The Shi'ites of Iraq have a glorious future ahead of them, writes Salah Nasrawi* -- but only if they can overcome their internal divisions The period preceding the allied invasion of Iraq witnessed the appearance of a number of differences among Iraqi Shi'ite groups. While the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) supported the war and coordinated with the US, others condemned such cooperation. Some Shi'ite leaders issued fatwas outlawing cooperation with the invading forces. Others, such as Ayatollah Mohamed Sadeq Al-Shirazi, the spiritual leader of the Islamic Task Organisation, while not explicitly supporting the war, still saw it as a chance that must be seized to save the oppressed Iraqi people. With the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, the Shi'ite leaders in exile began to return to Iraq. Al-Sayed Abdul- Mejid Al-Khoei, son of Grand Ayatollah Abul-Qasim Al- Khoei, who was spiritual leader at the time of the 1991 Shi'ite uprising, returned even before the regime had fallen. He was moved into Najaf by US forces, along with a small number of his associates. His murder on 10 April 2003, during a clash with rival Shi'ite forces, revealed that the realities on the ground are quite different from those anticipated by either the US, or the Shi'ite leaders in exile. This murder was subsequently attributed to Shi'ite followers of the late spiritual leader Mohamed Sadeq Al-Sadr -- himself allegedly assassinated by Saddam Hussein's forces in 1999 -- whose movement appears to have a large following in most Shi'ite cities. There are now four main politico-religious trends competing for the leadership of the Shi'ite population. The first trend emerges from the scholarly Hawza in Najaf, the supreme Shi'ite religious authority. At its head is Grand Ayatollah Al-Sayed Ali Al-Sistani, followed by ayatollahs Mohamed Ishaq Al-Fayyad, Hussein Bashir Al- Afghani and Mohamed Said Al-Hakim. Although this group enjoys the respect of most Iraqi Shi'ites, there are doubts as to its ability to politically mobilise the population, both because of its political position on the nature of an Islamic state, and because Al-Hakim is the only Iraqi in this group. The second trend is made up of the followers of Al-Sadr. This group has demonstrated considerable ability to mobilise by assuming control of the largest Shi'ite concentration in Iraq -- an area on the eastern edge of Baghdad whose more than two million Shi'ite inhabitants have renamed Saddam City, as it was known before the fall of the regime, Al-Sadr City. They have also taken the initiative in other Shi'ite neighbourhoods and cities, establishing militias to maintain order after the disintegration of authority, thereby making a strong bid to lead the Shi'ite forces. This movement can also draw on the rich heritage of political and religious thought created by the late Al-Sadr, and its bid for leadership is strengthened by its strongly Arab stance, which gives it credibility in comparison with organisations linked to Iran. Moreover, many of its followers can genuinely claim to have resisted the former regime when others remained silent or moved out of Iraq. The third trend is made up of the political parties and organised movements, such as the Islamic Daawa Party, the Islamic Task Organisation and other small factions. These groups labour under the burden of internal divisions and external connections established in exile, and their members have not been involved in action on the ground in Iraq since the 1970s and 1980s. They will now have to meet the challenge of operating in a very different environment and must demonstrate how covert political action can provide solutions to political, economic and social problems. The fourth trend is represented by SCIRI. The leader of this organisation, Ayatollah Mohamed Baqir Al-Hakim, enjoys great popularity as a result of his involvement in the efforts to overthrow the Saddam Hussein regime as well as thanks to his family history (his father was head of the religious leadership in Najaf before Al-Khoei). This organisation has received a lot of media attention, partly because of the considerable support it receives from Iran. Al-Hakim received a warm welcome on his return to Iraq, but it was still nothing like the reception Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini received on his return to Tehran. The inability of the council's activists to marshal support in some Shi'ite districts reveals that it has a smaller following on the ground than anticipated, and this weakens Al-Hakim's claim to speak in the name of all Shi'ites. Moreover, the council is heavily dependent on Al-Hakim's leadership: it has a weak organisational structure and no clear political programme. The council has also been discredited by its association with the US, which appears to have used it as cover to legitimise its invasion before discarding it, when it made clear that Islamic government in whatever form is not an acceptable option for Iraq. Al-Hakim has tried to dampen widespread fears in Iraq regarding the role of the faqih (religious scholar) in administrative as well as religious leadership, arguing that the Iraqi people should decide on the form of government they want, and must participate in the making of political and social decisions. He has proclaimed his commitment to civil society, political diversity and free elections. There are, however, indications of a difference of opinion regarding Islamic government between Al-Hakim and the religious leadership in Najaf, especially Al-Sistani, who takes a more moderate position on the role of the faqih. Al-Sistani enjoys wide respect among Iraqi Shi'ites, and although he appears to have supported Al-Hakim to date, it is not yet clear how this relationship will hold up. SCIRI will also be under pressure in the days to come to assert its national identity and its independence from the influence of Iran. When we discuss the Shi'ite political movements, we must also remember that the majority of Iraqi Shi'ites do not belong to any of these organisations, and many have nationalist, liberal or leftist affiliations. The fall of Saddam Hussein's regime provides the Shi'ites with an opportunity to play a political, social and economic role consistent with their number. In order to do this, however, they must successfully meet a number of challenges. Shi'ite thinkers must now define the form and nature of the political state they want, and develop a political programme. The Shi'ites in general must also overcome their internal divisions, so that they can emerge as a unified force on the domestic scene and translate their numerical majority into political influence. They must achieve a balance between their Arab national identity and their links with Iran. They must also deal with the reservations felt by other -- predominantly Sunni -- Arab countries with regard to a potential Shi'ite regime in Iraq. Despite the continuing growth of the Shi'ites' power, they have never expressed any separatist intentions, nor are there any economic, geographical or cultural justifications for such a move. On the contrary, the Shi'ites tend to view themselves as the very embodiment of Iraq. It remains to be seen, though, if they will finally be successful in winning their fair share of wealth and political power in the new Iraq. * The writer is a Cairo-based Iraqi journalist.
