A recent poll in Iraq holds surprises for Arabs and Americans alike, writes Abdel-Moneim Said* Many in the Arab world talk about the Iraqis but no one knows exactly what the Iraqis want. The problem is encapsulated in terms popular among Arab writers and politicians -- "the pulse of the masses" or simply "the masses" or, in its more recent formulation, "the Arab street". A random viewing of any talk show on Arab satellite networks is enough for the viewer to be deafened by the pulse of the masses as it is eloquently gauged by a parade of all- knowing guests. Initially, I had thought recourse to this particular catch-phrase was exclusive to Arab culture. But the term is catching on like wildfire. Visiting journalists have been quizzing me for months now about Arab streets, down to the narrowest back alley. One difference remains, though: while our own intellectuals maintain that anything the "public" feels must be good and true -- he voice of the "nation", ringing in awesome unanimity, cannot err -- for foreigners things are different. The Arab "public" is often cited to show that the Arabs are incorrigibly crude and hopelessly unruly. It is illuminating to watch how Arab and foreign satellite stations use street scenes to support diametrically opposed views. Arab stations air such images to show that the masses are filled with resolve, hot with determination, bent on endless struggle for justice and liberation. Foreign televisions, for their part, love to show crowds running back and forth with no clear aim or direction. The best part is when both sides use images of masked gunmen firing in the air. For the Arabs this is a sign of steely determination and bold defiance. For foreigners it is damning evidence of violence and terror. The difference is due to the cultural background of the two sides and their variant view of the "masses" and their so-called pulse. For Arabs the masses are pure and wise, repositories of an inherent wisdom intellectuals tap and distill. For westerners a credible public needs to present its political and cultural views through viable institutions. The public, acting chaotically, is just a mob. Suffice it to say that no one really knows how the pulse of the masses is beating. Arab politicians and writers rely mostly on guesswork. Certain individuals apparently have a God-given gift for gauging the public pulse. Others don't. In the more advanced world certain mechanisms exist to determine what people want, or don't. Public opinion polls are conducted by specialised centres and political research institutes. These polls use scientific methods to probe public opinion. Amazingly, this approach has never been favoured in the Arab world. So far we have no centres that specialise in conducting regular opinion polls. I am not belittling serious attempts to break into this field in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine and other Arab countries. But, generally speaking, Arab elites remain suspicious of such attempts, most still believing that the pulse of the masses has to be "felt", not "measured". They suspect public opinion polls of being a way of "infiltrating" Arab security, of divulging what is truly on people's mind. The latter -- needless to say -- is a national secret of the highest order. When the first public opinion poll was carried out in Egypt, by the Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies in 1998, some national newspapers denounced such research as a form of treason, the assumption being that foreign intelligence services must never know what is on our people's mind. We need to keep public opinion secret to confound the enemy, even if we ourselves remain confused. The argument is simple. Our enemies -- who are also our allies by virtue of protection or assistance -- know everything about us, from weapons to wheat, from artists to politicians, but they know little of what goes on in our minds. So we should keep this one last secret guarded -- no matter that we opine freely about it everyday. One of the key issues in today's Arab politics is the Iraqi issue, on which there are deep divisions both inside and outside the Arab world. The difficult question in most debates is: what do the Iraqis want? Because the question has never had a satisfactory answer, Arab pundits often claim that "our people" in Iraq want this and dislike that. Somehow, the preferences of the "masses" tend to match those of the pundit in question. But the clouds are finally lifting. Public opinion polls are starting to come out of Iraq. The first such poll, carried out by Zoghby International on behalf of the American Enterprise Institute, was conducted from 3 to 19 August, on a sample 600 people from Kirkuk, Basra, Mosul, and Al-Ramadi, across ethnic and religious lines. The poll has a margin of error of + or -- 4.1 per cent. The outcome of the poll was greeted with interest by both Arabs and Americans. Preliminary findings of the poll were printed a few weeks ago in the Arab press though the full text was not available until very recently and has not yet been subjected to careful examination. The poll holds certain surprises for Arabs and Americans alike. For the Arabs, one surprise is that there is no such thing as "the pulse of the masses". The Iraqis have offered different shades of opinion over the questions they were asked. The second is that the view of the Iraqi "brothers" differs from what the "masses", or at least the masses as represented by pundits on television, think. The Iraqis were asked if they expected their country to be in a better or worse shape in five years. Those who said it would be substantially better were 31.7 per cent, and those who thought it would be slightly better were 38 per cent. In total, 69.7 per cent of Iraqis, or two-thirds of the population, believe that Iraq will improve, substantially or slightly. The remaining third gave answers ranging from much worse (7.4 per cent) to slightly worse (13.2 per cent) to undecided (9.7 per cent). This general view was shared across ethnic, religious, and age lines. The degree of optimism varied, however, according to the background of the individuals polled. The number of optimists -- those believing Iraq would do substantially or slightly better in the future -- was higher than average among Iraqi Christians (77.8 per cent) and among those who had lost relatives in the recent war (77.4 per cent). Pessimists -- those who think Iraq would do substantially or slightly worse in the future -- were less among the two groups (12.2 per cent and 14.2 per cent respectively). Even among the Sunnis, who are thought to be the group that will benefit least from post- Saddam Iraq, optimists were 67.6 per cent and pessimists 22.7 per cent. When asked if they expect their situation to improve or worsen, Iraqis gave similar responses. Of the whole sample, 31.7 per cent thought their situation would substantially improve, 39.2 per cent said it would slightly improve, 5.3 per cent said it would substantially worsen, 8.8 per cent said that it would slightly worsen, and 14.9 per cent were undecided. This shows that the pattern of optimism and pessimism on the individual level matches that on the national level. Among Iraqi Sunnis, individual optimism was 69.7 per cent and pessimism 14.8 per cent, somehow an improvement on their view concerning the future of the country as a whole. The statistical difference is small and perhaps insignificant, yet it may suggest that the Sunnis are more optimistic about their individual fortunes than the status of their community. Pessimism is high among the old. Iraqis aged over 65 -- an age group that has suffered three decades of Ba'ath rule and successive wars -- believe their individual chance to live through better times is dim. Optimists among them were only 33 per cent. Many Arabs would be surprised to know that Iraqis do not believe that the current occupation necessarily bodes ill for the country. The Americans and British, among others, would be interested to know that Iraqis are generally opposed to the prolonged occupation of their state. Some 31.6 per cent of Iraqis do not wish the occupation to last more than six months, 34 per cent give it a year; and 25 per cent give it two years or more. Two exceptions are noteworthy. Of Christians, 77.8 per cent believe the Americans should stay more than two years. Of the over 65 group, a majority does not want the Americans to stay more than six months. In all, the poll shows that Iraqis are relatively more united than commonly thought. They believe that what happened to Iraq is not all bad, that the country has a definite chance of improvement, and that the occupation has to end soon, preferably within a year. * The writer is director of Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies.
