Saad Abdel-Razzak Hussein* provides an insider's view on the alliances and maneuverings behind the recent appointments of Iraq's interim president and prime minister Iraq has succeeded in appointing a new government but only after a number of surprises. Iyad Allawi, not a favourite for the job, became prime minister, pushing aside such powerful candidates as Planning Minister Mahdi Al-Hafez and nuclear scientist Hussein Al- Shahrastani. Ghazi Al-Yawar became president, edging off Adnan Pachachi. Although these jobs were filled by appointment, the selection involved intricate political footwork. Allawi, for example, had been head of the Interim Governing Council (IGC) security committee, a job that put him in charge of forming the new Iraqi army and security and intelligence services. The new prime minister is not a stranger to the security scene. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, he was a member of Hunein, a security apparatus headed by Saddam Hussein. Allawi left for the UK in the early 1970s, where he became an opposition figure. He has led the National Accord Movement since 1991. The movement was active in recruiting members of the defunct Baath Party, which may have been a factor in Allawi's appointment. It is not yet clear why Pachachi, a popular figure in Iraq, failed to get the post. At one point, it seemed that Pachachi was the front-runner for either the presidency or the premiership. Then reports came from Washington to the effect that Al-Hafiz, a friend of Pachachi, will become prime minister. IGC members may have become alarmed that a secret "deal" was reached between Pachachi and Lakhdar Brahimi. This would explain waning enthusiasm for Pachachi. Also, Al-Yawar was considered more capable of rallying tribal support and alleviating security tensions. Over the past 10 months, the IGC was a hive of alliances and counter-alliances. The strongest alliance was among the so-called "London Conference" group. The latter consisted of the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI) of Mohamed Baqir Al-Hakim (after the latter's death in a bombing, his brother Abdel-Aziz Al-Hakim assumed the leadership), the National Accord Movement of Iyad Allawi, the National Congress of Ahmed Chalabi, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) of Jalal Talabani and the Democratic Party of Kurdistan (DPK) of Masoud Barzani. To alleviate the ethnic and sectarian nature of this alliance, mostly of Kurds and Shia, Pachachi (Sunni) was invited to join. Pachachi has been vocal in opposing sectarianism. He remained so even when members of this alliance seemed likely to form an interim government, just before the formation of the IGC. Coordination among the London Conference group continued, albeit discretely, throughout the life span of the council. The Islamic Call Party of Ibrahim Al-Jaafari coordinated with this group so as to reach consensus on major issues. Often, differences surfaced between the Kurds and Shia. For example, the Shia objected to the veto on the constitution that Clause C of Article 61 gives to the Kurds. According to Clause C, the constitution cannot pass if rejected by "two- thirds of voters in three governorates or more". The London Conference group may have finally tired of Pachachi's secular views and denied him the presidency. The Shia group was also influential inside the IGC. The group consists of the 13 Shia members of the council who attempted to come up with a unified view on matters concerning the interests of the Shia community. The Shia, however, were not always united, as the secular leanings of some of its members clashed with the sectarian inclinations of others. The Shia group was eager to see the Shia community maintain an acceptable quota in key positions and was somewhat successful in this regard. The Kurdish group, led by the PUK and DPK, within the IGC was made up of five members and these mostly coordinated on the matter of government posts. Another alliance was the Democratic Gathering, a group composed of the Independent Democrats of Adnan Pachachi, the National Democratic Party of Nasir Al-Chaderchi, the Iraqi Communist Party of Majid Mousa, the Arab Socialist Movement of Abdul-Ilah Al- Nasrawi (not represented in the IGC), and the two main Kurdish parties. The goal of the alliance was to encourage the emergence of a secular democratic front in Iraq. This alliance did not play a pronounced role within the IGC, as its representatives within the council often differed, but it may become more vocal in the coming elections. One of the problems that persisted through the IGC's lifespan was its inability to make decisions in a timely and appropriate manner. This was due first to the presence of the occupation authority that had a decisive say in the issuance of rules and regulations, and second to the politically divisive nature of the council, which made decision a matter for endless bargaining. The interim cabinet formed last September was supposed to resolve this problem, but the council's failure to appoint a prime minister impeded its role. Each ministry acted independently, which created further complications. The 15 November 2003 agreement, signed by the IGC and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), resolved the council's debacle by setting a time for ending the council's mission as of 30 June 2004. The same agreement set a timetable for the tasks the council had to accomplish. This helped the latter focus on specific issues. From 15 November 2003 and 8 March 2004, the council concentrated on drafting the interim constitution, known as the law of administration for the state. As of March, the council turned its attention to the holding of general elections ahead of the handover of power on 30 June 2004. It also worked closely with the UN with regard to the appointment of the new transitional government and president. The appointment of the new government took place in line with the law of administration for the state (Pachachi had played a key role in drafting the said law). The law places authority in the hands of a cabinet to be helped by a presidential council consisting of a president and two vice presidents. The two bodies were supposed to be elected by a national assembly, but the latter could not be formed ahead of 30 June. Therefore, the task of forming the two bodies was given collectively to the IGC, the CPA and the UN. The formation of the national assembly is left for the expanded national congress that will be held in July. The national assembly (to be selected by the national congress) will have the power to hold a vote of confidence on the government. It will also have oversight over the government's 2005 budget. The government, for its part, will be in charge of keeping law and order in the country, providing essential services to the public and preparing for general elections to be held by the end of January 2005. Preparations for the latter task are underway. A seven-member committee has been formed to supervise the coming elections, which will lead to the formation of a national assembly. The assembly will draft the permanent constitution and elect the first non-appointed government. This will end the system of sectarian and ethnic quotas. New elections will be called at the end of 2005, after the nation approves the permanent constitution through a referendum. This will end the transitional period and take Iraq into a phase of democracy. Despite all that the Iraqi people have gone through in the past year of occupation, and despite the erroneous and hateful practices of the occupation forces, the Iraqis are more determined than ever to establish a democratic and plural system based on human rights and equality, a system in which all Iraqis are to be equal before law regardless of their social and ethnic background, of their sectarian and tribal affiliations. * The writer is a member of Iraq's Independent Democrats Coalition.
