Samir Ghattas* debunks the myth of the power of the American Jewish lobby, and examines its possible ramifications In the teeth of many opinion polls, the expectations of most political forecasters and the hopes of millions George W Bush, the most controversial US president for decades, succeeded in securing a second term at the helm of the US and, indeed, the entire world. Now, with the same degree of concern with which they had followed the tense electoral campaign, people around the world have their eyes pinned on Washington in anticipation of what a single man has in store for them. And this applies more strongly to the peoples and governments of the Arab world than to others. Of central concern to the Arabs will be Bush's position on the Palestinian question. As we contemplate this and other crucial issues, it is useful to take a closer look at the dynamics of the extraordinary neck-to-neck campaign that brought Bush to power for a second term. In particular, we should examine the commonly held perception in the Arab world that accords the American Jewish vote almost supernatural power. It is taken for granted in the Arab world that the American Jewish vote determines the outcome of American presidential elections and that the Jewish lobby, by extension, rules the world through the White House. This, in turn, is used to explain Washington's unremittingly pro-Israeli policies. This argument might have contained a kernel of truth in earlier electoral cycles but it certainly did not apply to the campaigns that brought Bush to power in 2000 and 2004. If the Arabs are to seek constructive and objective answers to the problems posed by American policy in the Middle East they must shed such glib oversimplifications, the most salient being the perennially ready-at-hand contention that American policy makers are puppets whose strings are pulled by a Zionist entity of near mythological power. Here are the facts. In the last presidential election 22 per cent of American Jews voted for Bush as opposed to 78 per cent for Kerry. In the two pivotal states of Florida and Ohio Bush won only 23 and 27 per cent of the Jewish vote respectively. Few Arabs, influenced by what they read in the media, are aware that Bush's victory over Al Gore in 2000 was achieved with only 19 per cent of the American Jewish vote going to the victor. But this is not all. According to post-electoral polls Bush's stand on Israel came only third in terms of influencing the decisions of Jewish voters. These facts beg a number of questions. Why did the overwhelming majority of American Jews vote against Bush in 2000, and then again in 2004, especially when it was clear Israel desperately wanted his re-election? The question can be reversed: How can Washington's staunch support for Israel during Bush's first term, when so few Jews voted for him, be explained? Will Washington's policy towards Israel change during Bush's second term now that it is clear that most American Jews voted for his rival? No Arab publication, either official or opposition, has even bothered to ask such questions, though they may well have a crucial impact on Bush's policy on Palestine during his second term. The same facts compel us to examine the position of other parties, especially that of Israel. Officially, at least, Israel had no doubt where its preference lay; Sharon went all out to present himself as Israel's political equivalent of Bush. This did not, however, prevent the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs from asking which US presidential candidate would be better for Israel. Many of Israel's career diplomats expressed the belief that regardless of who won Washington would get tougher on Israel. One of Kerry's top priorities was to mend the rifts in US-European relations, over which prospect Israel was neither keen nor sympathetic. Bush was keen on remedying the deteriorating situation in Iraq, which entailed improving America's image with the Arabs and, therefore, toning down his sympathy towards Israel. In sum Israeli Foreign Ministry officials expect a certain reduction in American support, especially diplomatic support. In the UN Security Council, for example, Israel will no longer be able to count automatically on an American veto in the event of unfavourable resolutions coming to vote. Yet according to Zvi Rafih, an Israeli expert in American affairs, Bush is a devout born again Christian for whom the subject of Israel is more an article of faith than a political issue. He will remain as staunchly pro-Israel as he was in his first term. The uncertainty that prevails, even in Israeli circles, compels us to take a look back and assess Bush's actions from the outset of his first term of office until he unveiled his "vision" for the Middle East. Bush inaugurated his Middle East policy with a determination, unlike Clinton, not to get involved in attempts to reach a solution to the Palestinian question. He clung firmly to this hands-off policy until 11 September, at which point his position towards anything pertaining to the Middle East altered drastically. Early on in this shift a brief crisis flared between Bush and Sharon, although the Arabs did not pay much attention to it at the time. In what became known as his Czechoslovakia