Mohamed Hassanein Heikal selected his 12 most decisive moments of the past 12 months during a talk on Al-Jazeera, broadcast on New Year's Eve. Below we present an abridged version of the selection I think my first decisive moment occurred, appropriately enough, on the first day of the year, and it concerned Pakistan's nuclear programme. The Pakistani bomb was not a Pakistani project, it was an Arab venture... or at least half- Arab by virtue of the fact that we financed it, though the Pakistanis put it into action. The second moment came with the assassination first of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, then of Abdul-Aziz Al-Rantisi. The third, in my opinion, is the way in which the Arabs have dealt with the issue of Israel's [security] wall. We always used to complain when international resolutions and documents didn't support us, and then when we finally get support -- even if it was only in the form of an advisory judgement from the International Court of Justice -- we neglect it. The fourth came with the use of threats against international organisations and the Arabs. Kofi Annan was obviously threatened with the possible suspension of his term as UN secretary-general, while the Arab world was pressured to the extent of threatening to freeze the accounts of pretty much every Arab leader, politician or president... the Americans know just where that hurts. The fifth decisive event concerns events in Iraq and the problem the Iraqi resistance poses for us. Sixth comes the closing of the border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt. This is the first time such a separation has occurred between Egypt and Palestine. The seventh came with Syria's readiness to negotiate, and Israel's reply that it wasn't ready to talk yet, so Syria must wait. And this in spite of the fact that Israel has always said it yearns for an Arab negotiating partner. Then came the fact that, according to an estimate by Harvard University, the Arab world spent $700 million in order to be represented at conferences, seminars and discussion groups, while in reality it was either talking to itself (and talking absolute nonsense), or was talking to America. The ninth moment came with Bush's re-election, which one journalist in the region called the "second homage" to Bush. Number ten was the death of Arafat. I'm not going to discuss conspiracy... I just mean the event itself. The 11th concerns the reduction of the most significant Arab issues into a series of deals while the 12th must be the phenomena of the Arab world tearing itself apart internally. The Iraqi resistance confronts us with an extremely difficult problem. I have in front of me a report from The Centre for Strategic and International Studies in the United States, one of the most influential centres in Washington's decision-making process. On 22 December last year it produced a report on the resistance which stated that America had come up against something it had not expected in Iraq and that its first instinct [...] it's first defence when surprised by the resistance was to deny what had actually happened. Their first weapon was denial. And I think there was more than just coincidence at work here, that certain elements in Iraq had seen what was coming early on and some of them had organised themselves in preparation. The first thing about the report is that it doesn't categorise the resistance. Nor does it use the term "terrorism", or the phrase "killed in battle". It blames the American administration for rushing to deny, or detract from the importance of, what was happening. It blames the administration for insisting that nothing was happening, or at least nothing important. The report talks about both the American failure to discuss what was happening and the failure to appreciate the strength of a resistance whose existence was denied. It deals with the period between October 2003 and October 2004 and details the types and extent of 5,000 or so operations that occurred. These actions are something we must know about properly, and we must come to understand why they became so necessary. One of the most important strategic centres in the US describes what was happening in Iraq as "insurgency". In all honesty, though, I cannot sit here on New Year's Eve, miles away in Cairo, and say yes, yes, there is no doubt about it, what is happening is terrorism. I feel for every civilian, every child and soldier that gets killed or wounded. The issues involved are infinitely complex. They are issues many European nations have had to confront as they sought a balance between what is human and what is political. In politics all we can control is force, in its various forms. The question for me is whether the Americans will be left in peace to make up for Rumsfeld's many errors in preparing for the war -- really an invasion -- with inadequate forces? And for Bremer's error in disbanding the Iraqi army? And what about the operations that began early to frighten away recruits and discourage them from joining the police, security forces or the army. This is an enormous problem. ARAFAT'S DEATH: As I watched Arafat being flown from Ramallah to Paris, then his return, I got the feeling that politics was imitating cinema, in this case The Godfather, the quintessential film about Mafia gang-warfare. One of the parties involved [Arafat] manages to get halfway towards completing a deal but finds something blocking him. He can go no further and stops, becoming an obstacle to others who are also unable to complete their deals. In the end he must be removed, either by directing prayers to heaven or by relying on other, more conventional methods. The man had to go. He was obstructing the completion of a deal that he had made progress towards but had been unable to complete. Was it a coincidence that Arafat's death coincided with Bush's re-election? Was it a coincidence that his death coincided with the [unilateral] decision to withdraw from Gaza, so characteristic of an Israeli policy that refuses to negotiate with any Arab party? Was it pure coincidence that this happened as Egypt's borders with Gaza were closed, or that