In an attempt to curry favour with Washington, Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan followed his head not his heart in a visit to Israel, writes Gareth Jenkins from Istanbul Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan put aside his government's misgivings about the Israeli government's treatment of the Palestinians and embarked on a two-day visit to Israel last week to try to repair ruptured relations with Washington's main ally in the region. Last year, Turkish-United States relations have plummeted to their lowest level in more than a decade, and to try to ingratiate himself with the US ahead of a visit to Washington at the end of the month, Erdogan had to try hard to mend ties with Israel. Erdogan's visit was only the second by a Turkish prime minister and the first ever by the leader of the Turkish Islamist Party. After the Israeli assassination of Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin in March 2004 and the demolition of the houses of the families of suspected Palestinian militants in May 2004, Erdogan bluntly accused Israel of "state terrorism", refused to meet Israeli officials, turned down an offer to visit the country and even briefly withdrew the Turkish ambassador to Israel. Perhaps equally significantly, in the last 18 months Erdogan has worked hard to forge closer links with Syria and Iran. Whatever they may say in public, in private the majority of the JDP remains not just anti-Israeli but almost instinctively anti-Semitic. While in recent months, a rise in nationalist hysteria in Turkey has been accompanied by a boom in sales of Hitler's unapologetically anti-Semitic Mein Kampf, which still remains in the Turkish bestseller lists. Since Turkey secured a date in December 2004 for the opening of accession negotiations with the EU, the JDP government appears to have lost direction. Erdogan has spent an increasing amount of his time on overseas trips. While in Turkey he has been insulated against both domestic disarray and a host of impending problems with the EU by the blandishments of a coterie of trusted advisors. The one area in which Erdogan does appear to be aware of problems is in Turkey's relations with the US. During the late 1990s Washington vigorously supported what at one time appeared to be nascent strategic alliance between Turkey and Israel, its two key allies in the region. But the recent problems in relations between Turkey and Israel -- and the increasingly warm ties between Ankara, Damascus and Teheran -- have been accompanied by a chill in the JDP's relations with the Bush administration, mainly as a result of the US-led war against, and occupation of, Iraq. It took 10 months before Turkey last week finally approved a US request to use its airbase in Incirlik for logistical supplies to American troops in Iraq. While the corridors of Ankara have recently been buzzing with rumours ranging from suggestions that the US is planning to relocate all of its military presence in Turkey to the Balkans to reports -- hotly denied by the government -- that Erdogan has considered withdrawing Turkey from NATO for fear that it will be used to attack Iran in the next stage of what Washington calls its "war on terrorism". But the JDP is also aware that, however uncomfortable it may be with US policies, Turkey still needs good ties with Washington; not just political support, such as backing Turkey's efforts to join the EU, but also economically. Although the Turkish economy has bounced back from the devastating currency collapse and recession of 2001, continued growth is heavily dependent on support from the IMF and the World Bank, both of which are heavily influenced by Washington. During their meeting in Jerusalem, Erdogan and the Israeli prime minister agreed to establish a direct "red telephone" line between their offices, further boost bilateral trade -- which currently stands at over $1.5 billion a year -- and hold detailed discussions on cooperation in the defence industry. But Erdogan's hopes that Turkey could boost its international prestige by brokering peace talks between the Israelis and the Palestinians were dashed by the Israelis. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that Erdogan's decision to re-engage with Israel will have played well in Washington and may even be sufficient to secure him a meeting with senior administration officials when he visits the US at the end of the month. However, whether these meetings can produce solutions to the numerous suspicions and disagreements which currently characterise US-Turkish relations remains to be seen. Despite Erdogan's visit, privately JDP officials insist that nothing has changed in the government's attitude towards Israel and the Sharon government, particularly its treatment of the Palestinians. Nor is there any reason to believe that the feelings of the Turkish have changed. When Erdogan's trip was first announced, government officials were quick to add that he would also be visiting the Al-Aqsa Mosque and meeting representatives of the Palestinian government in Ramallah. But Erdogan only spent a relatively brief time with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and had to cancel a one-to-one meeting with Prime Minister Ahmed Qurei after his meetings with Israeli officials overran; making if very difficult for the JDP to argue that the visit was a joint one to both Israel and the Palestinians. Given his failure to secure Turkey a role as peace-broker, and given the depth of anti-Israeli feeling in Turkey, Erdogan now needs a substantial gesture from Washington if he is to avoid a domestic political backlash.
