Nader Fergani* seeks to escape the corrosive pragmatism that has wreaked havoc across the region In its July edition Wujahat Nazar featured the translation of an article, originally appearing in the Atlantic Monthly, that might be taken as a defence of Lakhdar Brahimi. In that the article did not attempt to refute any allegations that might need refuting, suggesting that Brahimi faces some unnamed charge, the defence is both vague and something like a PR piece. It also raises questions about the defender and the scene of the defence. However, to be fair it should also be said that the article in question was written before the events this article addresses. Should we, then, perhaps call it a "preemptive defence?" Lakhdar Brahimi is the UN special envoy to Iraq and, before that, to Afghanistan. Because he is an Arab from an Arab country with a great legacy in the fight for Arab causes, many pinned high hopes on the part he would play in one of the most crucial and far-reaching crises in contemporary Arab history. These hopes had been raised further by statements issued by the man himself, before subsequent developments shunted him aside and US influence prevailed, backed by an enormous foreign army that is still desecrating the land of Iraq. Iraq and Afghanistan constituted the first two phases of the American imperial project, or the "New American Century", as the White House neo-cons prefer it. The first cornerstone of this project, which has governed the policies and actions of the current US administration, is to reshape the "greater" or "extended" Middle East, guided by a jumble of misperceptions and distortions of Islam and Arabism and a fallacious blurring of terrorism and the right to resist foreign occupation. The architects of this scheme have sanctioned the right to perpetrate illegal occupation, subjugation and the suppression of liberties on pretexts that can veil their imperialist ambitions only from the blind. In the advancement of the aims of the New American Century the US administration sought recourse to the UN and, in particular, the Security Council. When this failed it had no compunction in sidestepping international law, as embodied in the UN Charter, and exercising the arrogance that comes with being the most powerful nation on earth. From the folds of this approach emerged the "Bush principle" of preemptive war, which virtually all experts in international law maintain violates the UN Charter, according to which an act of self-defence, which is the only legitimate grounds for bearing arms, presumes a demonstrable immediate threat. The Arab world has suffered more than any other region from American commandeering or circumvention of the UN, because of its strategic importance and the weakness and disunity of the Arab order. America has attacked Sudan and Libya and, even before the invasion, it attacked Iraq, in cooperation with Britain, in the form of no-fly zones and missile strikes without legal justification. The American-led invasion of Iraq, without a UN mandate, delivered a powerful blow to the principle of international legitimacy, the credibility of the UN and its efficacy in maintaining international peace and security. However, that was only the beginning of what appears to be a deliberate drive to undermine the very foundations of international legitimacy, as is now evident in the administration's reactions towards the International Court of Justice. In flagrant breach of the Treaty of Rome, Washington has attempted to use every means at its disposal to obstruct the functions of the court, especially as regards the potential prosecution of American citizens. Nothing could be more indicative of the lengths to which the Bush administration will go in the pursuit of its imperialist project. Clearly it seeks carte blanche to perpetuate human rights violations, crimes of war and crimes against humanity, mounting evidence of which is unfolding in Iraq and Afghanistan, not to mention Camp Delta in the Gulf and Guantanamo. Even the US Supreme Court recently felt compelled to object to the methods of administrating the latter. Against this complex backdrop, especially ominous for the Arab world, we must attempt to assess the role of Lakhdar Brahimi, with particular focus on its ramifications on national freedom, the dignity of the Arab nation and related issues. It is unfortunate that the Arab world often focusses on personalities rather than issues and national interests. How frequent it is that Arab countries are identified with the personality of a leader who is seldom above suspicion, if not guilt, in his management of government and exercise of power. Certainly individuals play a pivotal role in history. However, the excessive influence vested in individuals in non-institutionalised forms of government is precisely what renders the introduction of institutionalised checks on power and guarantees of the supremacy of law so urgent to government reform, whether at the national, regional or global level. But as long as institutions remain either non- existent or fragile individuals will retain the focus of attention and, hence, the necessity of assessing their impact on the fate of nations. If there were such a thing as angels in politics then Lakhdar Brahimi would certainly not be reckoned among them. In spite of his contribution to the Algerian liberation struggle he served -- as the Atlantic Monthly article pointed out -- as one of the six members of the security committee that was formed to rule the country following the annulment of the parliamentary elections of 1992. "The Salvation Front should never have been granted legitimacy," he said in justification of that action, contrary to the universally held view that political legitimacy must emanate from the people. If angelic does not apply to politicians, we might also add that pragmatism is not necessarily a trait of political activists. Perhaps, too, we should not rule out the existence of quasi-angels in politics. Take Nelson Mandela and what he did for South Africa, to which Egypt ceded -- correctly, in my opinion -- the headquarters of the African parliament. In the context of dominant and corrupt power relations, pragmatism may be an advantage. But only for its practitioners; for pragmatism, in general, works against the principles and interests of the disadvantaged and in favour of the values and interests of dominant forces. Nonetheless, pragmatists are always ready with the argument that we must not forfeit what is possible for the sake of the impossible. The prime apologist for pragmatism was Niccolo Machiavelli. In his dedication to The Prince, he writes to Lorenzo de Medici, "Men who are anxious to win the favour of a prince nearly always follow the custom of presenting themselves to him with the possessions they value most, or with the things they know especially please him... Now, I am anxious to offer myself to Your Magnificence with some token of my devotion to you." This token was his "understanding of the deeds of great men", which matters "I have very diligently analysed and pondered for a long time, and now, having summarised them in a little book, I am sending them to Your Magnificence." In the manner of that notorious offering, the call was sounded in the Arab world in the 1980s to "bridge the gap between the intellectual and the prince". Pragmatism has wrought untold catastrophe upon the Arab world. In the name of pragmatism Arab regimes moved to make peace with Israel even though it is as racist, expansionist and aggressive as ever. Indeed, today, that