Ibrahim Nafie examines the implications of the so-called Swiss Agreement As Israel forges ahead with its campaign of aggression against the Palestinian people and ratches up regional tensions news from Switzerland confirmed that a group of Israelis and Palestinians, operating outside official channels, had discussed a formula for a settlement of the Palestininan-Israeli conflict. The so- called Swiss Agreement was vehemently attacked by officials from both the Israeli right and left. Ariel Sharon was so incensed as to accuse the Israelis who took part in the meeting of treason. Former prime minister Ehud Barak and current Labour Party leader Shimon Peres also criticised the meeting. A collection of prominent intellectuals and political figures from both sides participated in the negotiations. The Israeli negotiators included former minister of justice Yossi Beilin, former Labour Party leader General Amram Mitzna, former deputy chief of intelligence David Kimche, Ron Pundie, one of the architects of the Copenhagen Declaration, as well as Haim Urun, Yuli Tamir and Amos Oz. Also among them was Likud member Najama Ronin. The Palestinian side featured a similarly impressive group, including former minister of culture Yasser Abed Rabbu, Nabil Qassis, Hisham Abdel-Razeq, Mohamed Hourani and Qaddoura Faris. On 12 October, in Jordan, the two sides signed a summary of their agreement, having decided to defer the final signing to 4 November, so as to coincide with the 8th anniversary of the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin. With the sole exception of Ronin it is important to note that the Israeli signatories to the Swiss Agreement represent not the Israeli opposition, but a small flank of that opposition. It is not just the marginal status of those party to the Swiss Agreement that undermines its significance. The fact is that dozens of agreements on the Palestinian track have remained no more than ink on paper because of the manoeuvres and ploys of successive Israeli governments. This certainly applied to Oslo and its subsidiary agreements from Wye River to Sharm El-Sheikh. Neither the Likud government of Netanyahu nor the Labour government of Barak has proved true to its word. Since the assassination of Rabin the stumbling block to any settlement has always been that Israeli governments, regardless of their composition, have lacked the will to implement the provisions of any agreement signed with the Arabs. This is not to suggest that existing agreements are without value. Peace and stability in the region are contingent upon Israel's withdrawal from occupied territories and effective solutions to other final status issues. Such solutions must be spelled out in explicit and mutally acceptable terms. In considering the implications of the Swiss Agreement, therefore, we must bear in mind both its unofficial nature and the general Israeli refusal to honour any commitments previously made by Israeli governments. The parties to the Swiss Agreement appear to have based their talks on ideas and initiatives discussed during earlier Israeli- Palestinian negotiating rounds. Of particular importance were the proposals discussed during Camp David II in July 2000, former US President Clinton's initiative of December that same year and the Taba negotiations that took place shortly before the Knesset elections in 2001. That the Israelis and Palestinians in Switzerland perceived their negotiations as a continuation of this process was confirmed by Yossi Beilin who, in an article in Yediot Aharonot, wrote that "the day we signed the agreement with the Palestinians was to me the eighth day of Taba." Beilin's statement implies that the three years between then and the signing of the Swiss Agreement constituted an unproductive interval tragically marred by bloodshed and destruction. Certainly the document that has emerged from Switzerland represents a marked improvement over the ideas aired by Clinton on 23 December 2000 and then discussed in Taba. Clinton had proposed that Israel withdraw from between 94 to 96 per cent of the occupied territories in the West Bank, compensating the Palestinians for the remaining 4 to 6 per cent with between 1 to 3 per cent of Israeli land from within pre-1967 borders. The Swiss Agreement, by contrast, maintains that the borders should be those of 4 June 1967, as called for under UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, and that any adjustments made should ensure equal exchanges in land. In addition to reaffirming the authority of the UN resolutions, this agreement would ensure that the Palestinians regain the equivalent of 100 per cent of the West Bank. Nor would their be a question of possible "lease" arrangements for portions of the West Bank, as proposed by Israeli negotiators in Taba, and the consequent ambuiguity that could all too easily be exploited by the Israeli government. On Jerusalem Clinton had proposed that "the Arab areas should go to the Palestinians and the Jewish areas to the Israelis." The formula was far too vague. The Armenian quarter, to cite but one example, is neither Arab nor Jewish. Where should it go? Aware of such difficulties the parties to the Swiss agreement sat down with maps and topographical specialists, and succeeded in plotting in detail the areas that would fall under Palestinian or Israeli sovereignty. These areas would then become the capitals of the Palestinian and Israeli states. An even more sensitive issue in Jerusalem pertains to sovereignty over Al-Haram Al- Sharaf (The Dome of the Rock). Clinton suggested that the Palestinians be accorded sovereignty over Al-Haram Al-Sharaf and the Israelis over the Western Wall and the area behind that wall, which is to say the area beneath the Dome of the Rock. The formula provoked sharp controversy, especially because it would allow Israel to excavate beneath and behind the area it refers to as Temple Mount. Again the Swiss Agreement appears much more sensible. Using the term The Compound to refer to Al-Haram Al- Sharif or the Temple Mount, it states that "Palestine will be responsible for the security of the Compound." It further states that after the Israeli withdrawal "Palestine will have sovereignty over the Compound" while only "the Wailing Wall will be under Israeli sovereignty." In addition the agreement called for the creation of an "international investigation group", which would include representatives from several Islamic countries, to monitor the implementation of all articles of this section of the agreement, as well as for an "international presence in the Compound for this purpose." Another sensitive final status issue is the Palestinian right of return. The term has long been rejected by Israelis from acrossthe political spectrum since it challenges the ideological underpinning of Israel as a Jewish state to which only Jews have the right to return. The Palestinian negotiators in Switzerland proved unable to budge their Israeli counterparts on this score. The Swiss Agreement stated that "both parties agree that General Assembly resolution 194, Security Council resolution 242 and the Arab initiative, all of which concern the rights of refugees, shall constitute the basis for a solution to the problem of Palestinian refugees." No mention was made of the right of return. With regard to Palestinians displaced in1948 it stated merely that Israel would "permit the admission of a number of Palestinians." The formula thus does not present a significant departure from that proposed by Clinton three years ago. On security the Swiss agreement goes beyond the Clinton initiative and falls short of Taba. Clinton had called for an international force to guarantee implementation of the agreement. At the same time, however, Israel would retain three early warning stations in the West Bank, subject to revision after ten years, and it would retain military posts in the Jordan Valley for 36 months. He also said that Israel would have the right to deploy forces in the West Bank in the event of threats to its national security. In Taba the Israeli delegation insisted that Israel retain five military bases in the Jordan Valley in order to confront any threat from the east, and demanded control over Palestinian air space. The Palestinian delegation rejected both demands. Under the Swiss Agreement the Palestinian state would be unarmed apart from a "security force" to patrol the borders and peform policing functions. The agreement called for a multinational force to ensure the security of both sides and take all necessary measures to protect the Palestinian state. Israel would also be allowed to retain "a small military presence" in the Jordan Valley "under the supervision of international forces for a 36 month period." That period could come under review by both parties "in the event of new regional developments." Finally, the Palestinians in Switzerand agreed that Israel could retain two early warning stations in the West Bank, the use, administration and security of which would be under Israeli control. Palestinian air space, on the other hand, could be used by Israel for training purposes only. If the recent agreement produced by unofficial Palestinian and Israeli delegations contains many positive elements it also demonstrates the possibility of creative flexibility on long-standing Palestinian and Arab principles. But in the face of a Sharon-led war government working in coordination with the ultra-conservative adinistration in the US can any one really believe that an agreement hammered out by a minority of the Israel left stands any chance?
