While the handpicked Interim Governing Council has fallen out of American favour, it remains unclear if an interim Iraqi government will have any power after 30 June, reports Ahmed Reda With fewer than 50 days before the Coalition Provincial Authority (CPA) is due to transfer sovereignty, the Interim Governing Council (IGC) and the United Nations are far from reaching an agreement on the shape of the transitional government that is supposed to rule until national elections in January 2005. The war of words that broke out between members of the Council and Lakhdar Brahimi, the UN envoy charged with helping to form an interim government, because of his suggestion that the proposed government be based on competence rather than political affiliation, highlights the haziness of the whole process. Several members in the Council are calling for a larger version of the Council to stay on during the transitional period; a suggestion the body trotted out on the heels of last week's talks with Brahimi in Baghdad, emphasising that it should play a central role in shaping the interim government. According to a statement issued by the Council after talks with Brahimi, those members not only want a role in shaping the government but they also wish to monitor its activities during the transition. Brahimi drew a backlash from Council members when he suggested the new government should be based on technocrats rather than those affiliated with political parties -- a nod to the Americans who favour a Shia prime minister to oversee the interim government instead of expanding the current Council. The latest statements from the Coalition Provincial Authority suggest that power will be transferred to a secular technocrat who can quell the political jockeying amongst rival Iraqi groups. The Council, apparently, will have to engage in bitter negotiations with Brahimi over the coming weeks in order to come up with a prime minister as well as the rest of the ministers for the upcoming transitional government that will ceded limited sovereignty from the United States. With time passing by and the American Chief Administrator in Iraq Paul Bremer possibly packing, it seems that Washington trusts Brahimi to devise an acceptable plan to transfer power and to negotiate a deal with members of the IGC. The current political scene in Iraq marks a strategy shift from various handover plans negotiated, downgraded or rejected over the past few months, with no final version in sight. Having long resisted calls for UN involvement, the White House is now embracing it, expecting the world body to come up with a political solution that has evaded Washington. In recent weeks, the Bush administration has given tentative support for Brahimi's proposal to dismantle the existing IGC, which was hand-picked by the United States and is widely viewed by Iraqis as illegitimate. Reportedly at Brahimi's request, Bremer has partially reversed several of his most important edicts; moving to reconstitute segments of the Iraqi army, which he had originally disbanded, and rehiring some government employees who had been members of Saddam Hussein's Baath Party and were removed by the occupation authorities. The only solid plan now is that John Negroponte, the US envoy to the United Nations, will take over from Bremer, who is set to step down at the handover of power on 30 June. Negroponte, 65, will take charge of the American Embassy in Baghdad to be opened after the handover; slated to be the biggest US Embassy in the world with about 1,700 staff, including 1,000 Americans. Negroponte will have higher powers than of those selected for the transitional government -- effectively a mandate to run the country from within the walls of his new office. It is no secret that the government will not be permitted to administer the newly born divisions of the Iraqi army and will not have the power to issue new laws, or even change those enacted by the CPA. The inability of the IGC to relate to common Iraqis and its failure to end the military standoffs in Falluja, Najaf and elsewhere alienated the Council and left the door wide open to Shia religious leaders like cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr to extend their influence and eventually confront the occupying forces without much political help from the Council. Despite several efforts to end the situation peacefully, the young cleric is calling for a widening of the confrontations that saw the destruction of many of his offices in a number of Iraqi cities. The general impression is that the IGC and the rest of the Shia religious leaders -- especially Grand Aytollah Ali Al-Sistani -- have denounced the revolt announced by Al-Sadr and are letting him bear the consequences. With the end of operations in Falluja, intense clashes broke out between the militia of Al-Sadr, known as Al- Mahdi, and British and American troops elsewhere in the country. The recent confrontations in Basra, Amarah and Sadr City in Baghdad showed a pattern by Sadr to open new fronts apart from Najaf and Karbala that witness limited operations on the fringes of the two holy cities. Sadr's brand of open confrontation has won him little popular support in Najaf and Karbala. Business has dropped dramatically in both cities because of the unrest, and many blame Sadr. After a declaration that it would "kill or capture" Sadr, the United States has toned down its rhetoric and stayed largely outside Najaf. US troops have set up roadblocks at strategic points near the town and dealt heavy blows to Sadr's militia. The current military situation appears consistent with announced plans to eradicate Sadr through surgical operations in cities like Najaf and Karbala, where most of his militiamen are located. The ongoing attacks and counter attacks in the south, Baghdad, Najaf and Karbala indicate that violence is far from over with the date of handing over limited power looming. All statements from US officials and field commanders stress the need to dissolve Al-Mahdi or to finish it off. Yet President George W Bush has said that Sadr is a problem Iraqis themselves will have to deal with after the transfer of power. Will the transitional government have enough power to deal with Sadr, or will it leave this mission to American and new Iraqi forces that will take orders from no one but American field commanders?