speech, Sharon accused Bush of selling out Israel in order to appease the Arabs, as Europe had sacrificed Czechoslovakia in order to appease Hitler. Bush was incensed, so much so that Sharon had to apologise -- four times within the space of 48 hours -- for the crude and unwarranted utterances in his speech. After this brief contretemps the relationship between Bush and Sharon grew closer than that between any other US president and Israeli prime minister. Nonetheless, the repercussions of 9/11 -- the war on Afghanistan followed by the invasion and occupation of Iraq -- and the need to strike a strategic balance with European and Arab positions compelled Bush to unveil his "vision" and the "roadmap" that would lead to it. Sharon only agreed to the roadmap grudgingly, and then after stipulating 14 reservations. Subsequently he did all he could to circumvent it, or "bury it in formaldehyde" as his political adviser and bureau chief Dov Weisglass famously put it. The foregoing background information is essential if we are to convincingly forecast Bush's policy on the Palestinian question in the next four years. In doing so it is important to take into consideration several factors. Above all, Bush claims that his victory in both the electoral college and popular vote has given him a mandate from the American people, and the majority Republican Congress will enhance the manoeuvrability he derives from this. Also, he will be relatively immune to the blackmail of various interest groups, all the more so with respect to the Zionist lobby in view of the low Jewish turnout in his favour in the 2000 and 2004 elections. Whether motivated by some perceived messianic calling or by other moral or political considerations, Bush may well wish to crown his presidency with an historic achievement and go down in history as a peacemaker. Given the above considerations, as well as the fact that he is already familiar with the central issues and parties involved in the Palestinian question, he will be in a position to act quickly. Add to this the economic and political attrition experienced by Israeli society and the Israeli government may well prove more pliable than it has in the past, particularly now that the death of Arafat has deprived Sharon of his long-held excuse for refusing to deal with the Palestinians. It appears that Bush is readying himself to handle, in his own way, four possible scenarios in the foreseeable future, each one of which could be sufficient to trigger US-Israeli tensions. He may urge Sharon to fulfil his pledges with regard to dismantling some Israeli settlements and halting settlement expansion in general, and he may push him into resuming negotiations with the Palestinians as a full partner in the peace process. Bush may also revert to his earlier position on the separation wall, which he once described as a "coiling snake". Pressures brought to bear on Israel could halt the construction of the third stage of the wall. Finally, Bush may decide not to tread water for as long as Sharon would like after the evacuation of Gaza by the end of 2005 and, moreover, to append the withdrawal to the roadmap, which would entail the return of the American monitoring team withdrawn following the resignation of the Abu Mazen government. The possibility of such actions is not Tel Aviv's only source of anxiety. Although many regard the British prime minister as a tail wagged by Bush, Sharon sees it the other way around. He believes that it was Blair who pushed Bush into adopting the roadmap and he fears that Blair will push Bush into holding an international conference in London on ways to propel the roadmap forward. Sharon will do his utmost to forestall any of the foregoing scenarios. As a starting point he will demand that the new PA demonstrate its capacity to dismantle the opposition factions and strip them of weapons. Sharon will also try to buy as much time as possible, by calling for early elections if necessary, thereby deferring consideration of any political action that might derail his unilateral redeployment plan, for which he paid a heavy price while pushing it through the Knesset. It remains unlikely, though, that the Palestinian question will dominate the Bush administration's foreign policy agenda. Most analysts believe that it will be superceded by the situation in Iraq and by questions arising over Iran's nuclear programme. Should this prove true it will be difficult to assess how much time Bush will be willing to spend on putting his weight behind a solution to the Palestinian question. Nor does the problem end there. It may appear to Bush and others, after much wasted time, that the roadmap, rather than leading to a final settlement, will only land everyone back to square one, bogged down in negotiations over the intractable final status issues of Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, borders, sovereignty, water rights and settlements. In all events Bush will go down in history as the first American president to officially call for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. He may also go down in history for failing to prove true to this pledge in his second term. * The writer is director of the Maqdis Centre for Political Studies, in Gaza.