this took place at the very moment at which all parties in the region were ready to reach an understanding? It was as if he were a huge rock in the path of events, and the very instant he disappeared everything could start moving. The person for whose sake the rock was lifted, and for whose sake everything was so neatly arranged, was Sharon. Every one else was merely secondary. Removing Arafat was in the interests of finalising a deal for which Sharon had prepared everything, securing his party's agreement to the unilateral withdrawal from Gaza without negotiations, and the Labour Party's readiness to ally with him, while the Arab world is in tatters and has gone over to America wholesale. It is no surprise that Sharon himself said this was the opportune moment. I believe that the problem faced by Abu Mazen is the same one to which Yasser Arafat was alerted at the last minute, and that prevented him agreeing to things he found unpalatable. The list before Abu Mazen, to which he must agree or meet a fate similar to Arafat's, includes the following: there is no longer any opportunity for Arabs and Israelis to sit down and negotiate together. They can sit down to eat lunch or supper if they want, but negotiations are over. We've reached a stage of unilateral Israeli action. The Arabs can either accept them in their entirety or reject them in their entirety. They have no other choice. That is, unless things change, but in the current atmosphere that is hardly likely to happen. EGYPT'S ROLE IN GAZA: Here I would make a distinction between Egypt as a nation, state and history, and the Egyptian administration that rules the country. I disagree with the administration but am in agreement with that other Egypt. The administration has committed an error, though historical Egypt knows where it stands. Political Egypt has made a choice that leaves me sad, a choice that will see Egypt stand without the Arab world. I know of no country in the world that can survive cut off from others. But we are witnessing an Egyptian administration that is following policies it believes to be sound, and which I believe to be wrong. These policies have resulted in our withdrawal from the Palestinian issue and unfortunately we have seen ourselves transformed from being on one side in the issue to being a go-between. It is extremely unfortunate that the current Egyptian administration is playing roles that seem to aid Israel, and for the life of me I can't see why. I almost think that the Arab world has exchanged its entire national security, and not just Egypt, I mean all the regimes in the region have been bargaining, transforming issues into deals, and the main deal is security: the regimes' security in exchange for national security. It could have been possible to construct a real, a legitimate agreement that would have eliminated any contradictions between the security of all Arab nations, not just Egypt, and the security of their regimes. But they're all scared of America, and even those that aren't scared imagine that their future, even the future of their development, is destined to be American in nature. I disagree, and think this is a flawed theory. This doesn't mean I'm one of those who support the idea of a clash with America. I don't believe in clashing with anybody, especially not America nowadays. IRAN: I can see what Iran's doing, but I don't think that it constitutes a danger. Iran has always been there, and it's true we did get into scrapes with it in Ottoman times and at other points in history. But Iran, unlike Israel, is a true neighbour, and I would never recommend swapping a real enemy for a hypothetical one, or start talking about the Shia or Iranian threat while keeping silent about Israel. Why hold forth on the Shia crescent while it is the Israeli star that fills the horizon? It is senseless. I talk to people who say they're frightened by the Iranian nuclear programme. Is no one worried about the Israeli programme? The Iranian programme is a different matter. I wouldn't mind if it did become a nuclear state. Pakistan is a nuclear state funded by us, by Arab money. India, China and North Korea are nuclear states. Israel is right next to me, right in the heart of the Arab world, and it is a nuclear state that possesses 200 nuclear warheads. But this doesn't seem to worry those who warn us about Iran. As for the Iranian programme that they're fond of saying is a threat: is this because the Americans say so? This isn't the first time we've made the mistake of thinking of Iran as an enemy. Up until 1980 Iran was our friend. Everything was rosy, we were great friends, always coming and going etc. Then when the Islamic revolution happened and we were unable to reach an understanding and we began to give credence to the idea that Iran was our enemy, and we paid for it. Everyone paid for it, unfortunately. Saddam Hussein paid for it, and admitted that it had been a mistake. He plunged Iraq into an eight-year long war in which they spent $800 billion in an illusory battle against a country that I don't believe is a danger and which, if managed properly, could act as a kind of back-up ally. It is, at any rate, better than Israel. With the greatest respect to King Abdullah, he should tell me what his relations with Israel are like before he starts telling me about Iran. I respect everyone in the Arab world, but no one can give me advice, talk to me about policy or point out mistakes without first looking at his own position. Before King Abdullah starts telling me about a Shiite crescent, he must first address the Israeli star. Before he tells me Iran is a danger he must explain to me what Israel is. Because Iran isn't a danger: it doesn't want to expand. If you tell me that it entered Iraq, well that isn't good enough. 2005: The year 2004 can describe itself. If we were to say it was the year of the Arab coma, then we are left waiting in horror for new realities that we're powerless to face. We might as well close our eyes and await the fearful surprises. Sharon says that 2005 will be a year of rapprochement, but I don't believe this. Most likely it will be the year of Arab fright.
