The killing of Egyptian diplomat Ehab El-Sherif has exploded into an issue of global concern and debate. Its timing -- on the same day that a series of bombs exploded in London, and just two weeks after Iraq announced that Egypt would be the first Arab nation to name an ambassador to Baghdad -- lent the incident even greater weight, turning it into a possible watershed moment for the future of Iraq, the region and perhaps even the world as a whole. How Egypt will react to the brutal slaying of its senior diplomatic envoy at the hands of an Al-Qaeda splinter group that has joined the militant insurgency in Iraq may hold the keys to vital questions about whether Baghdad will eventually emerge from the waves of chaos that threaten to engulf it, and whether the world can help Iraq avoid a sectarian future full of strife. Al-Ahram Weekly Editor-in-Chief Assem El-Kersh spoke with Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Abul-Gheit about these pressing issues and more Allow me to start with a rather undiplomatic question: what will Egypt do to avenge the murder of Ehab El-Sherif? It is not just about Ehab El-Sherif. We also lost Egyptian diplomats overseas to terrorism in Islamabad in 1995 [when nine members of the Egyptian Embassy's staff were killed in a bomb attack]. Avenging the murder of Ambassador Ehab El-Sherif is a task to be undertaken on two parallel tracks: when it comes to diplomacy, I believe the best way to avenge Ehab El-Sherif's murder is for Egypt to stay the course with its mission in Iraq -- because that was the mission El-Sherif aimed to serve when he went to Baghdad in the first place. Egyptian diplomacy's regional and international role will not be undermined by such heinous acts, and Egypt will not be terrorised. As for other measures to be duly decided by the state, Egypt is perfectly capable of avenging the killing of its diplomats overseas, whether in Iraq or Islamabad. Our goal is not revenge: I want to stress this point. We want to right the wrong that has been done. Will Egypt be looking to the UN Security Council, for instance? Is that one aspect of the measures Egypt intends to take? Egypt has been stressing the need for collective anti-terrorism measures for years, but we have always encountered a problem related to the lack of consensus over the definition of terrorism. I think, however, that this is gradually changing: there is an increasing acceptance that all attacks targetting innocent civilians should qualify as acts of terror. I think if there is consensus on this definition, then we can move ahead towards an international conference, and maybe an international agreement, on measures of combating terrorism that go beyond UN Security Council Resolution 1373, which currently represents the international legal framework for collective anti- terrorism measures [including specific economic and political measures]. I think we need to agree that if resistance transgresses into attacks against innocent civilians, then it is no longer resistance, but terrorism. But there are cases where civilians are not exactly civilians in the real sense of the word... Those who live in occupied territories and carry arms are part of the framework of occupation. And we can easily identify them. Will Egypt need to send troops to Iraq as part of its plan to avenge this heinous act? We cannot send our men into a situation where neither the Iraqis nor the over 170,000 foreign forces on the ground and 40,000 forces at sea are able to provide security. We cannot send our troops to shoot at Iraqi people, nor is this an issue that should be raised. Not even as part of Arab peace-keeping forces? And would those really be peace- keeping forces? They would be more like peace-imposing forces. In any case, keeping the peace has proved illusive for the US and other forces in Iraq. We made our decision on this issue more than a year ago, and our position still stands. So what role are we really pursuing in Iraq? Egyptian diplomacy's number one objective involves knowing and communicating with all the elements involved in the current Iraqi equation. Until April 2003, Iraq was a country governed by a central government, and all Iraqis were referred to as such. There was no references to Shiites, Sunnis, Kurds and Turkmans, as is the case now. Today, we see evidence of sectarian quotas when top government posts are allocated. And this is not something we are not happy about. Our mission is to prevent this sectarianism from escalating. We want Iraq to remain intact as a united nation that can be governed by a federal or central government, depending on the Iraqi people's wishes. And to serve this objective, Egypt has been heavily involved in many regional and international meetings and conferences. Our second objective is to see a new Iraq emerging out of the current situation. We want to see a safe, stable and united Iraq that is democratically governed and capable of assuming its role within the Arab world. Our third objective is to see an Iraq capable of defending itself and imposing the rule of law on its territories -- an Iraq that does not need the presence of foreign troops. But are we making any progress on any of these fronts? The game is still in play. It's unclear where it might go, but I can tell you that we hope, and are working hard, to make sure it does not take Iraq towards a civil war scenario. Does this mean we have to support a government under occupation? First of all, with the end of US Civil Administrator Paul Bremer's mission in Iraq and the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1546, the international community sees Iraq as a government under occupation. As a matter of fact, this resolution refers to the presence of foreign troops as coalition, rather than occupation, forces. Resolution 1546 provided a framework for the political process in Iraq that aims to build a strong army and police forces, and to draft a consensual constitution and to hold free and fair elections. Obviously, there are questions about how we might arrive at these objectives, and whether or not the political process will lead us there. There are questions regarding whether or not Iraqis will overcome their limited sectarian concerns (even if legitimate), and concern themselves more with common Iraqi interests. And there are questions about Iraqis' ability to form secular political parties that could compete on the basis of a political agenda rather than sectarian religious beliefs. We hope that maybe by 2006 or 2007, the situation will evolve in a positive direction. In any case, working outside the UN's framework will certainly not