The new cabinet, argues Mohamed El-Sayed Said*, is in no position to buck trends Surprised. Well not exactly -- the Egyptian public long ago ceased to be surprised by political events. It has made of apathy a defence against shocks. I think, though, that the public has been demoralised by the announcement of the names of the new cabinet, though this is an early and, I think, premature reaction to an ongoing political process. Confusion, I think, is more pronounced than frustration. Enlightened public opinion has waited long for this moment. The previous cabinet has been around for too long, and the Atef Ebeid government was in any case viewed as a continuation of the one it succeeded, if only because the majority of the ministers who helped Atef Sidqi retained their ministerial positions, some having held on to office since President Mubarak ascended to presidency in 1981. Such lengthy tenure in office is one sign of the stagnation of political life in Egypt, linked to the monopolising of power and the absence of generational mobility. It is the latter aspect that is partly rectified by the formation of the new cabinet. The average ministerial age is now 52, and while this is not exactly young it is substantially less than in the last two cabinets. Egypt is once again seeing ministers as young as 39: it is reminiscent of Nasser's early cabinets which were filled by young officers and university professors. Some think that "high qualifications" became a prime criterion for ministerial jobs in Egypt with the July 1952 Revolution. In fact the educational level of Egyptian ministers has far exceeded their counter-parts world wide, including in developed countries, since the 1830s. Foreign consuls' reports on senior officials in the Egyptian government during the 19th century praised their educational and technical competence. Throughout the first part of the 20th century ministers were also highly qualified both educationally and technically. The influence of many ministers from the liberal age continues to be felt today. The failure of Egypt to take off economically -- unlike many states is South East Asia -- cannot be explained by a lack of technical competence on the part of the executive. Researchers who study the history of Egyptian elites often conclude that personal qualities remain high: the system's traits, rather than the character of its elite, lie behind the protracted failure. The really new feature of cabinets under the July 1952 system was that university professors were included not solely because of their technical knowledge but as part of an alliance between universities and the upper echelons of the military, constituents of the emerging middle classes. This alliance was intended to underline that policymaking was based not on politics but on politically neutral ground, a claim necessary to legitimise the dissolution of political parties in 1953 and the constraints placed on civil and union life from the mid- 1950's. In the present cabinet reshuffle high educational qualifications have remained, or even increased -- the incoming government includes 17 holders of PhDs. On the other hand, their claim as symbolic representatives of the middle classes is no longer valid. Most of those nominated to the new cabinet are market economy advocates. Middle class interests are barely represented, if at all. There can, though, be no mistaking the power structure that prevails. Bureaucratic control will not be shaken by the inclusion of a businessman as the Minister of Commerce and Industry though his inclusion symbolises a drive to salvage the reputation of business, currently wrecked by defaults on bank loans, corruption and other scandals. The cabinet reshuffle is clearly intended to further promote transition to a market economy, though under the strict tutelage of a powerful bureaucracy. And the balances that will prevail cannot be predicted by simply perusing the list of new cabinet members. It is clear, though, that the reform wing within the NDP, known to support more vigorous liberalisation in both the political and economic fields, failed to emerge triumphant as was widely expected. The old guard has retained its hold on power. The views of some new members of cabinet, though, are unknown, their faces unrecognised by even the most interested members of the public. Ministerial jobs continue to be divorced from any specific political significance. Essential decisions will continue to be made elsewhere, and not within the cabinet. The choice of Ahmed Nazif as the new prime minister speaks for itself. His reputation is for technical competence, discipline, hard work and integrity. But he has never been preoccupied with politics -- which has led some critics to already suggest, with black humour, that he would be unable to name five Egyptian intellectuals, and does not even read the Egyptian press. His appointment may well be an attempt to flirt with those in the country who continue to hold the view that politics is a bad thing. But this attitude is no longer shared by large swathes of public opinion which now see that the plight of the country can be explained by the death of politics at large, and by the lack of democracy more specifically. The philosophy behind the formation of the new cabinet suggests that the pace of political reform from above will continue to be slow and partial. The hope is that this cabinet will display more competence, at least practically, than previous cabinets. * The writer is deputy director of Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies.
