Is Iyad Allawi a secular politician who will salvage Iraq from its sectarian quagmire or the front man in a US-designed show to make the world believe Iraq can change, asks Salah Hemeid Iraq's parliamentary election last month, highly regarded as crucial in restoring stability to the violence-torn country, appeared in deadlock as the two main challengers failed to clinch an overall parliamentary majority that allows them to form a government. The result, which has turned into a bitter political and constitutional bickering between Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki's State of Law Alliance and his main rival, former premier Iyad Allawi's Iraqiya list, threatens to turn into protracted period of coalition building, hampering efforts to restore Iraq to normality any time soon. The complete results, which were only released on Friday, showed Al-Maliki finished with 89 seats in the 325-member Council of Representatives, two fewer than Allawi's bloc. The incumbent prime minister immediately refused to accept the election results and asked for a manual and nationwide recount, triggering a standoff. Meanwhile, Iraq's Accountability and Justice Commission, a body vetting the candidates, has sought to disqualify six people who had won seats in the election because of what it called their ties to the banned Baath Party. The disqualification effort could prove critical to determine the election's outcome. Also, Iraq's Supreme Federal Court on Thursday interpreted an ambiguous clause in the constitution as saying that the largest bloc in parliament, with the right to form the next government, could be two or more groups that merged after the election. The opinion, which was rebuffed by Allawi's bloc as unconstitutional, could allow Al-Maliki's bloc and a rival Shia slate, the Iraqi National Alliance to team with the Kurdish Alliance and the small Sunni National Accordance bloc, to claim the right to form a government first. That suggests the continuation of the current policies of ethnic-sectarian quota sharing established since the 2003 US-led invasion. If Al-Maliki clings onto power because of Shia- Kurdish solidarity, and Allawi, who has been claiming victory by getting the largest number of seats, is shoved off the stage, his Sunni supporters will feel disenfranchised and they could resume their anti-government insurgency. Much of the wrangling over the election results seems now to be focussed on Allawi, his Arab supporters and American backing. By allying with Sunni groups, Allawi was able to tap into their sense of being marginalised by the Shia-dominated government and its perceived leanings towards Iran. Still, the question remains: how did Allawi manage to attract support from the Sunnis, who formed the backbone of the insurgency against US-led forces after the 2003 invasion that brought Shias to power? Many Sunnis apparently believe Allawi is what he claims he is -- a secular liberal interested in national unity and reconciliation. But they surely remember his record as the first prime minister installed by the American invaders who allowed US soldiers to bomb Falluja, the stronghold of their resistance movement. They must also remember that Allawi, a British trained doctor by profession, defected from Saddam's Baath ruling party two decades ago, and later formed his own group with finance and backing from the United States, Britain and wealthy Gulf nations. That he was among those exiled Iraqis who waited for the fall of their nemesis in safety, and jumped at the opportunity to rule Iraq on the back of the invaders. Just over seven years ago, Allawi was flown by American planes from neighbouring Jordan to a deserted Iraqi air base across the border shortly after US troops started the Shock and Awe, the code name of the invasion of Iraq. Allawi, then leader of the US- funded Iraqi National Accord, was at the head of dozens of his supporters who were tasked with espionage and disruptive operations to clear the way for the American troops advancing towards Baghdad to remove Saddam from power. To many Arabs, Allawi is considered the secular nationalist most likely to resist Iranian influence in Iraq and curb on Iranian influence in the region. Nothing can illustrate Arab support to Allawi better than the adulation heaped on him in Arab newspapers and television network as their new darling. An editorial in the Saudi newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat following the release of the election results read: "Congratulations to us, the Awakening of Moderation in Iraq." As for the Americans, although the Obama administration has claimed neutrality, it clearly favoured Allawi. For example, the administration insisted that the elections had been conducted fairly despite the glaring lack of independent international observers. "There is no evidence of widespread or serious fraud," insisted Philip J Crowley, a spokesman for the US State Department. The American media also favoured Allawi, labelling him as a secular liberal valiantly battling his sectarian- oriented rivals, the Shia religious fundamentalists. Yet for all the glitz and buzz, whether Allawi becomes prime minister, president or spoiler in the post- election period, he is unlikely to bring political stability to Iraq. To the contrary, he might even spark a more serious national crisis. If he "wins", it will deepen Shia mistrust and their fear that his empowerment was aimed at stripping them of their newly acquired power. It is no wonder that he got almost no seats in the swathe of Shia-populated provinces in the south. To many Iraqi Shias, Allawi is the man of the West and Arab regimes and an erstwhile Baathist who aligned himself with Saddam's sympathisers. They remember him as the prime minister who appointed unrepentant Baathists to sensitive security posts in the government and security force, exacerbating both insurgency and sectarian violence. Shia also accuse Allawi of courting Arab regimes which they blame for facilitating logistics and other kinds of support to foreign fighters and suicide bombers responsible for the deaths of thousands of Iraqis. Only days before the election last month he toured several Arab countries and met with leaders who have been shunning Al-Maliki and other Shia officials. Allawi accused the Iranian government of interfering in Iraq's affairs by inviting all the major parties to Tehran for talks except his own Iraqiya bloc. On Tuesday, he accused Iran of trying to prevent him from becoming prime minister. "Iran is interfering quite heavily and this is worrying," he told the BBC. Indeed, Iran's Shia rulers have already stepped into the Iraqi crisis and are reportedly backing efforts by Al-Maliki to form an alliance with another Shia group, the Iraqi National Alliance, which came in third with 70 seats, and an alliance of Kurdish parties that placed fourth with 43 seats. Iraq seems to be at another dangerous crossroads, and Allawi will make things worse, no matter what he does at this point. Although Allawi denies any linkage to Baathists, Shia fear that if he leads a Baathist-backed government, he will trigger a Shia backlash. On the other hand, if he steps aside, the move will appear to be designed to allow Shia to continue to dominate the political landscape leaving Sunnis powerless or with token representation. Violence is already soaring after the release of election's results. On Monday a double car-bombing killed 10 people and wounded scores more in the Shia city of Karbala a day after a series of explosions in western Anbar province in which six people were killed. On Saturday a twin bombing near a restaurant in the town of Khalis killed at least 40 people and injuring dozens more. The huge turnover in the 7 March election proves that change from sectarian-based politics into a secular one in Iraq is possible but that it doesn't have to be led by politicians with questionable democratic credentials and dubious backgrounds hiding behind cross-sectarian and secular slogans.