country has openly revived its dream of an Israel "from the Nile to the Euphrates", having infiltrated Iraq and begun working in close alliance with the Kurds. Meanwhile, it continues to control the occupied territories, including Gaza, even if it withdraws its visible presence there. Still, the Arabs are obsessed with pragmatism, panting after "the possible", which will never satisfy the demands of the Arab people. In the name of pragmatism Arab regimes grovel before dominant forces in the global order, especially the world's superpower. One might even say that Arab leaderships have discovered the principle of "preemptive surrender". Some of these leaderships are working to demolish the Arab League, as though paving the ground for one of the US-led G8's alternatives for a regional organisation, in which Israel is to occupy a privileged position and Arab identity is diluted in a wider regional sea, ostensibly to counter the spectre of "Islamic terrorism". The invasion and occupation of Iraq marked the beginning of the American plan to reshape the Arab world, and from there the rest of the world in accordance with the vision of a new American century. Every pretext the Bush administration has cited for occupying Iraq has crumbled, exposing its true aims, which were to seize control of what could become the largest petroleum reserve in the world and to guarantee the security of Israel. The loudly proclaimed mission of liberating the people of Iraq has become a joke that makes no one laugh. The joke, unfortunately, is not only on Iraq, but on the entire Arab world. What happened? Initially it appeared, in mid April, that the US was prepared to accept the UN secretary- general's envoy's plan for the transfer of authority to the Iraqi people. According to this plan the Interim Governing Council (IGC) would be replaced by a interim government composed of reputable individuals who would prepare the way for internationally monitored general elections early in 2005. Then, on 20 April, statements began to issue from the US administration to the effect that Iraqis were unable to maintain security without outside help and that UN supervision of the transition process was not a magical solution to security problems. At the end of May the US, and its British ally, submitted a draft resolution on Iraq to the Security Council. The original draft of the proposal contained a paragraph stating that the interim government would request the Security Council to keep the multinational force in Iraq. The multinational force would, of course, be under American command and remain in Iraq for at least a year, with the option of renewing its term. The multinational force would be empowered to take all measures necessary to safeguard security and stability in Iraq. Nevertheless, the Security Council would consider a request submitted to it by the Iraqi government to terminate the presence of the multinational force (a request that would inevitably be turned down because of the American veto). The draft resolution stirred considerable debate within Security Council chambers over the power the interim Iraqi government would have over the length of stay and operations of the multinational force. In the course of these discussions, the US secretary of state declared that the interim government would not have the right to oppose the military operations of the multinational force. The draft resolution provided for similar arrangements with regard to the continued international supervision of oil revenues. Towards the end of May the interim government was appointed. Most of the candidates were closely connected to the current administration, the CIA and the IGC which had been appointed by coalition authorities. The UN special envoy had little say in this process, raising fears that the international organisation would be used to perpetuate the US-British occupation under an international guise through the auspices of an Arab intermediary. Should this prove the case it would gravely undermine the credibility of the UN's role in the building of a free society and good governance in the Arab world and in safeguarding the Arabs' legitimate rights, the right to national liberation and self-determination above all. The creation of the new government also adopted the same ethnic and denominational quota system that the occupation authorities used to create the governing council. This raises another fear, which is that it will entrench demographic mosaics instead of unity of citizenship as the ruling concept of government and politics even after the transfer of authority to the Iraqis. On 9 June the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1546, giving the multinational force the mandate to take all necessary measures to preserve the security and stability of Iraq, regardless of what the Iraqi government might have to say about its operations, and calling for general elections by the end of January 2005. Everything, from security arrangements to the composition of the interim government, has come out contrary to Lakhdar Brahimi's statements and to many Arabs' predictions. The US imposed all its conditions, without a peep of protest from Lakhdar Brahimi. Iraq, now that "authority" has been transferred, is a facsimile of Afghanistan. The transfer of authority has been magnificently staged by a handful of people in some back room while a CIA chum has had his papers of accreditation signed by a mid-level American official who had served as the noble governor-general of Iraq for over a year. We now have a government in Iraq with its hands chained behind its back, taking orders from the Americans in Washington and in Iraq, and happy to do so. And why shouldn't it be, made up as it is of friends of the Bush administration and its intelligence network. Now, too, the army of the US and its allies have an internationally sanctioned free hand in the country. Then along comes the foreign minister of that "sovereign" government, with all that power he has vested in his inferior status, threatening to unleash those foreign forces against Iraq's neighbours. Nothing could be more sadly risible than to watch a dog threaten to set the master who is holding its leash on others! What has Iraq and the Arab world gained from the pragmatism of Lakhdar Brahimi and others? If that was the role expected from him, he played it to perfection. But, then he was perfectly cut out for it, having played it before in Afghanistan. Of course, in his defence it might be said that he had been duped, or that he merely blundered. Unfortunately, that offers little consolation. The Arab world is passing through a historical phase that brooks no compromise. This is a moment of transition from a bleak reality to a -- hopefully -- brighter future, for the alternative is continued deterioration. There are forces that are seeking to perpetuate the current conditions and others that aspire to, and are working for, a loftier, more humanitarian alternative. To the former belong the current Iraqi government, its Western masters and the Arab pragmatists; to the latter the people and the intellectuals of the masses. This is not an appeal to absolute idealism or for the abandonment of realism. Without a little idealism we cannot even begin the struggle needed to reform the structures of oppression and corruption. But is it not time to try just a little idealism? Perhaps then we may really improve the state of the Arab nation. * The writer is the director of Almishkat Research Centre, and the lead author of the Arab Human Development Report.
