" and "Death to America". Local residents and shopkeepers thought it was just another demonstration, commonplace since the revolution. The students, however, were not content with chanting slogans. Cutting the chains and breaking the locks that bound the embassy gates shut, the students poured in. Once inside, they proceeded to take the 61 embassy staff captive. It was not long before Imam Khomeini's student supporters dispelled any doubts about their attentions by issuing their very own Statement No.1, following the custom of politics in the countries in the Islamic East. From the American point of view, the embassy's occupation was an example of "barbaric and savage acts", a perspective that cast a shadow over the Western media's coverage of Iran. This targeted media policy helped fix a certain image of the Iranian revolution into the world's consciousness. Soon, any mention of the word "Iran" brought to mind the occupation of the American Embassy. The media policy sought to disassociate the event from its basic constituent -- the political component -- and depicted the student kidnappers as a handful of "Apaches and armed thieves terrorising peaceful diplomats". Media opposition grew to such a degree that the students were described as terrorists, a term that had been reserved for Palestinian fighters after their airplane hijacks. Thus, the arguments used against the students took on a moral dimension and then a legal approach, claiming that a state's embassies and diplomatic representatives were, according to international law, under the national sovereignty of that state. The opposite point of view, represented by the "student followers of the teachings of the imam", stated that the occupation was no more than a political operation with a clearly defined objective: the return of the deposed Shah to stand trial for crimes committed against the Iranian people. They said that Washington giving the Shah asylum was not in accordance with democratic principles, principles that should not allow criminals to remain under their protection. According to the students who carried out the operation, the Shah was no ordinary criminal, but one who had acted against his people and whose crimes would never be forgotten. The awful memories that Iranian nationalists had of America's role in propping up the Shah were a central factor in galvanising Iranian public opinion and generating support for the occupation. After all, wasn't it Washington that, with the help of local agents, had planned and carried out the coup that swept away Mohamed Mossadaq's democratically elected and popular government in 1953? Arguments of international law posed no obstacle to the students, particularly as they saw the principles of international law being broken on a daily basis by Washington and its allies across the world. As the arguments of those who had supported them, boasting of their patriotic valour and religious conviction, dissolved into accusation and counter-accusation, nothing remained clear except the context of the event. Difficult issues such as those associated with the embassy takeover cannot be resolved with black-and-white decisions or convictions about the "wrong or right" course of action. The embassy takeover can be interpreted as an "illegal action" that broke international treaties or as a "revolutionary act" against a major power that had supported the Shah and drained Iran's resources against the interests of the majority of its citizens. A month after the embassy was first occupied it had become a place to go and show off your muscles and strength; a number of prominent Iranians went to visit the hostages. This was how Ma'ssouma Ibtikar, one of President Mohamed Khatami's deputies in the Iranian parliament and at that time, spokeswoman for the occupiers of the embassy, remembers the scene. Leading figures in Iranian politics would visit the embassy, from Ayatollah Hussein Ali Muntazeri (Imam Khomeini's appointed successor) and Hojatalislam Ali Khamenei, the current supreme leader of the Iranian Islamic Revolution, all the way up to the former president of the Iranian Republic, Mohamed Ali Rajaei.- Nearly 25 years after the occupation of the American Embassy I had the chance to meet one of the "student followers of the teachings of the imam" in Fardoosi Square, halfway between the British Embassy in Fardoosi Street and the American Embassy in Talaqani Street. Today he works in trade, having finished his studies and inherited a trading store from his father. He has also distanced himself from politics following the embassy takeover. The embassy is a large building occupying a sizeable portion of Talaqani Street, with walls that still bear revolutionary slogans denouncing Washington's policies. Standing on the opposite pavement, crowded with antique shops and household goods stores, nothing can be seen on the other side of the wall other than tall trees that lean forward over the street. Barbed wire covers the top of the wall. This is the embassy of "Shaitan Barzak", or the "Great Satan", to use a phrase of Imam Khomeini that became a synonym for America in Iran. "The morning of the occupation of the American Embassy I was shouting 'Death to America' until my voice went hoarse." This desire to shout against America is no longer with him: "We performed a patriotic act by any standards, and I don't apologise for it, even though I won't take part in something like that ever again." On either side of the road lie the small stalls that characterise Iran, selling their newspapers to passers-by. I bought some reformist papers. We walked until we came in sight of the statue of the Iranian poet, Fardoosi, after whom the clean and orderly street was named. The cries of the money-changers followed us: "Mah Dollar Kharidim Aqa", meaning "We buy dollars, mister." The