Facing up to terrorism should mean confronting the motives and aims of terrorists, not just their operational capacity, writes Adel Darwish* Following last week's second attempt to bomb London, an American friend e-mailed his support calling the terror attacks "your 9/11". I said I hope "7/7" doesn't lead Britain to the route the United States foreign policy took after 9/11, or lead to a policy that would tear the social fabric of the colourful legacy of the British empire. Britain had centuries-long experience dealing with terrorism, overseas and on the mainland during the Irish Republican Army (IRA) terror campaign that claimed over 3,600 lives in Britain and Ireland and which was largely funded by American sympathisers, yet no British prime minister accused America of sponsoring terrorism or issued any "with us or against us" ultimatum. Amazingly, American security agencies gave little notice to the skills and methods tested on the British side of the Atlantic, acquired over decades and successfully deployed by very capable and experienced officers in MI5 and the Special Branch of Scotland Yard. Of course, the threat is global. Look how the terrorists timed their two attacks on London with the attack in Egypt and the kidnapping and murdering of the Egyptian ambassador to Iraq; the second London attack coming just 30 hours before the cowardly bombing of Sharm El-Sheikh. Note also how leaders of Muslim nations that suffered attacks were among the first to express support for, and send intelligence officers to, London. Nonetheless, America's concept of a "global war on terror" has been proven -- by "7/7", 21/7 and the Sharm bombings -- to be ineffective in making our capital, and other cities like Madrid and Sharm El-Sheikh, safer. It is even counter- productive. It is essential to understand that the perpetrators of the 7/7 and Sharm El-Sheikh bombings are more than just a manifestation of an abstract "global terrorism"; they are murderers with personal histories, relationships and cultural backgrounds. Building a profile of a "would-be- terrorist" is an important step to prevent him or her from placing the next bomb on a train; a task more in line with traditional British policing and preventative security agencies' work in the Middle East than with America's war on terror as currently managed. A terrorist needs a motive, operational capability and a strategic aim. The counter plan is to remove the motives, reduce or destroy operational capabilities and/or make terrorist aims less achievable. A careful balance is imperative to avoid losing over the long-term regarding motives and aims. The Afghanistan campaign is a case in point, being a success in severely disrupting terrorist operational capabilities by ending their safe-haven. Compared to its status in 2001, Al-Qaeda today is less a cohesive organisation than a cult made of a number of ideologically linked groups, with reduced capabilities -- they would have exploded more bombs in the past two weeks if they could -- desperate to prove they are still in business, to the point that two groups claimed responsibility for London, unlike the old, strong Al-Qaeda that kept us guessing after each atrocity. The credit for pushing Al-Qaeda back goes to the Afghanistan campaign. In contrast, the less popular Iraq campaign had the opposite effect. It created new motives for fresh terrorist movements, recruitment opportunities for more angry young Muslims, and a haven for Afghanistan-trained extremists. Although some American analysts welcomed the unintended consequence of "placing many of the world's terrorists in one location to deal with them wholesale", the high price paid putting theory to the test is unjustified for us in Britain with our historic interests in a region to which Americans are new arrivals. America's war model turned Afghanistan's success into a fiasco, undermining the war on terror by failing to deploy tested British anti-crime intelligence and evidence gathering methods when hundreds of international suspects where still in Afghanistan. Instead of quietly keeping them under surveillance, intercepting their communications, gathering valuable intelligence and collecting evidence for safe convictions, the Americans roughly rounded up bystanders while letting hardened fighters flee. This was followed by intensive, often illegal, interrogations using torture in notorious places like Guantanamo, Bagram airbase and Abu Ghraib, "with little or no intelligence value", according to a senior British intelligence expert who is not alone in despairing at American methods that swelled the sense of grievance among young Muslims, propelling them towards violence. Unlike traditional terror groups whom in the past had stated a clear -- or at least a recognisable -- aim, Al-Qaeda and its affiliates are not clear about their aims. While we recognise, even understand, the motives and operational capabilities of Al-Qaeda and its associate groups, their strategic aim is almost impossible to comprehend, as it is unidentifiable. It is not clear what constitutes a "victory", and if achieved would they switch from violence to politics? While Jewish organisations in Mandate Palestine, ETA, the PLO or the IRA, were all ready to decommission arms for political gains, Al-Qaeda's aim is unclear. It seems a mixture of anarchy and nihilism. "We love death more than you love life," their leaders threaten the West. Their absurd earlier aim of creating a worldwide theological autocracy, or khelapha, was replaced by a tactical objective to change our way of life and erode our democracy that they loathe as kufr (ungodly). By annihilating all -- including themselves -- Al-Qaeda terrorists try to force their victims' societies to change their nature and accept a gradual erosion of liberty. If New Labour politicians use the London attacks as an excuse for illiberal measures like introducing national ID cards -- which couldn't have prevented "7/7" -- they will hand the terrorists a tactical victory on a platter, the way the Spaniards unwisely did by pulling their troops out of Iraq after the Madrid bombings. Britain is admired in the Middle East where its democracy is a model to which liberal Muslims aspire. "It is our duty to join Britain in a front against terrorism," was the message of many Muslim imams during last Friday's sermon. Arabic language commentators said London was "the capital of the Free Middle East", in editorials lambasting London-based clerics and Muslim extremists in Britain and in the region who glorify suicide bombers in Israel and Iraq. Many questioned why one of those clerics, Sheikh Youssef Al-Qardawi, was given a red-carpet reception by left-wing London Mayor Ken Livingston last year, against the advice of Middle East experts and Muslim and Jewish leaders. The work of reducing the "motives" that help terrorist commanders recruit volunteers could be furthered by shrinking the platforms from which messages of hatred are delivered, and by disqualifying the messengers. Honouring them, security experts and moderate Muslims say, severely undermines international efforts against the kind of evil that hit London and Sharm El-Sheikh recently. * The author is a veteran Fleet Street reporter on foreign affairs.