lead to any sort of positive result. How will Ehab El-Sherif's murder affect the role Egypt plans to play in this process? Many see it as a slap in the face... It was certainly a grave insult. But Egypt's confrontation with such [terrorist] groups is an old one -- 20 or 30 years old. They killed Ehab El-Sherif in this battle, but the war goes on. Is pursuing Al-Zarqawi part of the war? This matter does not fall within the jurisdiction of the foreign minister. Have we decided what we want to do next in Iraq? We are with the Iraqi people who want to see the current tragedy in Iraq coming to an end. We are with the Iraqis who want to emerge from the dark tunnel, and build a stable and capable country that is in control, and does not need the presence of foreign troops. Do you have clear criteria regarding the difference between resistance and insurgency in Iraq? I have my criteria, but am not willing to share them. So what is your next step? It's too early to decide. For now, we are temporarily downsizing our mission in Iraq, and will reassess the entire situation before making any decisions. But the Egyptian role in Iraq will continue? The Egyptian role will continue. They will not stop Egypt's diplomatic or political role at the regional or international levels. Egypt will continue to pursue its role, and the Egyptian flag will continue to fly in Iraq. And will Egypt support a timetable for withdrawal of foreign forces? The trouble with that kind of a timetable is that it could prompt all the forces on the Iraqi scene to start jockeying for positions. This could lead to a civil war and this would be a much worse scenario than the one we have now. The way out is to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1546 as soon as possible. This is what Egypt aims for. But are we doing enough? Egypt and Iran, for instance, used to have equally influential roles in Iraq, whereas today Iran... This is simply not true. [Former Iraqi Prime Minister] Iyad Allawi was here not so long ago. And Iran is a different story, because some 60 per cent of Iraqis are Shiites, and many of the leading Iraqi figures have sought refuge and lived in Iran for a long time. Moreover, Iran is Iraq's direct and immediate neighbour. So this is a different story altogether. In any case, the Iraqi government says that it administers its relations with Iran to serve Iraqi national interests. This is an argument that we accept. In short, we have our contacts with all Iraqis. We talk to the Shiites, the Sunnis -- who are now acting somewhat subdued -- and all the others. And it is important to note that it is one thing to work, and quite another to talk about your work. We prefer to work quietly. It is being widely argued that this incident is symbolic of an overall decline in Egyptian prestige on the global scene... Those who argue that Egypt's status is on the decline are simply unable to read the map of international politics in today's world. On 31 December 1991 the map changed: a single super power emerged in the wake of NATO's victory over the Warsaw Pact. Today, NATO stands at Russia's doorstep, and the US secretary of state can go to Moscow and express views that may not necessarily be to Moscow's liking. This is a very important matter that we should not loose sight of when we are trying to assess Egypt's role. On 11 September 2001, the world's sole super power was hit hard, and it reacted unreservedly. The strikes we saw in Afghanistan and Iraq were a far cry from earlier US containment efforts in Somalia, for example. These are strategic facts that have to be considered by those who do not wish to have their fingers burned. But let me talk tactics in response to those who claim that Egypt's role has been on the decline. In the framework of the UN, Egypt is making its voice heard loud and clear. Egypt's ability to push for, or hinder, certain resolutions or political lines is very well known. The last NPT [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty] review conference was a good example. When it comes to Iraq, Egypt is present at every regional and international conference. Egypt is a member of the Iraq Steering Committee and it was not long ago that Egypt -- along with the US, EU, Russia and the UN -- held a preparatory meeting before the recent major donor conference that took place in Brussels. So those who say that Egypt's role is on the decline must instead look at the Egyptian flag side by side with the flags of the US, Russia, the EU and the UN. On Palestine, it was Egypt that hosted the Sharm El-Sheikh summit to make sure that the withdrawal plan is implemented in coordination with the Palestinians in a prompt and careful way. And on Sudan, Egypt has its role -- as a signatory of the signing of the Nevashah protocols that settled the North-South dispute. On 18 June, Egypt hosted a North-North dialogue. And Egypt is now pursuing an active role in relation to Darfur. Meanwhile, Egypt's presence in Africa is strong as well. President Mubarak attended the NEPAD summit in Algeria and hosted a follow up summit in Sharm El-Sheikh. He went to Abudja to attend the African Union summit and then attended a follow up African summit in Sirte. So, as you can well see, Egypt is there, and its role is active, not declining -- not declining at all. Your argument is easily countered by the fact that Libya's role in Sudan is much more influential, that Egypt is not the most important mediator in the Palestine track, and that Cairo's relations with Washington are not exactly in their best shape... You are overlooking the financial limitations imposed on the foreign policy budget. If there were around LE3 billion available for foreign policy, then maybe much of what you said wouldn't be true. That said, we are exerting maximum effort to make sure that our resources are well invested, and that our diplomacy is doing its job properly. But even when Egypt plays an important role, you seem to start at an impressive level, then follow up with very timid steps. For example, Egypt is not involved in drafting the Iraqi constitution... This is a particularly sensitive issue. You cannot just send judges and legal experts to Iraq where they would be threatened. This said, we could -- if asked -- provide our expertise from, say, Amman. But our expertise has not been solicited. We have offered our help, but the Iraqis feel that they have all the cadres they need. It is understandable. After all, Iraq gained its independence in the early decades of the 20th century. This said, there have been cases where we trained Iraqi diplomats and Iraqi managers upon their government's request.