Iranian trader continued: "We rubbed the United States' nose in the dust." He straightened in his seat and added, "we were young men, pushed to take revenge against the US that was the very symbol of arrogance and pride to the Iranian people. We didn't take orders from anyone... Imam Khomeini was our only authority. When he announced his support for the takeover we felt we were performing an act that was both religious and patriotic at the same time. Now, after all these years, I think that things haven't turned out as we dreamed. We wanted a pure Islam that would stand up for the oppressed and weak both inside Iran and abroad, and that would take on the proud and haughty. But countries and their interests never turn out as we hope, but according to the dictates of politics. That's why I told you that I've parted company with politics." I didn't press the man for any more. I took out the newspapers I'd bought and flicked through them. "Do you remember them now?" I pointed to the photographs of leading political figures. He smiled and nodded. They were the leaders of the students who'd occupied the embassy, and he had been a member of this committee: Reza Khatami, Mohsen Mirdamadi, Abbas Abdy, Ibrahim Asghar Zada, Said Hajarian, Ma'ssouma Ibtikar and Habibollah Betraf. It is perhaps ironic that the leaders of the embassy takeover disappeared from political life in one way or another, only to re-emerge with the election of the reformist Khatami as president of the Islamic Republic of Iran. They occupy positions in various reformist parties and constitutional councils, and are at the forefront of the political struggle between reformists and conservative clerics. If we take a closer look at this group of politicians, we find that Ibrahim Asghar Zada is a leader in the Islamic Solidarity Reform Party; Said Hajarian worked in the Ministry of Intelligence during Khatami's first term in office and survived an assassination attempt, the responsibility for which lay in the reformist camp; Ma'ssouma Ibtikar is one of Khatami's parliamentary deputies; and Habibollah Betraf is Khatami's minister of power. How is it that these individuals have come to dominate the leadership of the reformist movement? Is it fate, coincidence, or something else? The Iranian trader believes that coincidence has played its part. On the way back to the hotel we passed a building under construction. The building was being erected using a system followed throughout Iran. Having laid the foundations, the steel skeleton of the entire building, with all its floors, is put up, leaving gaps between the metal posts. The big gaps are filled with bricks and cement, and concrete used to cover the metal posts. It is built according to its original plan. The "theologian's rule" in Iran followed the same course. Imam Khomeini first established his basic vision for "theologian's rule", then started a political movement in support of this idea that began to build step by step, in accordance with a pre- determined plan. The takeover of the embassy brought an end to the duality in the governance of Iran, coming after the resignation of Mahdi Bazargan's liberal nationalist government and its surrender to "theologian's rule". Regardless of the legality of the embassy takeover or the international aspects of the event, the dialectic between the internal and the external and the exploitation of the latter for the sake of the former, is powerful evidence of the skill and pragmatism of those who planned and ran the operation and managed to achieve their political objectives almost 25 years ago today. This analysis would not be complete if we failed to compare the occupation of the American Embassy in Tehran, during which not one drop of blood was spilt, with the hostage-taking and beheadings currently taking place in Iraq. These operations have no clear objective, and fail to gain any political or moral victory for the kidnappers. Hostage-taking operations marked the beginning of Iran's new regional role in the Middle East that stretched from the takeover until at least the mid-1990s. It also marked the moment when it threw off its shackles and emerged from under Washington's shadow to pursue its own regional ambitions and stretch its wings. At the time it was the figurehead of radical politics in the region, something that helped entrench its regional status and in the end worked in its favour. The timing of the American Embassy hostages release was a final confirmation of the operation's skilful planning and execution. The refusal to release the hostages for the whole length of the American election campaign led directly to the downfall of the Democratic candidate Jimmy Carter, and the election of his Republican rival Ronald Reagan in the 1980 presidential elections. It stands as a rare example of the ability of regional countries in the shadow of the bipolar world order to use moral and political pressure to influence the political systems of the great powers. After analysing the embassy takeover and the change to a unipolar world order we arrive at one question in particular: "Does the return of the student leaders, who occupied the American Embassy some 25 years ago, to Iranian politics from the mid-1990s onwards as radical reformists brandishing concepts such as 'civil society', 'popular participation' and 'dialogue between civilisations' mark a new attempt, using different means, to achieve Iran's strategic goals?" In other words, was it a planned effort, designed to give a democratic colouring to Iran's political development enabling them to be marketed abroad, both regionally and in the world at large? Perhaps it would allow decision-makers in Tehran to buy the time they needed to establish themselves as a regional power in the unipolar world order by developing their nuclear capabilities.
